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People v. Thuy Thhi Le

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Feb 15, 2017
D070932 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2017)

Opinion

D070932

02-15-2017

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. THUY THI LE, Defendant and Appellant.

Jennifer L. Peabody, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and Allison V. Hawley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 09WF1952) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, M. Marc Kelly, Judge. Affirmed. Jennifer L. Peabody, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and Allison V. Hawley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Thuy Thi Le stabbed her two daughters, ages three and five, in their chests while they were sleeping. A jury found Le guilty of two counts of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 664, subd. (a)) (counts 1 & 2) and two counts of felony child abuse (§ 273a, subd. (a)) (counts 3 & 4). After the jury was unable to reach a verdict with respect to allegations that Le committed the attempted murders willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation, the trial court declared a mistrial as to those allegations, and discharged the jury.

Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.

With respect to all counts, the jury found true allegations that Le personally used a deadly weapon. The jury also found true allegations that Le inflicted great bodily injury with respect to counts 1 and 3. The jury found not true great bodily injury allegations with respect to counts 2 and 4.

The trial court subsequently held a trial on the premeditation and deliberation allegations attached to the attempted murder counts, before a different jury. The second jury found the premeditation and deliberation allegations true. The trial court then held a sanity trial before that jury, and the jury found that Le was legally sane at the time she committed the charged offenses. The court sentenced Le to an aggregate term of 11 years to life in prison.

On appeal, Le contends that there is insufficient evidence in the record to support the second jury's verdicts that she acted with premeditation and deliberation in attempting to kill her daughters and that she was legally sane at the time she committed the charged offenses. We conclude that there is sufficient evidence to support the verdicts. In so concluding, we acknowledge that there is strong evidence that Le was legally insane at the time of the charge offenses, including the unanimous opinions of all of the experts who were called to testify. Nevertheless, under the deferential standard of review applicable to sufficiency claims, we conclude that a reasonable jury could have found that Le failed to carry her burden of establishing her insanity at the time of the charged offenses. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. The first trial

In the early morning hours of September 16, 2009, Le stabbed her two daughters J.G. (age three) and R.G. (age five) once each in their chests. She then stabbed herself several times in the chest and stomach. B. The second trial

Le does not raise any claims with respect to the first trial, and the second jury considered only the evidence presented at the second trial. Accordingly, we do not discuss the evidence presented at the first trial in detail.

1. The guilt phase

a. The People's evidence

Le and her daughters, J.G. and R.G., stayed overnight at the home of Le's cousin, Toan Pham, on the night before the stabbings. Le and her daughters slept on a mattress on the family room floor. The following morning, sometime before 6:34 a.m., Le went to the kitchen, got a glass of water, and retrieved a knife. Le then returned to the family room and stabbed J.G. and R.G. each in the chest a single time. After stabbing the children, Le stabbed herself in the chest, abdomen, and wrists. After noticing that R.G.'s lip was changing color, Le called 911.

Pham awoke to the children crying and went to the family room. Le was holding R.G. Pham asked Le what had happened. Le responded that "Bobby . . . caused it."

As discussed in detail in part III.A, post, Le told investigators that she had been having relationship difficulties with her boyfriend "Robert," the father of R.G. and J.G. At the time of the charged offenses, Le lived with Robert and she had dated him for more than ten years.

At approximately 6:40 a.m., Westminster Police Officer Cameron Knauerhaze arrived at the Pham residence. Le was sitting on the floor, holding R.G. and crying. According to Officer Knauerhaze, R.G. appeared "lifeless [and] limp" and her eyes were rolled back in her head. Officer Knauerhaze took R.G. from Le and began to perform first aid on R.G.

Officer Michael Ogawa arrived at the scene with Officer Knauerhaze. Ogawa saw three bloody knives in the kitchen sink. Officer Ogawa began to assist J.G., who was crying. Paramedics also arrived at the scene. While paramedics were working on Le, Officer Ogawa asked Le what had happened. Le responded that she had stabbed her children and that she wanted to kill herself. Officer Ogawa asked Le whether she was on any medication. Le responded in the negative. Paramedics transported Le and the children to the hospital.

