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People v. Mays

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento)
Jun 28, 2019
No. C083884 (Cal. Ct. App. Jun. 28, 2019)

Opinion

C083884

06-28-2019

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BRIAN JAMES MAYS, Defendant and Appellant.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 12F05993)

In 2012, after his car swerved into a school district police officer's lane, the officer pulled over defendant Brian James Mays and arrested him for driving under the influence. Defendant failed to appear to respond to the charges against him and a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. In 2016 defendant was in custody and arraigned. Defendant waived jury trial. The court found defendant guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol with a blood alcohol level of .08 or greater and within 10 years of being convicted of vehicular manslaughter without gross negligence. It sentenced him to five years in state prison and in so doing treated the vehicular manslaughter conviction as a strike. Defendant appeals, arguing that in assessing his prior manslaughter conviction as a strike the court improperly determined that he personally inflicted great bodily injury or death, and the court erred in denying his motion to dismiss, a motion premised on the failure of law enforcement officials to retain the blood samples taken following his arrest. We shall affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

One evening in February 2012, Officer Justin Stanley drove his marked patrol car in the slow lane. Defendant drove ahead of Officer Stanley in the middle lane. Suddenly, defendant turned into the slow lane, causing Officer Stanley to slam on his brakes to avoid hitting defendant.

As defendant turned into a parking lot, Officer Stanley activated his emergency lights and pulled up behind defendant's car. Officer Stanley asked defendant for his license and defendant offered some documents, but not his license. After Officer Stanley renewed his request, defendant produced a California Identification Card.

In response to the officer's question about alcohol, defendant stated he had had two drinks. Officer Stanley asked defendant to get out of his car in order to conduct sobriety tests. As defendant walked to the front of the car he tripped on the smooth parking surface. The officer smelled a strong odor of alcohol when defendant exited the car and noted defendant slurred his speech.

Officer Stanley questioned defendant about what he had been drinking. Defendant stated he had begun drinking around 11:00 a.m. and had two drinks called "crogs" or "crocs." In response to the officer's question about prescription drugs, defendant said he took two "Norcos," painkillers for pancreatitis, at noon and ate a small piece of a marijuana brownie. Defendant stated he ate the brownie at 7:00 p.m. However, Officer Stanley had been in contact with defendant since 6:30 p.m. and defendant had not consumed a brownie during that time. At Officer Stanley's request, defendant performed a series of sobriety tests, which he performed poorly. The tests were videotaped and played during the court trial.

The video is not part of the appellate record.

Based on Officer Stanley's observations and interactions with defendant, the officer determined defendant had been driving under the influence of alcohol and arrested him. Defendant elected to have his blood drawn to ascertain his blood alcohol level. School District Officer Cory Yen transported defendant to jail where his blood was drawn by the jail's phlebotomist.

The Sacramento County District Attorney's Laboratory of Forensic Services tested defendant's blood. The tests showed defendant's blood alcohol level was .31 percent.

In September 2012 an amended complaint was filed charging defendant with, count one, driving under the influence of alcohol within ten years of being convicted of vehicular manslaughter without gross negligence; and, count two, driving with a blood alcohol level of .08 or greater within 10 years of being convicted of vehicular manslaughter without gross negligence. (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (b); Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b); Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (b).) The amended complaint also alleged that defendant served a prior prison term and had a prior strike conviction on May 23, 2008, for vehicular manslaughter without gross negligence. (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b); 667, subds. (b)-(i) & 1170.12, 191.5, subd. (b).)

Defendant failed to appear and a bench warrant was issued. In January 2016 defendant was in custody and arraigned on the complaint.

Subsequently, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence and a motion to dismiss based on a failure to preserve the blood drawn at the time of his arrest. Defendant also filed a motion to dismiss his prior conviction in the interest of justice, arguing it did not qualify as a strike. The trial court denied the motions.

