Filed January 12, 2006
It did not. In People v. Jones, supra, 15 Cal.4th 119, the prosecutor argued that “every murderer on death row ‘really probably grew upas a kid, nice kid.”” (/d. at p. 185.) This Court found the argument “was proper becausethe prosecutor ‘did not imply that the jury should disregard the evidence of defendant’s background,but ratherthat, in relation to the nature of the crimes committed, it had no mitigating effect.”
Filed March 19, 2010
(26RT 4964-4965.) Dolores K.is also like the juror who was found to have been properly excused for cause in People v. Jones, supra, 15 Cal.4th 119. In Jones,the prospective juror Beeler, like Dolores K., stated that, becauseofhis religious convictions, he could not, under any circumstances, vote to imposethe death penalty.
Filed November 28, 2011
The comparison wasnotto Hitler, or Charles Manson, or the Menendez brothers, cases which could be considered common knowledge, and reference to which might have been permissible. (Wharton, 53 Cal.3d at 567-68; see e.g. People v. Jones, 15 Cal.4th at 180 [proper for the prosecutor to use well-known examples of irrational murdersto illustrate a point]; People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 836-37 [accord].) Rather, the prosecutor's reference was to "other killers" and "other murders" in general — information the jury would understand as being within the prosecutor's professional experience and knowledge(but not their own) — and thus both highly persuasive to the jury and prejudicial to appellant.
Filed March 18, 2011
Appellant has not eliminated the possibility that trial counsel’s decision not to object was within the range of reasonable competence. (See 16l People v. Jones, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 182; see also People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 661.) Howe wasa controversial witness from the defense’s perspective, and the prosecutor’s allegedly improper remark was brief and madein an otherwise unobjectionable part of her argument. (See 41RT 10879-10880.)
Filed March 18, 2011
Appellant has not eliminated the possibility that trial counsel’s decision not to object was within the range of reasonable competence. (See 16l People v. Jones, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 182; see also People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 661.) Howe wasa controversial witness from the defense’s perspective, and the prosecutor’s allegedly improper remark was brief and madein an otherwise unobjectionable part of her argument. (See 41RT 10879-10880.)
Filed March 10, 2006
Arias does not stand alone in rejecting the claim appellant makes here; this Court has rejected the claim consistently and frequently. (See People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1137; People v. Taylor, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1178; People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1064; People v. Jones, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 196; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 153.) E. Equal Protection Principles Are Not Violated By The Death Penalty Law This Court has repeatedly rejected appellant’s argument (AOB 385-391) that California’s death penalty law deprives capital defendants of equal protection becauseit does not guarantee somesort of disparate sentence review that was in the past given to noncapital convicts under the Determinate Sentencing Act.
Filed February 25, 2014
By repeatedly reminding the jurors of the horrifying events of 9/11, the prosecutor encouraged the susceptible jurors to view Ghobrial with the same sense of horror when deciding whether he Mich. 2012) 852 F.Supp.2d 820, 838.) See e.g., RB 90, citing People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 298-299 [prosecutor described defendant as a “dope dealing lying rat’’]; People v. Sassounian (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 361, 396 [in a case being tried 23 years later, prosecutor referenced the assassination of President Kennedy]; RB 95,citing People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 665- 666 [prosecutor described defendantas “that animal,” “vicious,” and as a “base individual”]; RB 95-96, citing People v. Jones (1997) 15 Cal.4th 119, 180, People v. Millwee (1998) 18 Cal.4th 96, 153, People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, and People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 420,all cases in which the prosecutor madereferences either to Nazis, Charles Manson,or both; and RB 99, citing People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1030 [prosecutor called defendanta “snake in the jungle’’]. 63 should live the rest of his life in prison or be executed.
Filed September 12, 2012
The trial court’s function isnot to make an independent and de novo determination, but rather to independently reweigh the evidence and determine whether,in the court’s independent judgment, the weight of the evidence supports the jury’s verdict. (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1039; People v. Jones (1997) 15 Cal.4th 119, 190-191, 75 overruled on other grounds, People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1.) The ruling on a motion to modify must be based on evidence presentedattrial.
Filed September 16, 2011
Respondentfirst claims that this court must defer to the trial court’s rulings because, according to respondent, the responses of the jurors were equivocal or conflicting. (RB 53; quoting People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 768 and People v. Jones (1997) 15 Cal.4th 119, 164.) Respondentalso asserts that the trial court’s rulings must be upheld by this court even if the jurors’ responses were not equivocalor conflicting because they were supported by substantial evidence.
Filed June 22, 2009
Moreover, any assumed misconduct was not prejudicial. A. STANDARD OF REVIEW Respondent set forth the standard to review claims of prosecutorial . misconduct, or error, during closing argument in Argument XXXI. Briefly, prosecutorial misconduct implies the use of deception or reprehensible methods to persuade the court or jury. (People v. Jones, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 187.) The same standard is applied on appeal to evaluate a claim of prosecutorial misconduct in the penalty phase.