R.G. suffered a stab wound to her left chest and had emergency surgery to repair a puncture wound to her heart. J.G. suffered a stab wound to her left chest, which was closed with staples. Le suffered approximately 10 puncture wounds to her upper chest, two puncture wounds to her abdomen, and several cuts on both wrists.

As discussed in detail in part III.A, post, the People presented evidence of statements that Le made to law enforcement officers during interviews conducted at the hospital shortly after the stabbings, and at the police station during the following day. During the interviews, Le admitted to stabbing the children. Le also stated that, prior to the stabbings, she was "debating" whether to hurt the children. In addition, Le told investigators that she intended to kill the children and herself.

While this appeal was pending, we directed the trial court to transmit the exhibits containing the audio recordings of Le's statements to this court for review. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.224(d), 8.320(e).) While written transcripts of the recordings were contained in the record, as the trial court directed the jury, "[t]he transcript[s] [are] not the evidence in the case," and are provided to the jury as "a guide." Thus, in order to properly review Le's sufficiency claim, it was necessary for this court to review the actual recordings played at trial. We remind appellate counsel that it is appellant's responsibility to designate for transmittal to this court all exhibits that are necessary for this court to review appellant's claims on appeal. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.224(a)(1), 8.320(e); see also People v. Whalen (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1, 85 ["it is appellant's burden to present a record adequate for review and to affirmatively demonstrate error"].)

b. The defense

Several of Le's relatives testified that Le had been acting strangely during the days leading to the stabbings. For example, Le told Pham's wife that she was afraid of ghosts in her house. Le told her brother that she was very afraid that something was going to happen to her. Several relatives testified that Le was a caring mother and that she did not act violently toward her children.

Dr. Richard Lettieri, a forensic and clinical psychologist, testified that he had diagnosed Le as suffering from a psychotic disorder, "most likely schizoaffective." Dr. Lettieri stated that in his opinion, Le was psychotic at the time of the stabbings.

In forming this opinion, Dr. Lettieri relied upon various pieces of evidence, including Le's medical history. Dr. Lettieri noted that approximately two weeks prior to the stabbings, Le called 911 but refused to get in the ambulance when paramedics arrived. According to Dr. Lettieri, Le "mentioned something about a set-up" in refusing to get into the ambulance. Dr. Lettieri also noted that just two days prior to the stabbing, a physician had diagnosed Le as suffering from major depression with psychotic features. In addition, Dr. Lettieri stated that a psychiatrist who treated Le at the emergency room immediately after the stabbings stated that Le exhibited psychotic symptoms and recommended that she be committed to a mental hospital.

2. The sanity phase

a. The stipulation to consider all of the evidence presented during the guilt phase

Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, the jury was instructed that it was to consider all of the evidence presented in the guilt phase of the second trial, in addition to any new evidence presented during the sanity phase.

b. Le's evidence

Le presented the testimony of three experts, each of whom expressed the opinion that Le was legally insane at the time of the charged offenses.

Dr. Roberto Flores de Apodaca performed an insanity evaluation of Le at the request of the People. In Dr. Flores de Apodaca's opinion, Le was insane at the time of the crimes. Dr. Flores de Apodaca diagnosed Le as suffering from a psychotic disorder, not otherwise specified. Dr. Flores de Apodaca believed that Le lapsed into a state of psychosis prior to the stabbings, following the loss of her grandmother, the loss of her business, the loss of her home, and conflicts in her relationship with Robert. In addition, Dr. Flores de Apodaca stated that Le appeared to suffer from paranoid delusions and hallucinations, including that people and spirits were attempting to harm her.

Dr. Veronica Thomas, a forensic psychologist, testified that, in her opinion, at the time of the crimes, Le "was laboring under a severe settled mental disorder" and that she did not know that her behavior was wrong, immoral, or illegal. According to Dr. Thomas, Le suffered symptoms that were consistent with schizophrenia, including hallucinations and delusions.