Defendant waived a jury trial. In addition, defendant waived a jury trial on the prior conviction allegation. Defendant filed a motion in limine arguing his prior conviction did not qualify as a strike.

The court held a bifurcated trial on the prior conviction allegation. The court found the prior conviction true and found it qualified as a strike because defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury or death during its commission.

Defendant filed a motion for a new trial challenging the strike finding. After denying the motion for a new trial, the court sentenced defendant to five years in state prison as follows: two years, the middle term on count two, doubled to four years due to the prior strike, plus one year for the prior prison term; two years on count two, stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

I

Determination of Prior Strike

Defendant argues the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment rights and improperly determined he personally inflicted great bodily injury or death during his prior manslaughter conviction. He also contends his conduct did not constitute the personal infliction of great bodily injury or death because he did not intend to inflict such injury.

Background

As noted, defendant waived his right to a jury trial. Immediately afterward the following exchange took place:

Prosecutor: "I would also ask the Court to inquire if [defendant] would waive jury on prior as well as specifically waive the determination of whether he . . . I mean waive the jury making a determination on whether he personally inflicted great bodily injury or death on that prior. He is entitled to a jury determination on that under People v. Marin [(2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1344]."

The Court: "Right, and that is implicit, but I will, however, inquire specifically as to those points.

"In the terms of enhancements, there are enhancements on this underlying charge, prior convictions and whether one of those priors amounts to a strike prior. Every single issue that is at issue in this case, you are entitled to have a jury decide that as opposed to the court.

"Do you wish to waive jury trial and have the Court decide it after trial on those matters?"

Defendant: "Yes, Your Honor."

The Court: "All right. And all counsel join in the waivers?"

Defense Counsel no. 1: "Join."

Defense Counsel no. 2: "Join."

Prosecutor: "Join."

The Court: "The Court finds a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of rights to a jury trial on all matters pending before this Court in connection with fact finding, and the Court will then declare that . . . based on that waiver, a jury will not be impaneled, and the Court will try the case instead."

After the court found defendant guilty on the underlying offense, proceedings on the strike allegation followed. The prosecution introduced evidence regarding the prior allegation, including the plea, abstract of judgment, complaint, and reporter's transcript. The documents were admitted without objection.

In the prior proceeding defendant agreed to plead no contest to the lesser included offense of vehicular manslaughter without gross negligence in exchange for a two-year prison sentence. The court requested the factual basis for the plea. The prosecutor stated: "On January 16th 2007, at approximately 12:30 a.m., the defendant, while driving under the influence of alcohol, northbound on I-5 in excess of the posted speed limit, did clip the back of the victim's car while making an unsafe turning movement which caused the victim's vehicle to spin into a barrel roll. The victim . . . died as a result of the injuries received in that collision. [¶] At approximately 1:40 a.m., the defendant's blood was drawn at UC Davis medical center and his blood alcohol level was a point one seven." The parties agreed the prosecutor accurately summarized the evidence. The court informed defendant of his rights and defendant entered a no contest plea. Defendant acknowledged that the no contest plea equated to a guilty plea.

In the case before us, the trial court heard argument on whether the prior offense constituted a serious felony and found that it did. Under Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (c), the court reasoned, "if the Defendant's prior Penal Code Section 191.5(b) conviction involved the personal infliction of great bodily injury on any person other than an accomplice, or the personal use of a dangerous or deadly weapon, it constitutes a serious felony under 1192.7(c), sub (a) and/or sub (23)."

The court continued: "Here the evidence is uncontroverted that there was a personal infliction of great bodily injury under the law, as set forth, on a person other than an accomplice, and that concern, an issue raised by the defense really, and the thrust of the arguments presented, has more to do with whether the Defendant intended this as opposed to what the law proscribes. [¶] The law doesn't require the element of the Defendant's intent being in there. It simply requires that the crime—that the mens rea for the crime itself, which resulted in the death here was met. [¶] The mens rea was met, and by the way of a number of volitional acts in connection with that: [¶] The Defendant volitionally drinking alcohol, ingesting alcohol. [¶] The Defendant volitionally getting into the car. [¶] The Defendant volitionally driving down the freeway. [¶] The Defendant volitionally driving at an excessive speed. The Defendant volitionally making an unsafe lane change. [¶] And the Defendant then hitting the victim's car, the direct result of which was that the victim dies."

