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People v. Maciel

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Oct 18, 2017
F074135 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2017)

Opinion

F074135

10-18-2017

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RAUL MACIEL, Defendant and Appellant.

Cynthia L. Barnes, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez and William K. Kim, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. MCR052960)

OPINION

THE COURT APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Madera County. Ernest J. LiCalsi, Judge. Cynthia L. Barnes, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez and William K. Kim, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Before Franson, Acting P.J., Peña, J. and Meehan, J.

-ooOoo-

A jury convicted appellant Raul Maciel of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)/count 1), infliction of corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a)/count 2), and misdemeanor violation of a court protective order (§ 273.6, subd. (a)/count 3). The jury also found true a great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) in count 1, an enhancement in count 2 for inflicting great bodily injury under circumstances involving domestic violence (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)), and allegations that Maciel had a prior domestic violence conviction (§ 273.5, subd. (f)). In a separate proceeding, the court found true allegations that Maciel had a prior conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)).

All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise indicated.

On appeal, Maciel contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain the jury's finding that he inflicted great bodily injury; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his Romero motion. We affirm.

People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero).

FACTS

At trial Beatrice B. testified she was in an intimate relationship with Maciel and lived with him for approximately two years. On January 2, 2016, at approximately 7:30 p.m., Maciel arrived home angry, smelling like alcohol, and carrying a tree branch. As soon as he entered the house, Maciel began accusing Beatrice of sleeping with other men and he struck Beatrice on the forehead with the branch. Maciel continued striking Beatrice with the branch and struck her on her back as she tried to cover her face and block the blows with her hands. Maciel then dropped the branch and began punching Beatrice with his fists, throwing her to the floor and stepping on her with his boots. Maciel also tried to stab Beatrice with a sharp tool. When he was unable to stab her, he grabbed a large piece of firewood and tried to hit her on the head. Beatrice, however, moved and he hit her on her thigh. After Maciel again began punching Beatrice on her face, she heard her nose "crackl[e]" and it started to bleed. Maciel continued hitting Beatrice and stepping on her with his boots until he noticed that the front door was open and he told her to close it. Beatrice then pushed Maciel causing him to fall on his buttocks and she ran to the door. As she did, Maciel struck her on the back with a piece of wood. Beatrice testified that this blow was very painful.

The beating left Beatrice with bruises on her back, spine, thigh, waist, arm, and shoulder. Additionally, Beatrice believed her nose was broken. However, she did not go to the hospital that night, nor did she seek medical attention for her injuries.

Madera County Sheriff's Deputy Nicholas Davis testified that when he arrived on the scene he saw Beatrice with blood on her face, nose and mouth, and a significant area of swelling on her forehead. He also saw swelling and red marks on Beatrice's left forearm.

Officers eventually found Maciel in the backyard hiding on top of a wooden structure and arrested him.

After the prosecutor rested, the court denied the defense motion to dismiss the great bodily injury allegation. The Romero Motion

On June 14, 2016, defense counsel filed a Romero motion asking the court to strike his prior strike conviction, a 2004 conviction for making criminal threats. In the moving papers counsel argued, inter alia, that Maciel's prior strike conviction should be stricken because Maciel was addicted to alcohol; he was under the influence of alcohol and attempting to evict Beatrice from his home when he committed the underlying offenses; and the strike was 12 years old.

On June 22, 2016, the prosecutor filed a response that described the circumstances of Maciel's 2004 criminal threats conviction as follows: on October 26, 2003, during a telephone conversation with his ex-wife, Maciel threatened to kill a member of her family. Approximately 10 minutes later, he was at her door ringing the doorbell. A Madera police officer responded to the home, handcuffed Maciel, and placed him in the back seat of his patrol car. Maciel's ex-wife told the officer she was afraid of Maciel and feared he would carry out his threat because Maciel owned several firearms and on prior occasions had pointed them at her. She also told the officer that Maciel usually carried a firearm in his vehicle. The officer searched Maciel's car but did not find any firearms. However, after Maciel was removed from the patrol car, the officer discovered a Browning nine-millimeter pistol wedged between the seat cushion where Maciel had been sitting.

Maciel's Probation Report and Sentencing

Maciel's probation report indicated that Maciel was 52 years old when he committed the underlying offenses and he had resided in Madera County since 1979. Maciel had only a second grade education. He had been married twice and had three daughters. Maciel reportedly drank a 24-ounce can of beer daily and a 12 pack of beer on weekends and he was under the influence when he committed the underlying offenses. However, he denied having a problem with alcohol.

In addition to his 2004 criminal threats conviction Maciel was also convicted of possession of a concealed firearm (former § 12025, subd. (a)(2)) as a result of the 2003 incident when he threatened his ex-wife. In 2009, he committed two separate offenses of driving with a blood alcohol content (BAC) of .08 percent or greater (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b)) of which he was subsequently convicted. In 2012, in addition to driving while his driver's license was suspended for driving under the influence (Veh. Code, § 14601.2), Maciel committed a third offense of driving with a BAC of .08 or greater (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b)) (case No. CCR041388). In 2013, Maciel was again arrested for driving while his license was suspended for driving under the influence (Veh. Code, § 14601.2, subd. (a)) and he was subsequently convicted of that offense (case No. CCR045188). In 2015, Maciel was arrested for misdemeanor infliction of corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a)) and subsequently convicted of that offense (case No. MCR051635). Maciel committed all the above offenses, except his criminal threats offense, while he was on at least one grant of misdemeanor probation. He also violated his misdemeanor probation in cases Nos. CCR041388, CCR045188, and MCR051635 when he committed the underlying offenses in this matter.