Dr. Lettieri also testified that he believed Le was insane at the time of the offenses. Dr. Lettieri diagnosed Le as suffering from psychosis, not otherwise specified. According to Dr. Lettieri, Le was psychotic, delusional, paranoid, and suffered from severe depression.

c. The People's evidence

Dr. Adrian Miranda, an attending physician at Fountain Valley Hospital, testified that he had treated Le in the emergency room nine days before the stabbings. Dr. Miranda stated that he diagnosed Le as suffering from nausea, which had resolved, and "an anxiety reaction." Dr. Miranda stated that Le had denied suffering any auditory or visual hallucinations during a psychiatric examination conducted at the hospital that day. Dr. Miranda did not express any opinion with respect to whether Le was legally sane at the time of the charged offenses.

III.

DISCUSSION

A. There is sufficient evidence in the record to support the jury's verdicts that Le acted with premeditation and deliberation in committing the attempted murders

Le claims that there is insufficient evidence in the record to support the jury's verdicts that she acted with premeditation and deliberation in committing the attempted murders.

1. Standard of review

In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, "the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319.) "[T]he court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.)

" 'Although a jury must acquit if it finds the evidence susceptible of a reasonable interpretation favoring innocence, it is the jury rather than the reviewing court that weighs the evidence, resolves conflicting inferences and determines whether the People have established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' [Citation.] ' " 'If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.' " ' " (People v. Casares (2016) 62 Cal.4th 808, 823-824.)

2. Applicable substantive law

a. Attempted premeditated murder

"Every person who attempts to commit any crime, but fails, or is prevented or intercepted in its perpetration, shall be punished . . . ." (§ 664.) Section 664, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part, "[I]f the crime attempted is willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder, as defined in Section 189, the person guilty of that attempt shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life with the possibility of parole."

Section 189 provides in relevant part, "All murder which is perpetrated by means of . . . willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing . . . is murder of the first degree."

"In this context, 'premeditated' means 'considered beforehand,' and 'deliberate' means 'formed or arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful thought and weighing of considerations for and against the proposed course of action.' [Citations.] The process of premeditation and deliberation does not require any extended period of time. 'The true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly . . . .' " (People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 767 (Mayfield).)

In People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15 (Anderson), the Supreme Court identified three categories of evidence that are relevant in proving premeditation and deliberation: planning activity, motive, and the manner of killing. "A first degree murder conviction will be upheld when there is extremely strong evidence of planning, or when there is evidence of motive with evidence of either planning or manner." (People v. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 401.) "However, . . . 'Anderson does not require that these factors be present in some special combination or that they be accorded a particular weight, nor is the list exhaustive. Anderson was simply intended to guide an appellate court's assessment whether the evidence supports an inference that the killing occurred as the result of preexisting reflection rather than unconsidered or rash impulse." ' " (People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1249.)

b. Evidence of a defendant's mental disease, defect, or disorder

Section 28 governs the admissibility of certain evidence of a defendant's mental state during the guilt phase of a criminal trial and provides in relevant part:

Section 28, subdivision (c) makes clear that "[t]his section shall not be applicable to an insanity hearing . . . ."

"(a) Evidence of mental disease, mental defect, or mental disorder shall not be admitted to show or negate the capacity to form any mental state, including . . . premeditation [or] deliberation . . . with
which the accused committed the act. Evidence of mental disease, mental defect, or mental disorder is admissible solely on the issue of whether or not the accused actually . . . premeditated [or] deliberated . . . ."

3. Application

With respect to planning activity, " 'the most important prong of the Anderson test,' " (People v. Lucero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1006, 1018-1019), the record contains evidence of Le's statements in the immediate aftermath of the stabbings from which a jury could reasonably find that Le planned the attempted murders.

Officer Cynthia Sweasy of the Westminster Police Department testified that she and Detective Terry Selinske began to interview Le approximately a half hour after the stabbings. Officer Sweasy described Le's account of her mental state while she was in the kitchen just before stabbing the children:

"She said she went in to get a glass of water, which she actually did get the glass of water and drank some water and grabbed it. I clarified with her if she was referring to a knife. She said it was. Detective Selinske asked her if she intended to use the knife on herself. She said yes. He asked her if she intended to use the knife on her children and she said yes."

In addition, Officer Sweasy stated that Le explained that, after she picked up the knife, "she was hoping somebody would come stop her." According to Sweasy, "[Le] was looking out the window hoping somebody would come." Le told the interviewers that when no one came, she stabbed the children and herself. Officer Sweasy also testified that Le stated three times during the interview that she intended to kill her children.

