Filed January 27, 2016
Second, invoking a court’s inherent powerto grant defendants a right to imposepreservation obligations on law enforcement and prosecution authorities would be inconsistent with legislative intent and confer jurisdiction where it does not otherwise exist. (See Jn re Steele, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 695 [concluding that, by enacting section 1054.9, the Legislature intended to grant defendant’s a right to discovery of only materials currently in the possession ofthe authorities; it did not intend to impose any preservation duties]; Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 1257- 1258 [holdingtrial courts lack jurisdiction to issue a postconviction order for preservation of evidencein anticipation of habeas corpus proceedings].) 23 Morales contends that Townse/ supports his position on this point by providing an analogous example ofa statute conferring inherent powers.
Filed December 29, 2015
at pp. 1260-1261.) Gonzalez was then followed by People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1258, and in People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 337 (Picklesimer), the court again confirmedthat a motion is not an independent remedy butimplies the pendencyofan ongoingaction.8 The court in Jn re Steele, supra, 32 Cal.4th 682 recognized that section 1054.9 affected the rule of Gonzalez to the extent covered bythe statute.
Filed August 19, 2015
at pp. 1260-1261.) Gonzalez was then followed by People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1258, and in People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 337 (Picklesimer), the court again confirmedthat a motion is not an independent remedy but implies the pendency of an ongoing action.® The court in Jn re Steele, supra, 32 Cal.4th 682 recognized that section 1054.9 affected the rule of Gonzalez to the extent covered by the statute.
Filed December 19, 2011
This Court has stated, "The weighing processis 'merely a metaphor for the juror's personal determination that death is the appropriate penalty underall the circumstances. ' (People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1243-1244, quoting People v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at 1250.) Thus, this Court has held that the 1978 death penalty statute permits the jury in a capital case to return a verdict of life without possibility of parole even in the complete absence of any mitigating evidence.
Filed February 28, 2008
Erroneous admission of victim impact evidence is subject to a harmless-error analysis. (People v. Lewis (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1058; People v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1246.) There is no reasonable probability that Edwards would have enjoyed a more favorable outcome, absent the victim impact evidence.
Filed October 16, 2014
) In People v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 1183, this Court followedits prior ruling in People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, which approvedofthe use of eyewitness identification jury instructionsthat “focus the jury’s attention on facts relevantto its determination” and disapproved instructionsthat explained the effects of the various factors,i.e., witness certainty. (People v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 1230, 1231, citing People v. Wright, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 1141-1142.) However, as argued above, becausecertainty is not a relevant factor, thatis, it has been shown to have essentially no correlative relationship to the reliability of the identification, and in light of the Neil v. Biggers focus on certainty at the time of confrontation, this Court should reconsider its reasoning in Johnson.
Filed January 12, 2006
Part of that overall identification procedureis the pre-lineup admonition. (See People v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1218.) Appellant points to nothing suggestive in the pre-lineup statements or admonition, other than the fact that a suspect was in custody.
Filed March 25, 2015
Thus, the overall content of his testimony wasrelevant mitigating evidence, which the jury could properly consider. (See People v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1252 [stating a “defendant may urge his possible innocenceto the jury as a factor in mitigation,” and that a jury mayproperly consider any residual doubt about his guilt].) Nonetheless, Anderson protests that his testimonytelling the jury he ‘did not care and to give him the death penalty “surely encouragedthe jury to short circuit the process and decide ona penalty of death.”
Filed December 21, 2012
However, because there was no evidence that her failure to remember signing the form was not genuine, the fact that she had signed the form was not appropriate impeachment evidence. See Johnson, 3 Cal. 4th at 1220 (explaining that a witness’s genuine statement that she does not remember an event is not inconsistent with that witnesses’ prior statement describing the event and such instances a witnesses’ prior statement cannot be introduced as an exception to the hearsay bar.) Moreover, to the extent it was proper impeachment testimony of Estella it was irrelevant to whether Mr. Benavides was guilty of the charged crimes.
Filed March 14, 2011
The law is clear that the jury may return a life verdict even if it finds that aggravation outweighs mitigation. (See People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1250.) This Court cannot assume that a death verdict would have been imposed hadthe jury been instructed as appellant requested.