In the court's view the only issue presented was whether there was direct culpability as opposed to derivative culpability: "The Defendant has direct culpability under the law, and based on . . . the facts set forth in this case because he directly caused that accident. He directly broke the law, as a result of which the victim died. . . . [H]e wasn't assisting somebody or he wasn't aiding and abetting somebody who directly did that. His hands were on the wheel. His foot was on the accelerator. That is how that happened, and that's all the law requires." The court characterized defense counsel's argument as "that this seems to be an awfully consequential result for this offense" and that "it's not as grave or serious as some other strike priors might be." The court noted this argument would be considered in the defendant's Romero motion. The court concluded the People met their burden beyond a reasonable doubt.

People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.

In defendant's motion for a new trial, defense counsel argued defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel stemming from counsel's failure to object to the factual basis in the plea transcript as hearsay. Defense counsel also challenged the trial court's finding that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury or death as contrary to law.

The court denied the motion. As for the ineffective assistance claim, the court found defense counsel understood that the statements regarding the factual basis for the plea were admissible as an adoptive admission. Nor did defendant or defense counsel challenge the court's recitation of the facts at the change of plea hearing. The trial court noted there was an affirmative admission: "The Defendant's counsel states that the People, in assenting to the Court's question, have accurately summarized their evidence, the facts that were set forth a moment ago, and the Defendant himself, in entering the no contest, not only is not just standing there declining to deny the allegation, he is affirmatively adopting it. He's not contesting it. He could oppose it. He is accepting it."

The court also addressed defendant's request for a new trial because the court's finding was contrary to law. As the court summed up the evidence before it: "Defendant was unequivocally the individual who drove the vehicle, violated the law, caused the accident that resulted in the death, he has sustained a strike conviction under the law of this state."

Discussion

Defendant contends the trial court erred in resolving disputed factual issues and relying on the reporter's transcript of the plea in determining defendant's prior was a strike. However, even assuming the court was authorized to rely on the record, the court erred in finding defendant's failure to respond to the prosecution's recitation of the factual basis constituted an adoptive admission. As a final fall back, defendant argues the record does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the vehicular manslaughter conviction was a strike.

The trial court informed defendant he had the right to a jury trial to determine whether he personally inflicted great bodily injury or death during the prior vehicular manslaughter, rendering his prior conviction a strike. The court asked: "Do you wish to waive jury and have the Court decide it after a trial on those matters? Defendant responded "Yes, Your Honor." Defendant unequivocally waived his right to a jury trial on the issue.

The court subsequently considered the plea colloquy from the vehicular manslaughter case. In the earlier case, defendant acknowledged that, while driving under the influence of alcohol, his vehicle clipped the back of the victim's car while making an unsafe turning move. The victim's car spun into a barrel roll resulting in the victim's death. A trial court, in determining the character of a prior conviction, may consider the statutory definition, charging documents, written plea agreement, transcript of the plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial court to which the defendant assented or confirmed. (People v. Marin (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1344, 1364.)

Defendant contends his assent to the factual basis in the plea transcript did not constitute an adoptive admission. However, defendant failed to object on hearsay grounds. Accordingly, defense counsel sought a new trial on the court's strike finding, arguing counsel performed ineffectively in failing to raise a hearsay objection to the prosecutor's recitation of the factual basis for the prior plea.