In addition to presenting Officer Sweasy's testimony concerning Le's statements, the People played for the jury, and offered in evidence, recordings of Officer Sweasy and Detective Selinske's interview with Le. Many of Le's responses on the recording are inaudible. However, the jury could have reasonably relied on Officer Sweasy's testimony concerning Le's statements discussed in the text as well as those audible portions of the recording of the interview in reaching its verdicts.

The People also presented evidence of Detective Kevin MacCormick and Detective Aoki's interview with Le on the day after the stabbings. During the interview, the following colloquy occurred:

"[Detective]: Do you pick up the knife? And you stood there with the knife in your hand, looking out the window? Is that what you said, Thuy? Okay.

"[Le]: [Inaudible] and I look.

"[Detective]: But nobody came? And what happens?

"[Le]: [Inaudible] to my kids.

"[Detective]: You went back to your kids?

"[Le]: I was debating [inaudible].

"[Detective]: What were you debating?

"[Le]: The knife in my hand, [inaudible] I was thinking [inaudible] young people [inaudible]."

Shortly thereafter, Le stated that she thought about waking up her cousin before she stabbed her children:

"[Detective]: Okay, Thuy. So you came back, and you walked back to the bed, to your kids, and you had the knife in your hand and you were debating, what happened after that?

"[Le]: The next thing in my head, should I go wake up my cousin? Should I . . . Scared.

"[Detective]: What were you afraid of?

"[Le]: I didn't want to hurt my kids, [inaudible]. I told Robert I didn't want to be alone so long, [inaudible]."

A few minutes later in the interview, Le described what she was debating just prior to the stabbings:

"[Detective]: Okay. I want to go back to the other night when you, um, or the morning rather, you said you got up in the morning, you got a drink of water, you were looking out the window, you picked up the knife off the kitchen sink and you walked over to where your kids were, and you were debating. What were you debating?

"[Le]: [Inaudible.]

"[Detective]: What?

"[Le]: I don't want to do it.

"[Detective]: You don't want to do it?

"[Le]: [Inaudible.]

"[Detective]: I can't hear you, Thuy.

"[Le]: I don't want to do it.

"[Detective]: What didn't you want to do?

"[Le]: Hurt the kids, hurt myself.

"[Detective]: What?

"[Le]: Hurt the kids, hurt myself.
"[Detective]: You didn't want to hurt them? Okay.

"[Le]: Wish someone came [inaudible.]

"[Detective]: You wish someone came and stopped it?

"[Detective]: Stopped what?

"[Le]: Me hurting the kids."

From this evidence, a reasonable jury could find that Le, as she, herself, stated, was "debating" whether or not to "hurt the kids." "Debating" whether to engage in some conduct, is the essence of acting with premeditation and deliberation. (See Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 767 [" 'premeditated' means 'considered beforehand,' and 'deliberate' means 'formed or arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful thought and weighing of considerations for and against the proposed course of action' "].) Further, from evidence that Le stabbed her sleeping children in their chests immediately after debating whether to "[h]urt the kids," and evidence that Le repeatedly told investigators that she intended to kill the children, a reasonable jury could find that Le planned to commit two premeditated and deliberate murders.

Le's arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. Le argues, "In the light more favorable to the prosecution, [Le] stated that she was debating whether or not to hurt her children, while standing in the kitchen with the knife in her hand. Debating about whether or not to hurt someone is not the same as deliberating about killing someone." (Italics added.) As discussed above, the jury could plainly infer that from Le's statements and her conduct that she debated not only whether to hurt the children, but whether to kill them.

Le also contends that, in light of her "compromised mental state," no reasonable jury could have relied on her statements to investigators in finding that she acted with premeditation and deliberation. While Le did present considerable evidence of her "comprised mental state," the jury was not required to find that this evidence established that she did not premeditate and deliberate before stabbing her children. In particular, while we agree with Le that her statements to investigators were often "confused, disorganized, contradictory and often inaudible," it was the jury's role, and not ours as a reviewing court, to determine the evidentiary weight to attach to her statements. (See, e.g., People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27 (Lindberg) [stating that a reviewing court does not "reweigh[ ] evidence"].)

