People v. Morris

39 Citing briefs

  1. PEOPLE v. GOMEZ

    Appellant’s Opening Brief

    Filed March 21, 2012

    Speculation, of course, is not enough.(See, e.g., People v. Morris, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 21; People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 735; Juan H. v. Allen, supra, 408 F.3d at pp. 1277-1278.) Becausethe case against Gomez rested on no more thanthat, his conviction for the murder of Raul Luna mustbe reversed.

  2. PEOPLE v. TULLY (RICHARD C.)

    Appellant's Reply Brief

    Filed September 23, 2010

    State law error also occurred and,in light of the prosecution’s improper lack of remorse arguments, there is a reasonable possibility that the jury would not have sentenced Appellant to death if the trial court had granted his request to allocute. (See Brown, supra, 46 Cal.3d at 448). Principles of due process, the rightto a fair trial, to a reliable penalty determination, and to equal protection under the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as state law, required that Appellant be allowed to address the jury before his sentencing.

  3. PEOPLE v. GHOBRIAL

    Appellant’s Opening Brief

    Filed May 26, 2011

    If the evidence wasinsufficient to support a lewd-act felony murder conviction, the corresponding attempted lewd act felony murder special circumstance must also be reversed. (See People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 530; People v. Morris, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 21-23; People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 41.) This murder,like all murders, is horrible, and the facts of this case are particularly unsettling.

  4. PEOPLE v. MORA

    Appellant, Ruben Rangel, Opening Brief

    Filed July 28, 2010

    To satisfy this due process standard and to avoid an affirmance based primarily on speculation, conjecture, guesswork, or supposition, the record must contain substantial evidence of each of the essential elements. (People v. Morris, supra, 46 Cal.3d 1, 21, overruled on other groundsin Jn re Sassounian, supra, 9 Cal.4th 535, 543.) The test for the sufficiency of a special circumstance finding is essentially the same; this Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state and determine whetheranyrational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the allegation beyond a reasonable doubt.

  5. PEOPLE v. MORA

    Appellant, Joseph Adam Mora, Opening Brief

    Filed December 10, 2009

    ) To satisfy this due process standard and to avoid an affirmance based primarily on speculation, conjecture, guesswork or supposition, the record must contain substantial evidence of each of the essential elements. (People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 21, overruled on other grounds in Jn re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 543.) In order for the evidence to be “substantial,” it must be “ofponderable legal significance . . . reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value.”

  6. PEOPLE v. JONES (BRYAN MAURICE)

    Respondent’s Brief

    Filed September 28, 2006

    Appellant presented no evidence that either Maria or his mother’s recollection would have beenbetter if the charges were broughtin 1990 rather than 1992,so like the claim in Morris, appellant’s claim was properly denied as speculative. (People v. Morris, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 38.) Andas the court found followingtrial, it was completely speculative as to whether the “preacher” who went to appellant’s mother’s home could have been found if the attempted murder of Maria had been filed earlier.

  7. PEOPLE v. JOHNSON (BILLY JOE)

    Appellant’s Opening Brief

    Filed December 26, 2013

    A reasonable inference, however, “may not be based on suspicion alone, or on imagination, speculation, supposition, surmise, conjecture, or guess work.[§] ... A finding of fact must be an inference drawn from evidence rather than ... a mere speculation as to probabilities without evidence.” In the absence of any sub- -57- stantial evidence . . . , we must conclude that the evidence will not support a conviction ... (People v. Morris, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 21, italics in original, internal cita- tions omitted.) Did Miller not suspect what was going to occur?

  8. PEOPLE v. POWELL

    Appellant’s Reply Brief

    Filed November 27, 2013

    Thetrial court’s series of tenuous inferencesis contrary to the weight of the evidence and does not add up to a valid inference of racial animus,let alone sufficient justification to allow the white supremacist gang evidence admittedhere. 37 Asthis Court pointed out in People v. Morris, supra, 46 Cal.3d 1, 21, (overruled on another point in Jn re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 543), the record must contain substantial evidence. In order for the evidence to be "substantial," it must be "of ponderable legal significance . . . reasonablein nature, credible, and of solid value."

  9. PEOPLE v. CAGE (MICKY RAY)

    Appellant’s Opening Brief

    Filed March 14, 2011

    The jury may baseits findings on “reasonable inferences,” but cannot rely on “suspicion alone, or on imagination, speculation, supposition, surmise, conjecture, or guess work.” (People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 21 [internal citations omitted].) The California Supreme Court has confronted a case similar to.

  10. PEOPLE v. BANKS

    Appellant’s Opening Brief

    Filed October 30, 2008

    The jury could not reasonably infer, absent speculation, that the gunman harbored the specific intent to steal. (See People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 21 ["A reasonable inference ... may not be based on suspicion alone, or on imagination, speculation, supposition, surmise, conjecture or guess work .... A finding of fact must be an inference drawn from the evidence rather than ... a mere speculation as to probabilities without evidence."]; People v. Reyes, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 500; People v. Trevino (1985) 39 Cal.3d 667, 698-699.