In order to establish ineffective assistance, defendant must show counsel's performance was deficient and defendant suffered prejudice as a result of the deficient performance. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-692 .) Since the trial court is best situated to ascertain the competency of counsel, we do not disturb the court's decision absent a showing of clear and unmistakable abuse. (People v. Wallin (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 479, 483.) Considering the record before us, we can find neither deficient performance nor resulting prejudice.

The normal rules of hearsay apply to evidence admitted as part of the record of conviction to show the conduct underlying the conviction. (People v. Woodell (1998) 17 Cal.4th 448, 458.) "Evidence of a statement offered against a party is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is one of which the party, with knowledge of the content thereof, has by words or other conduct manifested his adoption or his belief in its truth." (Evid. Code, § 1221.) As pertinent here, " ' "when a person makes a statement in the presence of a party to an action under circumstances that would normally call for a response if the statement were untrue, the statement is admissible for the limited purpose of showing the party's reaction to it. [Citations.] His silence, evasion, or equivocation may be considered a tacit admission of the statements made in his presence." ' " (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 661.)

We determine whether a statement constitutes an adoptive admission based upon the facts and circumstances surrounding the statement. (People v. Roberts (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1121.) To be an adoptive admission, there must be sufficient evidence to sustain a finding that the defendant heard and understood the statement under circumstances calling for a response, and the defendant adopted the statement as true by the defendant's words or conduct. (People v. Sample (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1262 (Sample).)

Here, the trial court solicited the factual basis for the plea in the prior vehicular manslaughter case. The prosecutor stated defendant, driving under the influence of alcohol, clipped the victim's car and sent it into a barrel roll. The victim died as a result of the accident. The court asked defense counsel if the summation was accurate; defense counsel agreed it was. The court asked if counsel or defendant would offer any amendments and counsel declined. Defendant heard and understood the statement, and by failing to respond and maintaining his no contest plea adopted the statement as true.

As the court in Sample observed: "Generally, both parties to a plea agreement are expected to pay careful attention during a plea colloquy to ensure the formalities necessary for its validity are met and the record accurately reflects the parties' agreement. The possibility of future consequences, including the application of habitual offender statutes, further necessitates the parties ensure the record accurately reflects the factual basis for the plea. Therefore . . . a defendant would normally and reasonably be expected to object to or respond to the prosecution's factual recital if the factual recital did not accurately reflect the circumstances of the offense to which the defendant was pleading guilty or no contest." (Sample, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 1265.)

Finally, defendant argues the prosecution must show he intended to inflict great bodily injury or death in order for his prior conviction to qualify as a strike. The trial court rejected defendant's argument, noting defendant directly caused the accident which resulted in the victim's death.

Vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is not among the offenses labeled violent or serious felonies to support imposition of a strike. (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (d)(1), 667.5, 1192.7, subd. (c).) However, any felony in which the defendant personally inflicts great bodily injury on any person qualifies as a strike. (Pen. Code, § 1192.7, subd. (c)(8).) This includes vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated with gross negligence or without gross negligence, if, in the commission of the crime, the defendant personally inflicts great bodily injury on another person who is not an accomplice. (People v. Gonzales (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1684, 1695-1699.) In order for defendant's prior conviction to qualify as a strike under Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8) the prosecution was not required to prove defendant intended to cause great bodily injury. (Gonzales, at pp. 1695-1699; People v. Guzman (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 761, 763-764 (Guzman).)

As the court found, defendant, while intoxicated and driving, clipped the back of the victim's car while making an unsafe turning move causing the car to roll, killing the victim. Defendant's actions were no less volitional than those that caused the collision and death in Guzman.

In Guzman, the defendant while intoxicated made an unsafe left turn causing a collision that resulted in an injury to another person. (Guzman, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 763.) On appeal, the defendant argued he did not personally inflict the injury because the other driver involved in the accident was the person who directly performed the act that caused the injury. (Id. at p. 763.) The court disagreed, finding: "Here, appellant turned his vehicle into oncoming traffic. This volitional act was the direct cause of the collision and therefore was the direct cause of the injury. Appellant was not merely an accomplice. Thus appellant personally inflicted the injury . . . . " (Id. at p. 764.) As in Guzman, defendant's unsafe turning movement was the volitional act that was the direct cause of the collision. The court did not err in imposing the strike.

