Submitted February 15, 2001.
March 19, 2001.
Appeals by the defendant from (1) a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Demakos, J.), rendered October 30, 1998, convicting him of burglary in the first degree, robbery in the first degree (four counts), criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, and unlawful imprisonment in the first degree (five counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence, and (2) a resentence of the same court, imposed November 13, 1998, which modified the sentence imposed on the conviction of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree from an indeterminate term of 2 1/3 to 7 years imprisonment to an indeterminate term of 3 1/2 to 7 years imprisonment.
Lynn W. L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Jay L. Weiner of counsel), for appellant.
Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Nicoletta J. Caferri, and Thomas S. Berkman of counsel), for respondent.
Before: FRED T. SANTUCCI, J.P., SONDRA MILLER, LEO F. McGINITY, NANCY E. SMITH, JJ.
ORDERED that the judgment and resentence are affirmed.
The defendant contends that the trial court improperly impeded his ability to present his defense by curtailing his cross-examination of prosecution witnesses. We disagree. Although a criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to confront all adverse witnesses through cross-examination (see, Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673; Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308), that right is not unlimited (see, People v. Stanard, 42 N.Y.2d 74, 83; People v. Martinez, 177 A.D.2d 600). A trial court has broad discretion to limit cross-examination when questions are not relevant to the case or concern collateral issues, and pose a danger of misleading the jury (see, People v. McGriff, 201 A.D.2d 672, 673). Here, the trial court properly exercised its broad discretion in limiting the defendant's inquiry regarding an issue that had no relevance to the case (see, People v. Weinberg, 213 A.D.2d 506; People v. McGriff, supra, at 673; People v. Ashner, 190 A.D.2d 238, 246; cf., People v. Levy, 186 A.D.2d 66, 67).
In addition, the defendant's contention that his convictions of unlawful imprisonment in the first degree should have been dismissed since they merged into his convictions of robbery in the first degree is unpreserved for appellate review (see, People v. Velez, 206 A.D.2d 258). In any event, since the unlawful imprisonments and the robberies were discrete acts and the abduction was not merely incidental to the robberies, the merger doctrine is inapplicable and the defendant was properly convicted of both crimes (see, People v. Rodena, 170 A.D.2d 418).
The sentence was not excessive (see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).