Moreover, with respect to the critical issue of Le's mental state immediately prior to the stabbings, Le's statements were not particularly confused, disorganized or contradictory—and they were audible. Le stated that, while standing at the kitchen sink holding a knife, she was "debating" whether or not to "[h]urt the kids." Further, the jury could have reasonably found that her disjointed statements to investigators were a product of her relationship struggles with Robert, which she continually referred to in her interviews with investigators, as well as the emotional turmoil she experienced after stabbing her children in their chests. Thus, we reject Le's contention that the jury was required to find that her statements to investigators in the wake of the stabbings regarding her mental state just before the stabbings were unreliable as a matter of law in view of her compromised mental state.

The People also presented evidence of a motive for the attempted murders. As discussed above, throughout her interviews with investigators, Le discussed how her relationship struggles with Robert had led her to commit the stabbings. For example, Le told Detectives MacCormick and Aoki that in the middle of the night before the stabbings, she awoke with feelings that Robert would "[t]ake the kids away." Le also told Detectives MacCormick and Aoki that she was concerned that Robert would leave her and that she was afraid that he might hurt her because she had previously left him. When asked,"[W]hy did you stab your kids though?" Le responded, "Because Robert will try to harm me, and take the kids."

Le told Officer Sweasy and Detective Selinske that she and Robert had been having problems "for years." Detective Selinske asked, "What kind of problems?" Le responded, "Just kind (inaudible). I knew something like this was going to happen." Le also told Officer Sweasy, "I tried to warn him that something would happen like this, I tried. I begged him. I begged him. I did (inaudible)." Le also said that Robert "was driving me to this." While Le contends that her "delusions about the state of her relationship with [Robert] were inherently improbable as they were totally contradictory and irrational," this, too, was a question for the jury. In sum, viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment (see Lindberg, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 27), Le's statements to the investigators concerning her relationship with Robert constitutes evidence of a motive for the attempted murders.

Finally, evidence of the manner in which the attempted murders were committed also supports the verdicts. The People presented evidence that Le took a knife from the kitchen, walked into the family room where the children were sleeping, and stabbed each of them in the chest once, "hard," with the intention of killing each child. This evidence is consistent with the commission of premeditated and deliberate attempted murders. (See, e.g., People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1253 ["With regard to method, the clustered stab wounds [around the victim's chest] support an inference of a deliberate killing"; see id. at p. 1191 [describing location of wounds].)

Officer Sweasy testified that Le said, "I stabbed them hard. And then when I clarified with her[,] she said, I stabbed myself hard or I tried to stab myself hard. So in listening to the audio tape[,] it sounded like I stabbed them hard, and then clarifying with her. What she intended to say, I don't know."

Accordingly, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the jury's verdicts that Le acted with premeditation and deliberation in committing the attempted murders. B. There is sufficient evidence in the record to support the jury's verdicts that Le was legally sane at the time she committed the charged offenses

Le claims that there is insufficient evidence in the record to support the jury's verdicts that she was legally sane at the time she committed the charged offenses.

1. Governing law

"Insanity, under California law, means that at the time the offense was committed, the defendant was incapable of knowing or understanding the nature of his act or of distinguishing right from wrong. (Pen. Code., § 25, subd. (b); People v. Skinner (1985) 39 Cal.3d 765, 776-777 [construing [section] 25, subd[ivision (b)], as providing that defendant may be found insane if he did not know the nature and quality of his act or if he did not know the act to be morally wrong].)" (People v. Hernandez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 512, 520-521; see also People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 170 (Lawley) ["Despite [section 25, subdivision (b)'s] use of the conjunctive 'and' . . . this court has interpreted the statute as recognizing two distinct and independent bases on which a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity might be returned"].) It is a defendant's burden to prove insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. (§ 25, subd. (b).)

Section 25, subdivision (b) provides, "In any criminal proceeding, including any juvenile court proceeding, in which a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity is entered, this defense shall be found by the trier of fact only when the accused person proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she was incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his or her act and of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the commission of the offense."