On July 19, 2016, at Maciel's sentencing hearing the court first considered his Romero motion. Prior to hearing argument on the motion, the court stated that it had read and considered Maciel's Romero motion and the opposition. Defense counsel then argued that Maciel had the support of his family; that he had led a hard life and that might have "shaped his actions"; and that if the court granted the motion, Maciel would still have to serve more than 10 years.

The court denied the motion noting that Maciel's prior strike was not too remote, that it involved domestic violence, that Maciel now had three convictions that involved domestic violence, and that it appeared Maciel did not have any respect for the court's orders or for women. Defense counsel did not raise any objections to the court's decision.

The court then sentenced Maciel in the instant case to an aggregate 15-year prison term consisting of a doubled middle term of 10 years on his domestic violence conviction, a five-year great bodily injury enhancement, a stayed term on count 1, and time served on count 3. It also sentenced Maciel to time served on each of the three cases in which he violated probation.

The court signed an acknowledgement in the probation report that it had read the report. Additionally, prior to sentencing Maciel the court stated on the record that it had read and considered Maciel's probation report. --------

DISCUSSION

The Sufficiency of the Evidence claim

Maciel contends the evidence is insufficient to sustain the true finding on the great bodily injury enhancement because Beatrice suffered only minor or moderate injuries. We disagree.

In assessing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, the reviewing court's task is to review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—upon which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The standard of review is the same in cases in which the prosecution relies mainly on circumstantial evidence. It is the jury that must be convinced of a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment. (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11; see Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 317-320; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.)

Additionally, in reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, appellate courts do not determine the facts, instead we presume the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence in support of the judgment. (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) If the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, a reviewing court must accord due deference to the trier of fact and not substitute its evaluation of a witness's credibility for that of the fact finder. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) The testimony of a single witness—unless physically impossible or inherently improbable—is sufficient for a conviction. (Evid. Code, § 411; People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.)

Once the jury found Maciel had violated section 273.5, subdivision (a)—corporal injury of a spouse or cohabitant—it was next required to determine whether Maciel inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of that offense. Great bodily injury "means a significant or substantial physical injury." (§ 12022.7, subd. (f); see People v. Escobar (1992) 3 Cal.4th 740, 749-750.) The California Supreme Court has long held this is a factual, not a legal determination. (People v. Escobar, supra, at p. 750; People v. Wolcott (1983) 34 Cal.3d 92, 109.) " 'A fine line can divide an injury from being significant or substantial from an injury that does not quite meet the description.' " (People v. Escobar, supra, at p. 752, quoting People v. Jaramillo (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 830, 836; accord, People v. Clay (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 433, 460.) Where to draw that line is for the jury to decide.

Multiple contusions, swelling and discolorations on the victim's body were enough to satisfy the definition of great bodily injury in People v. Jaramillo, supra, 98 Cal.App.3d at page 837. In Jaramillo, after a bench trial, the court found the defendant guilty of felony child abuse and found true a great bodily injury enhancement. On appeal, the defendant claimed the great bodily injury enhancement had been improperly imposed because the injuries sustained by the victim were not sufficiently serious to support the trial court's finding that the defendant inflicted great bodily injury on the child within the meaning of section 12022.7. (Jaramillo, supra, at pp. 832-833.) As stated in Jaramillo, "while the issue might be close it appears that there were sufficient facts upon which the court could base its finding of great bodily injury and such a finding therefore will not be disturbed on appeal." (Id. at p. 836.) Like Jaramillo, here there are sufficient facts upon which the jury could base its finding of great bodily injury.

Maciel struck Beatrice with a tree branch and a piece of firewood, he repeatedly punched her on the face, and while she was on the floor, he stepped on her with his boots. The beating left Beatrice with bruises all over her body, a large bump on her forehead, swelling and red marks on her left forearm and it ended with a very painful blow to her back. During the assault, Maciel also repeatedly struck Beatrice in the face causing her nose to make a "crackling noise" and to bleed. Further, although the evidence was inconclusive whether Beatrice's nose was broken, the jury could reasonably conclude from the crackling sound it made that her nose sustained a substantial physical injury. Thus, we conclude the evidence is sufficient to sustain the jury's true finding on the great bodily injury enhancement. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Denied Maciel's Romero Motion

Section 1385, subdivision (a) provides, in relevant part, "The judge or magistrate may, . . . in furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed." In Romero, the California Supreme Court concluded that "section 1385[, subdivision ](a) . . . permit[s] a court acting on its own motion to strike prior felony conviction allegations in cases brought under the Three Strikes law." (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 529-530.)

