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People v. Hurlic

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.
Jul 9, 2018
25 Cal.App.5th 50 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018)

Summary

stating that "the courts have unanimously concluded that Senate Bill No. 620's grant of discretion to strike firearm enhancements under Section 12022.53 applies retroactively to all nonfinal convictions"

Summary of this case from Stroud v. Madden

Opinion

B286082

07-09-2018

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Daryl Glen HURLIC, Defendant and Appellant.

Edward Mahler, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Steven E. Mercer, Acting Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Eric J. Kohm, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


Certified for Partial Publication.

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1100 and 8.1110, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of Part II of the Discussion Section.

Edward Mahler, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Steven E. Mercer, Acting Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Eric J. Kohm, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

HOFFSTADT, J.As a general rule, a criminal defendant who enters a guilty or no contest plea with an agreed-upon sentence may challenge that sentence on appeal only if he or she first obtains a certificate of probable cause from the trial court. ( Pen. Code, § 1237.5, subd. (a) ; People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 76, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 851, 913 P.2d 1061 ( Panizzon ); People v. Cuevas (2008) 44 Cal.4th 374, 384, 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 303, 187 P.3d 30 ( Cuevas ).) Does this general rule apply when the defendant’s challenge to the agreed-upon sentence is based on our Legislature’s enactment of a statute that retroactively grants a trial court the discretion to waive a sentencing enhancement that was mandatory at the time it was incorporated into the agreed-upon sentence? We conclude that the answer is "no," and hold that a certificate of probable cause is not required in these narrow circumstances. Because we are unable to say that there is "no reasonable possibility" that the trial court would decline to exercise its newfound sentencing discretion, we vacate the judgment and remand for a new sentencing hearing to decide whether to exercise that discretion.

All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The People charged Daryl Glen Hurlic (defendant) with three counts of attempted premeditated murder (§§ 187, subd. (a) & 664), and further alleged that those crimes were committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, and in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C), (4) ) and involved a principal’s personal and intentional use and discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d) ).

In March 2017, defendant accepted the People’s offer of a 25-year prison sentence. In accepting this offer, defendant (1) entered a no contest plea to a single count of attempted murder after the People struck the premeditation allegation as to that count, and (2) admitted to a 20-year sentencing enhancement for the personal discharge of a firearm under section 12022.53, subdivision (c). Defendant did not waive his right to appeal.

Although the trial court mistakenly described the enhancement as premised on "[u]sing a firearm and causing great bodily injury," the court also repeatedly made clear that defendant was admitting to a 20-year enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (c). Defendant does not assert that the court’s misstatements in any way rendered the plea involuntary.

Six months later, in September 2017, the trial court imposed the agreed-upon sentence of 25 years in prison and dismissed the remaining two counts of attempted premeditated murder.

On October 11, 2017, the Governor signed Senate Bill No. 620 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) into law, effective January 1, 2018. Senate Bill No. 620 amended section 12022.53 to grant trial courts, for the first time, the discretion to strike section 12022.53’s firearm enhancements. (§ 12022.53, subd. (h), as amended by Stats. 2017, ch. 682, § 2.)

On Halloween 2017, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. He did not check the box on the first page indicating that his appeal "challenge[d] the validity of the plea or admission," but, in the blank space where defendants are to spell out why they are requesting a certificate of probable cause, defendant wrote that he sought to avail himself of "the new Senate Bill 620."

No trial court issued a certificate of probable cause.

DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that he is entitled to ask the trial court to exercise its newfound discretion to strike the 20-year firearm enhancement. The People respond that we may not entertain defendant’s appeal because he did not obtain a certificate of probable cause and that a remand for resentencing would in any event be futile. The parties’ arguments accordingly present two questions: (1) Is a certificate of probable cause required, and (2) Would a remand for resentencing in this case be futile?

I. Necessity for Certificate of Probable Cause

A. Certificates of probable cause, generally

A defendant who seeks to appeal from a "judgment of conviction" after entering a "plea of guilty or" no contest must first (1) file with the trial court a sworn, written statement "showing reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings," and (2) obtain from the trial court a certificate of probable cause attesting that at least one of the defendant’s stated grounds "is not clearly frivolous and vexatious." ( § 1237.5 ; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b) ; People v. Holland (1978) 23 Cal.3d 77, 84, 151 Cal.Rptr. 625, 588 P.2d 765, original italics; cf. People v. Arriaga (2014) 58 Cal.4th 950, 960, 169 Cal.Rptr.3d 678, 320 P.3d 1141 [certificate of probable cause not required when defendant appeals an " ‘order made after judgment’ "].)