"The test of legal insanity in California is the rule in M'Naghten's Case (1843) 10 Clark & Fin. 200, 210 as adopted by the electorate in June 1982 with the passage of Proposition 8." (Lawley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 169 [noting that Proposition 8 adopted section 25, subdivision (b)].) "The M'Naghten test is a narrow one. It is only when 'mental illness is manifested in delusions which render the individual incapable either of knowing the nature and character of his act, or of understanding that it is wrong, [that] he is legally insane under the California formulation of the M'Naghten test.' " (People v. Elmore (2014) 59 Cal.4th 121, 146, first italics in original, second italics added.) "Notably, a defendant may suffer from a diagnosable mental illness without being legally insane under the M'Naghten standard." (People v. Mills (2012) 55 Cal.4th 663, 672.)

2. Standard of review

We apply the substantial evidence test described in part III.A.1, ante, in our review of the jury's sanity verdict. (People v. Chavez (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 882, 891 ["[T]he substantial evidence test applies to appellate review of a sanity determination"].) However, "[b]ecause the burden was on the defense to show by a preponderance of the evidence that appellant was insane, before we can overturn the trier of fact's finding to the contrary, we must find as a matter of law that the [trier of fact] could not reasonably reject the evidence of insanity." (People v. Skinner (1986)185 Cal.App.3d 1050, 1059.) In addition, "[j]urors are not automatically required to render a verdict which conforms to [even] unanimous expert opinion as to a defendant's sanity. Our Supreme Court has frequently upheld on appeal verdicts finding a defendant sane in the face of contrary unanimous opinion." (People v. Duckett (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 1115, 1119.)

3. Application

Le's statements to investigators in the hours after the stabbings, made at the hospital and on the day after the stabbings at the police station, provided substantial evidence from which a jury could find that she was legally sane at the time of the charged offenses.

As noted in part II.B.2.a, ante, in accordance with the parties' stipulation, at the outset of the sanity phase of the trial, the court instructed the jury, "The jury is to consider all evidence presented in the guilt phase for the sanity phase as well."

At the hospital, Officer Sweasy began her interview with Le by asking Le whether she knew the difference between right and wrong. According to Officer Sweasy, Le responded, "It's wrong to do what I did." Officer Sweasy added that Le "pulled the blanket up to cover her face and nodded her head up and down and began crying." Further, as described in part III.A.3, ante, Le described her mental state just prior to the stabbings by stating that she was hoping someone would intervene to prevent her from harming her children, that she had considered waking her cousin before committing the stabbings, and that she had "debat[ed]" about whether to harm the children before doing so. From these statements, a reasonable jury could find that, at the time Le committed the stabbings, she had an understanding of the nature of her acts and was able to distinguish right from wrong.

Indeed, while Dr. Flores de Apodaca stated that, in his opinion, Le was insane at the time of the charged offenses, he also testified that Le's postarrest statements could support a contrary finding:

"[Defense counsel]: Do you recall that Miss Le had made a statement to police afterwards that it was wrong to do what I did?

"[Dr. Flores de Apodaca]: Yes.

"[Defense counsel]: How does that fit into your opinion?

"[Dr. Flores de Apodaca]: Well, one of the criteria for insanity is an awareness of the wrongfulness of your acts. So if someone has an awareness of the wrongfulness of their act, then that runs counter to insanity. So that fact, and it was reported in various instances, would be something that you have to account for because it runs counter to the idea of insanity in this particular instance.

"[Defense counsel]: Also she had made a statement about that she had a knife and she was debating. [¶] Do you recall that?

"[Dr. Flores de Apodaca]: Yes.
"[Defense counsel]: How does that factor into your opinion?

"[Dr. Flores de Apodaca]: That would suggest there is some inner conflict, some inner awareness about the wrongfulness of the action. There was some rumination and some deliberation beforehand, should I do it or not do it beforehand. So that enters into it. You have to account for that as well.

"[Defense counsel]: Despite those things you still formed the opinion she was insane at the time of the act?

"[Dr. Flores de Apodaca]: I think so. All things considered, weighed, and determined I think so. I think it's much more clinically probable than not."

