People v. Jennings

37 Citing briefs

  1. PEOPLE v. NGUYEN (LAM THANH)

    Respondent’s Brief

    Filed January 26, 2011

    This Court should reject the contention because appellant cannot prove from the state record that his trial counsel acted in professionally unreasonable manner and that different verdicts would have been reasonably probable but for his trial counsel’s alleged failings. (Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at 679-684; People v. Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 376.) Appellant alternatively contends that theconstitutional issues he raises are not waived by inadequate trial court objection. (People v. Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 117-118, 132; People v. Coddington, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 632; AOB 431.)

  2. PEOPLE v. JOHNSON

    Respondent’s Petition for Review

    Filed May 30, 2012

    (Jd. at pp. 379, 380.) Although later United States Supreme Court cases appeared to again endorse the “reasonable juror” standard, Boyde’s “reasonable likelihood” standard was reaffirmed in Estelle v. McGuire, supra, 502 U.S.at pages 72-73, footnote 4. 271. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 560-561; People v. Lawley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 162-163; People v. Price, supra, | Cal.4th at p. 446), or constitutes error that was harmless whether assessed under Watson or Chapman(e.g., People v. Cornwell, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 88; People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 227; People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 190-191; People v. Sully, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 1218-1219; People v. Carrera, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 313; People v. Garrison, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 780). In the presentcase, the trial court should have expressly excluded Agustin and Jackson from CALCRIM No.373’s ambit.

  3. PEOPLE v. CLARK (WILLIAM CLINTON)

    Appellant’s Opening Brief

    Filed June 17, 2005

    On the other hand,it has also affirmed the death verdict in a case where the fact that the defendant killed in a so- called savage frenzy waspresented as an aggravator underfactor (a). People v. Jennings, 53 Cal.3d 334 (1991). The vagueness of the factor allows prosecutors to argue that virtually any murderinvolving any victim qualifies as an aggravating factor, weighing in favor ofimposition ofthe death penalty.

  4. PEOPLE v. CAGE (MICKY RAY)

    Appellant’s Opening Brief

    Filed March 14, 2011

    First, what the California Supreme Court hascharacterized as the “plain meaning”ofthe instructionsis not whatthe instructions say. (See Peoplev. Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 386.) The question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instructions in a way that violates the federal constitution (Estelle v. McGuire, supra, at p. 72), and there certainly is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instructions according to their express terms.

  5. PEOPLE v. COVARRUBIAS (DANIEL SANCHEZ)

    Respondent’s Brief

    Filed July 30, 2008

    "Under these circumstances, there is no reasonable possibility that consideration of the [alleged personal use enhancements and conspiracy to commit murder] could have improperly influenced the jury." (People v. Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 390.) Appellant's claim should be denied.

  6. PEOPLE v. JOHNSON

    Respondent’s Brief

    Filed May 28, 2013

    [Citation.] ... The key is whether it can be shownthat the population is of such a size that it ‘neutralizes or dilutes the impact of adverse publicity.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 363.) There is no magic number of people that must reside in a county in order for it to be deemed large enoughto support a sufficiently diverse jury pool.

  7. PEOPLE v. JOHNSON

    Appellant’s Opening Brief

    Filed May 30, 2012

    *°/ See, e.g., People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1 -- RT 3296-3297 [defendant killed in cold blood]. 77/ See, e.g., People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334 -- RT 6755 [defendant killed victim in savage frenzy (trial court finding)]. *8/ See, e.g., People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425 -- RT 1741-1742 [defendant attempted to influence witnesses]; People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754 -- RT 1141 [defendantlied to police]. °/ See, e.g., People v. Adcox (1988) 47 Cal.3d 207-- RT 4607 [defendantfreely informsothers about crime]; People v. Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d 527 -- RT 3093 [defendantfailed to engage in a cover-up].

  8. PEOPLE v. GOMEZ

    Appellant’s Opening Brief

    Filed March 21, 2012

    First, what this Court has characterized as the “plain meaning”ofthe instructions is not whatthe instructions say. (See People v. Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 386 [plain meaning of instructions “merely informs the jury to reject unreasonable interpretations of the evidence and to give the defendantthe benefit of any reasonable doubt”]; see Subsections A. and B., above.) The question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instructions in a way that violates the Constitution (Estelle v. McGuire, supra, 502 U.S. at p. 72), and there certainly is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instructions according to their express terms.

  9. PEOPLE v. MORA

    Appellant, Ruben Rangel, Opening Brief

    Filed July 28, 2010

    First, what this Court characterizes as the “plain meaning”ofthe instructions is not whatthe instructions say. (See People v. Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 386.) The question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instructions in a waythat violates the federal Constitution (Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72), and there certainly is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instructions according to their express terms.

  10. PEOPLE v. ROUNTREE (CHARLES F.)

    Respondent’s Brief

    Filed February 22, 2010

    sed to find defendant guilty]; People v. Ramirez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 432-434 [change of venue not compelled where, following media “’saturation,’” 94.3 percent of survey respondents had heard of case, and 51.7 percent thought defendant was responsible for Night Stalker murders]; People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 45 [change of venue motion properly denied where survey showed almost 71 percent of participants who resided in judicial district from which jury was drawnrecalled case, and over 80 percent of those had formed opinionas to guilt]; People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 743, 745 [change of venue not compelled where surveyresults disclosed 65 percent ofjury-eligible individuals had heard of case, and 78 percent of those had prejudged defendantto be guilty]; People v. Proctor, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 524-525 [change of venue not compelled where survey showed 80 percent of those contacted had heard ofcase, and 31 percent of those had formedopinionasto guilt]; People v. Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 359, 363 [change of venue motion properly denied where survey showed 72 percent of respondents recalled case, 51 percent thought they might be influenced by the publicity, and 31 percent believed district attorney had very strong case against defendant].) “The key consideration is ‘whether it can be shownthat the population is of such a size that it “neutralizes or dilutes the impact of adverse publicity.”