Consistent with its purpose of "discourag[ing] and weed[ing] out frivolous or vexatious appeals" following a defendant’s voluntary entry into a plea " ‘in exchange for specified benefits such as the dismissal of other counts or an agreed’ "-upon sentence ( Panizzon , supra , 13 Cal.4th at pp. 75, 80, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 851, 913 P.2d 1061 ; People v. Johnson (2009) 47 Cal.4th 668, 676, 101 Cal.Rptr.3d 332, 218 P.3d 972 ( Johnson ) ), the certificate of probable cause requirement is aimed at (and consequently applies to) claims that operate "in substance [as] a challenge to the validity of the plea" ( Panizzon , at p. 76, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 851, 913 P.2d 1061, original italics; People v. McNight (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 620, 624, 217 Cal.Rptr. 393 ). "[T]he crucial issue," our Supreme Court has explained, "is what the defendant is challenging, not the time or manner in which the challenge is made." ( People v. Ribero (1971) 4 Cal.3d 55, 63, 92 Cal.Rptr. 692, 480 P.2d 308.) In light of this focus, the certificate of probable cause requirement does not apply to claims "that arose after entry of the plea and do not affect the plea’s validity" ( Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(4)(B) ), such as "issues regarding" post-plea "proceedings held ... for the purpose of determining the degree of the crime and the penalty to be imposed." ( Panizzon , at p. 74, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 851, 913 P.2d 1061 ; Johnson , at pp. 676-677, 101 Cal.Rptr.3d 332, 218 P.3d 972 ; People v. Ward (1967) 66 Cal.2d 571, 574, 58 Cal.Rptr. 313, 426 P.2d 881.) Our Legislature has also expressly carved out appeals challenging search and seizure rulings. (§ 1538.5, subd. (m); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(4)(A).)

The question presented in this case regarding the necessity of a certificate of probable cause lies at the intersection of two lines of authority. Reconciling them is a question of law we decide de novo. ( People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 182, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365.)

The first line of authority involves the law interpreting the certificate of probable cause requirement in section 1237.5. This body of law draws a line between pleas in which the parties agree that the court will impose a specific, agreed-upon sentence, and pleas in which the parties agree that the court may impose any sentence at or below an agreed-upon maximum. A certificate of probable cause is required for the former ( Cuevas , supra , 44 Cal.4th at pp. 381-382, 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 303, 187 P.3d 30 ; Panizzon , supra , 13 Cal.4th at pp. 78-80, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 851, 913 P.2d 1061 ; see generally Johnson , supra , 47 Cal.4th at p. 678, 101 Cal.Rptr.3d 332, 218 P.3d 972 ), but not the latter (except where the defendant challenges the legal validity of the maximum sentence itself) ( People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 45-46, 73 Cal.Rptr.3d 605, 178 P.3d 1100 ; People v. Buttram (2003) 30 Cal.4th 773, 777, 790-791, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 571, 69 P.3d 420 ; cf. People v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 763, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 354, 125 P.3d 290 ( Shelton ) [certificate of probable cause required to challenge validity of agreed-upon maximum sentence under section 654] ). This differential treatment flows directly from the substance of the parties’ agreement: Where the parties agree to a specific sentence, the court’s "[a]cceptance of the agreement binds the court and the parties to the agreement" ( People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921, 930, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 715, 188 P.3d 649 ( Segura ) ), and a defendant’s challenge to the specific sentence is "in substance a challenge to the validity of the plea" ( Panizzon , at p. 76, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 851, 913 P.2d 1061, original italics). But where the parties agree to any sentence at or beneath an agreed-upon maximum, that "agreement, by its nature, contemplates that the court will choose from among a range of permissible sentences within the maximum, and that abuses of this discretionary sentencing authority" do not attack the validity of the plea and "will be reviewable on appeal" without a certificate of probable cause. ( Buttram , at pp. 790-791, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 571, 69 P.3d 420.) Because the parties in this case agreed to a specific, 25-year prison sentence, this line of authority suggests that appellate review is permissible only if defendant first obtains a certificate of probable cause.

The second line of authority involves the law governing the retroactivity of new criminal statutes. Although new criminal statutes are presumed to operate prospectively (§ 3), that presumption is rebuttable: Our Legislature or the voters may "expressly ... declare[ ]" an intent to apply the new law retroactively (ibid. ); and, absent an express indication to the contrary, courts will infer an intent to apply a new law retroactively to all nonfinal convictions where that new law "mitigat[es]" or "lessens" "the punishment for a particular criminal offense" ( People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 324, 142 Cal.Rptr.3d 824, 278 P.3d 1182 ; In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 744-745, 48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948 ). A new law mitigates or lessens punishment when it either mandates reduction of a sentence or grants a trial court the discretion to do so. ( People v. Francis (1969) 71 Cal.2d 66, 75-78, 75 Cal.Rptr. 199, 450 P.2d 591.) Applying this body of law, the courts have unanimously concluded that Senate Bill No. 620’s grant of discretion to strike firearm enhancements under section 12022.53 applies retroactively to all nonfinal convictions. ( People v. Billingsley (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1079-1080, 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 277 ( Billingsley ); People v. Arredondo (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 493, 506-507, 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 380 ; People v. Watts (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 102, 119-120, 231 Cal.Rptr.3d 248 ; People v. Woods (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1080, 1090-1091, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 318 ; People v. Robbins (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 660, 679, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 468.) This line of authority suggests defendant is entitled to have the trial court exercise its discretion under Senate Bill No. 620.So which line of authority prevails? We conclude that the authority regarding retroactivity trumps, and we do so for three reasons.