In finding Le sane at the time of the charged offenses, the jury also could have reasonably relied on Le's statements to investigators described in part III.A.3, ante, that suggested that Le may have attempted to kill her children in an attempt to gain attention from Robert, with whom she was having considerable relationship difficulties. While Le contends that her statements to investigators do not constitute substantial evidence of her sanity because they were not "securely tethered in reality," as we explained in part III.A.3, ante, it was the jury's role to determine the evidentiary weight to attach to her statements, and we may not second guess the jury's determinations. (See, e.g., Lindberg, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 27.)

Dr. Flores de Apodaca acknowledged that, although this explanation was "reasonable," and that it was "fair to pose that theory," he "respectfully disagree[d]," with it.

The jury also could have reasonably relied on evidence that Le called 911 after committing the offenses. As Dr. Flores de Apodaca acknowledged, this act supported a finding that Le was sane:

"Well, you have to again go to the issue of wrongfulness and awareness of wrongfulness. So why would she call 911? One interpretation is she knew all along what she was doing was wrong. That is one interpretation, a reasonable one, one that I have come to in other instances of insanity evaluations."

Further, while Dr. Flores de Apodaca stated that it "seems more clinically probable," that Le called 911 after being "jolted back, shocked back into a better sense of reality," after seeing her daughter become lifeless, the jury was not required to accept Dr. Flores de Apodaca's opinion. This is particularly so, since another expert, Dr. Thomas, stated that in her opinion Le "has schizophrenia," and Dr. Flores de Apodaca stated that "[y]ou wouldn't expect being shocked back into reality if the underlying condition is, say, schizophrenia . . . . You wouldn't expect someone would be shocked back that readily."

Moreover, although the experts unanimously expressed the opinion that Le was insane, the jury could have reasonably rejected those opinions. To begin with, each of the experts relied in part on statements made by Le and/or her family members well after the stabbings to the effect that Le had suffered delusions and hallucinations in the time period prior to the stabbings. The jury could have reasonably found that the number and severity of such alleged psychotic episodes were less than represented by Le and her family members, particularly since Le made little mention of such episodes during her statements to investigators in the immediate aftermath of the stabbings. The jury also could have reasonably given Drs. Lettieri and Flores de Apodaca's testimony less weight given that Dr. Lettieri had not reviewed the police reports prior to rendering his opinion, and Dr. Flores de Apodaca had not listened to the audio recordings of Le's interviews with law enforcement officers nor had he reviewed the transcripts of those interviews at any time.

We emphasize that we are not making any findings concerning the severity of Le's psychosis prior to the stabbings. We state here only what a reasonable jury could have found.

The People argue that "the delusions and hallucinations that [Le] conveniently described to the doctors were not things she mentioned in her interviews at the time of the offenses." In reply, Le contends that this is a "blatant misstatement of fact," noting that Le asked Detective Selinske whether he was going to kill her and told Selinske that she had been hearing voices every night for two hours a night. While Le is correct that there is evidence that she made those statements to Detective Selinske, the People are correct that the bulk of the prestabbing psychotic episodes purportedly suffered by Le that the experts relied on were based on statements made by Le and/or her family members after the stabbings. For example, Dr. Thomas stated that Le reported that "somebody had put voodoo on her," and stated that Le told her that she had been receiving messages from the television. Dr. Flores de Apodaca stated that Le indicated that she believed spirits or ghosts were haunting her house and that "people in and around [Le]," recounted her "wanting to leave the house and set up in a motel." Le had not specifically referred to such psychotic episodes during her postarrest interviews with law enforcement officers. --------

Finally, the jury could have weighed Le's statements to law enforcement officers concerning her mental state just prior to the stabbings differently from the way the experts weighed them in reaching their verdicts on her sanity. (See People v. Drew (1978) 22 Cal.3d 333, 350 ["jurors . . . are not automatically required to render a verdict which conforms to the expert opinion"].)

Accordingly, we conclude that there is substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict that Le was sane at the time of the charged offenses.

IV.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

AARON, J. WE CONCUR: HUFFMAN, Acting P. J. O'ROURKE, J.


Summaries of

People v. Thuy Thhi Le

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Feb 15, 2017
D070932 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2017)
Case details for

People v. Thuy Thhi Le

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. THUY THI LE, Defendant and…

Court:COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Date published: Feb 15, 2017

Citations

D070932 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2017)