II

Motion to Dismiss

In his motion to dismiss, defendant argued the prosecution failed to properly preserve his blood samples and thereby prevented the samples from being retested. Defendant contends that in finding law enforcement complied with appropriate procedures the trial court misinterpreted the law.

Background

The court heard the following evidence:

Officer Yen testified that he took custody of defendant's blood after it was drawn on February 24, 2012. He deposited the blood in the crime lab's evidence pickup locker.

A criminalist with the District Attorney's Laboratory of Forensic Services, Karen Buckman, testified she picked up defendant's blood from the locker on February 27, 2012. On May 30, 2012, she tested the sample. The samples were refrigerated until August 22, 2012, when they were returned to the police department. Buckman stated she was familiar with California Code of Regulations, title 17 (hereafter title 17) and the requirement that: "In order to allow for analysis by the defendant, the remaining portion of the sample shall be retained for one year after the date of collection." According to Buckman, the crime lab's policy was to retain blood for six months and then return it to the police department that submitted it. Buckman also stated defense counsel could request retesting of a blood sample prior to the filing of charges.

Officer Stanley testified he received defendant's blood from the crime lab on August 22, 2012, and put it in the unrefrigerated evidence room. The samples were destroyed in the summer of 2014 as part of the department's practice of purging items to provide space in the evidence room. Officer Stanley stated no one requested a portion of the blood sample for retesting between 2012 and 2014.

Defendant presented testimony by Stanley Dorrance as an expert in the field of forensic alcohol analysis. Dorrance stated that title 17, section 1219, subdivision (g) (now § 1219.1, subd. (f)) applied only to labs conducting alcohol testing and not to police agencies. According to Dorrance, returning the sample to the police department after six months did not meet the requirements of title 17, which mandates the lab keep it for a year. If the samples were not kept in refrigeration at the police station, they could degrade over time, ferment, or lose alcohol.

On cross-examination, Dorrance stated it was possible, but difficult, for blood to ferment and he had never seen a sample ferment from .08 blood alcohol content to .31 over a period of four months. Defendant's sample would have been "good" on May 30, 2012, the day it was tested. Even if refrigerated, alcohol degrades over time, but that does not prevent analysis of the sample. Given the hypothesis of a sample refrigerated for six months, then unrefrigerated for two to two and a half years, Dorrance believed it could still be tested, "but the result you're gonna get is not predictable in advance."

The court denied the motion, finding title 17 did not require that the crime lab, as opposed to a police agency, solely maintain the sample for a year, nor did it require the sample be refrigerated. Even if title 17 had been violated, the court found the result would not have resulted in exclusion of the evidence. Instead, the violation would go to the weight of the evidence.

In denying the motion, the court provided further analysis: "[T]he Trombetta motion . . . which is related to the Title 17 argument . . . requires that the Defendant prove, if there were an alleged Trombetta violation, that would have been—could have been, at least, an apparent exculpatory value.

California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479 (Trombetta).

"Here there is no apparent exculpatory value. This was a very high blood result, a .31 percent, and even if one were to walk this thing through and make assumptions in every particular in respect to the Defendant's interests . . . and also I would say that's inconsistent with the law . . . but even if one were to assume a Trombetta violation and to assume that there would have been or could have been some exculpatory value . . . with it, there would still be the 23152(a) count, Count 1, driving under the influence, which doesn't require establishing a certain blood alcohol level. [¶] And the Court is mindful of the video of [defendant's] field sobriety tests and the other evidence suggesting that [defendant] was under the influence when he was driving. So it would obtain and avail him of nothing even if, contrary to law, I were to find favor of the Defendant on the Trombetta issue."