In determining whether to strike a prior conviction "in furtherance of justice," a court must consider " ' "both . . . the constitutional rights of the defendant, and the interests of society represented by the People . . . ." ' " (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 530.) As further clarified in People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148:

"[I]n ruling whether to strike or vacate a prior serious and/or violent felony conviction allegation or finding under the Three Strikes law, on its own motion, 'in furtherance of justice' pursuant to . . . section 1385[, subdivision ](a), or in reviewing such a ruling, the court in question must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme's spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies." (Id. at p. 161.)

We review a ruling upon a motion to strike a prior felony conviction under a deferential abuse of discretion standard. (People v. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 162.) Maciel bears the burden of establishing that the trial court's decision was irrational or arbitrary. (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977-978 [presumption that trial court acts to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives].) We do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. (People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310.) "It is not enough to show that reasonable people might disagree about whether to strike one or more of [the defendant's] prior convictions." (Ibid.) "[A] trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it." (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377.)

Although Maciel's prior record was not extensive, the circumstances underlying his prior strike offense were particularly egregious because after threatening to kill a member of his ex-wife's family, Maciel appeared a short time later at her doorstep armed with a handgun, apparently ready to carry out that threat. Further, Maciel's ex-wife told the investigating officer that Maciel owned several firearms and on prior occasions had pointed them at her. Although there was a lapse in his commission of criminal offenses, in 2009 Maciel began committing a series of alcohol-related offenses and in 2015 he was convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence. Maciel's current conviction for infliction of corporal injury was his third conviction that involved domestic violence and the instant case was exceptionally violent because he beat Beatrice with two pieces of wood, his fists, and his boots. Furthermore, Maciel's offenses were occurring more frequently and they were becoming increasingly violent. Moreover, Maciel manifested his contempt for the court's orders by violating his probation on numerous occasions and by violating a protective order in the instant case. Thus, the record supports the court's statement that it appeared Maciel had no respect for the court or for women, its implicit finding that Maciel was not outside the scheme's spirit, and its decision to deny Maciel's Romero motion.

Maciel contends the court focused on his criminal record in ruling on his Romero motion and that a proper individual consideration of the following factors mandated a finding that the relevant factors weighed in favor of granting the motion: (1) Maciel had lived a hard life; (2) he had the support of his family as demonstrated by the numerous letters he attached to his motion; (3) his prior strike was 12 years old; (4) the prior strike was the only other felony on his record; and (5) Maciel suffered from alcoholism. Thus according to Maciel, the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to strike his prior strike conviction. We disagree.

In People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, the Supreme Court held that "the [forfeiture] doctrine should apply to claims involving the trial court's failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices. Included in this category are cases in which the stated reasons allegedly do not apply to the particular case, and cases in which the court purportedly erred because it double-counted a particular sentencing factor, misweighed the various factors, or failed to state any reasons or give a sufficient number of valid reasons." (Id. at p. 353, italics added.)

Maciel did not raise any objection to the trial court's ruling denying his Romero motion. Thus, he forfeited his contention that the court did not consider certain circumstances and misweighed others. However, even if this contention were properly before us, we would reject it. The trial court acknowledged that it had read and considered Maciel's probation report and his motion. Although the court focused on Maciel's criminal record in announcing its decision, the court also considered the circumstances Maciel contends the court did not because that information was contained in Maciel's probation report and/or in the letters attached to his motion. Thus, the trial court's failure to mention some circumstances in announcing its decision to deny Maciel's motion at most means only that the court found they did not outweigh the circumstances it did mention in announcing its decision. Additionally, although Maciel's prior strike conviction was 12 years old when he committed the underlying offense, he was only free of any new convictions for five years before he began committing a series of alcohol-related offenses that culminated in his most violent offense to date. Thus, the record supports the trial court's finding that his 2004 conviction for making criminal threats was not remote for purposes of ruling on Maciel's Romero motion. (Cf. People v. Humphrey (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 809, 813 [court abused its discretion in striking 20- year-old conviction for being remote where defendant had not lead "a 'legally blameless life' " since being convicted of the prior].)

Additionally, the record contains evidence that Maciel had a problem with alcohol. Although alcoholism and drug addiction may be mitigating factors, that is not always the case. In People v. Reyes (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 957 and People v. Regalado (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 531 the appellate courts found that where the defendant has a pattern of substance abuse, addiction, or alcoholism, the defendant has failed to deal with the problem despite opportunities to do so, and the defendant continues criminal conduct to support the pattern of substance abuse, the trial court is justified in imposing a higher sentence rather than treating the substance abuse as a factor in mitigation. (Reyes, supra, at p. 963; see Regalado, supra, at p. 540 [substance abuse can be an aggravating factor].) Here, the trial court could reasonably find Maciel's apparent alcohol addiction was not a mitigating factor because Maciel did not believe he had a problem with alcohol, he did not make any efforts to deal with this problem, and it was at the heart of his criminal behavior, which was becoming progressively more violent. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Maciel's Romero motion.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.


Summaries of

People v. Maciel

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Oct 18, 2017
F074135 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2017)
Case details for

People v. Maciel

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RAUL MACIEL, Defendant and…

Court:COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Date published: Oct 18, 2017

Citations

F074135 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2017)