Discussion

The Supreme Court in Trombetta considered whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires a state to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence on behalf of defendants. The defendants alleged the state's failure to preserve breath samples taken of those arrested for driving while intoxicated required exclusion of the results of the tests. (Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 483.) The court found the policy of not preserving the samples did not violate a defendant's due process rights. (Id. at p. 491.) Instead, the duty to preserve evidence is "limited to evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense. To meet this standard of constitutional materiality, [citation], evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means." (Id. at pp. 488-489, fn. omitted.) However, the standard is not met where the chances are extremely low that the samples would have been exculpatory and the defense retained the ability to attack the reliability of the breath tests. (Id. at pp. 489-490.)

Arizona v. Youngblood (1988) 488 U.S. 51 (Youngblood) followed Trombetta. In Youngblood, police took clothing and biological evidence from a sexual assault victim and ran tests to determine if there had been contact. The sexual assault kit was refrigerated, but the clothing was not. Over a year later tests on the clothing proved inconclusive. (Id. at pp. 52-54.) At trial, the defendant challenged the victim's identification of him and presented testimony regarding tests which could not be performed on the clothing because they had not been refrigerated. The state appellate court reversed the defendant's conviction, noting the tests might have exonerated the defendant. (Id. at pp. 54-55.)

The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that due process makes the good or bad faith of the state irrelevant when the state fails to disclose to the defendant mandatory exculpatory evidence. However, due process requires a different result when the state fails to preserve evidentiary material "of which no more can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant." (Youngblood, supra, 488 U.S. at p. 57.) The court refrained from imposing on police an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain and preserve any and all materials that might be of conceivable evidentiary significance in a particular prosecution. (Id. at pp. 57-58.) Instead, the court imposed a requirement that a defendant show bad faith on the part of the police which "both limits the extent of the police's obligation to preserve evidence to reasonable bounds and confines it to that class of case where the interests of justice most clearly require it, i.e., those cases in which the police themselves by their conduct indicate that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating the defendant." (Id. at p. 58.)

Therefore, we find a due process violation when police fail to preserve exculpatory evidence, whose value was apparent when the evidence was destroyed and where the defendant could not obtain comparable evidence by other means. In contrast, no such due process violation occurs when the evidence is only potentially useful. In such cases, the defendant must show the police acted in bad faith. (Youngblood, supra, 488 U.S. at p. 58; Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 489.)

Defendant argues the crime lab's decision to send the blood sample to an unrefrigerated evidence locker at the police station showed bad faith under Youngblood. The trial court remained unconvinced, as do we.

As the trial court noted, the blood sample was preserved from February 24, 2012, the date of collection, until the summer of 2014. It was destroyed as part of the police department's routine evidence purge. During this period, defendant never requested a test of the blood samples. Neither the lab nor the police acted in bad faith. In addition, any alleged failure to comply with title 17 regulations goes to the weight of evidence. Defendant could have attempted to discredit the test results by showing noncompliance with the regulations affected those results. (People v. French (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 511, 522; People v. Adams (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 559, 567.)

Another problem with defendant's argument is that the blood evidence was not exculpatory, but inculpatory, tending to prove he was under the influence. The initial test showed a blood alcohol content of .31 percent. The blood evidence bolstered Officer Stanley's description of defendant's erratic driving, defendant's failure to pass the field sobriety tests, and the smell of alcohol emanating from defendant. Given that, the evidence was not exculpatory and the police did not act in bad faith in destroying the evidence.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

RAYE, P. J. We concur: HULL, J. MURRAY, J.


Summaries of

People v. Mays

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento)
Jun 28, 2019
No. C083884 (Cal. Ct. App. Jun. 28, 2019)
Case details for

People v. Mays

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BRIAN JAMES MAYS, Defendant and…

Court:COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento)

Date published: Jun 28, 2019

Citations

No. C083884 (Cal. Ct. App. Jun. 28, 2019)