First, plea agreements are, at bottom, "a form of contract," and their terms, like the terms of any contract, are to be enforced. ( Shelton , supra , 37 Cal.4th at p. 767, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 354, 125 P.3d 290 ; cf. Segura , supra , 44 Cal.4th at pp. 931-932, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 715, 188 P.3d 649 [court must enforce terms of plea and may not modify them just because one party unilaterally so requests].) Unless a plea agreement contains a term requiring the parties to apply only the law in existence at the time the agreement is made, however, "the general rule in California is that the plea agreement will be ‘ "deemed to incorporate and contemplate not only the existing law but the reserve power of the state to amend the law or enact additional laws for the public good and in pursuance of public policy." ’ " ( Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 64, 66, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 290, 302 P.3d 598, quoting People v. Gipson (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1065, 1070, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 478.) Put differently, courts will not amend a plea agreement to add " ‘an implied promise [that] the defendant will be unaffected by a change in the statutory consequences attending his or her conviction.’ " ( Harris v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 984, 991, 209 Cal.Rptr.3d 584, 383 P.3d 648, quoting Doe v. Harris , at pp. 73-74, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 290, 302 P.3d 598.) Because defendant’s plea agreement does not contain a term incorporating only the law in existence at the time of execution, defendant’s plea agreement will be "deemed to incorporate" the subsequent enactment of Senate Bill No. 620, and thus give defendant the benefit of its provisions without calling into question the validity of the plea. What is more, because Senate Bill No. 620 grants the trial court at most the discretion to strike the 20-year firearm enhancement and leaves the five-year attempted murder sentence intact, the trial court may end up reimposing the originally agreed-upon 25-year prison sentence; but even if it does not, a resentencing under Senate Bill No. 620 still does not "eviscerate[ ] ... the plea bargain" in this case, and thus, the People may not seek to set aside the plea. ( Harris v. Superior Court , at p. 993, 209 Cal.Rptr.3d 584, 383 P.3d 648.)

Because defendant’s plea agreement was negotiated and fully executed prior to Senate Bill No. 620 becoming law on October 11, 2017, we have no occasion to address whether a defendant whose plea agreement was negotiated while Senate Bill No. 620 was already part of the legal landscape must obtain a certificate of probable cause. (See People v. Enlow (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 850, 853-854, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 402 (Enlow ).)

Second, dispensing with the certificate of probable cause requirement in the circumstances present here better implements the intent behind that requirement. Although the requirement is to be "applied in a strict manner" ( People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1098, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 969 P.2d 146 ), we cannot ignore its underlying purposes, which are: (1) to facilitate and encourage plea agreements, which are " ‘an accepted and "integral component of the criminal justice system and essential to the expeditious and fair administration of our courts." [Citations.]’ " ( Harris v. Superior Court , supra , 1 Cal.5th at p. 992, 209 Cal.Rptr.3d 584, 383 P.3d 648 ; Segura, supra , 44 Cal.4th at p. 929, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 715, 188 P.3d 649 ; Panizzon , supra , 13 Cal.4th at pp. 79-80, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 851, 913 P.2d 1061 ); and, as noted above, (2) to "weed out frivolous or vexatious appeals" ( Panizzon , at p. 75, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 851, 913 P.2d 1061 ). If, as the People urge, a defendant who enters a plea of guilty or no contest must go through the additional step of seeking and obtaining a certificate of probable cause to avail himself or herself of the advantage of ameliorative laws like Senate Bill No. 620 that are otherwise indisputably applicable to him or her, the incentive to enter a plea—or, at a minimum, the incentive to do so expeditiously if legislation or voter initiative along these lines is being contemplated—is reduced. And where, as here, the defendant’s entitlement to a new law’s retroactive application is undisputed, an appeal seeking such application is neither "frivolous" nor "vexatious," thereby obviating any need for section 1237.5 ’s screening mechanism.

Third, the rules of statutory construction favor application of Senate Bill No. 620 over section 1237.5. Where two statutes conflict, courts give precedence to the later-enacted statute and precedence to the more specific statute. ( State Dept. of Public Health v. Superior Court (2015) 60 Cal.4th 940, 960-961, 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 60, 342 P.3d 1217.) And if those two rules of precedence conflict, the more specific statute trumps—even if it is earlier enacted. ( Ibid. ) In this case, Senate Bill No. 620 is the later-enacted statute because it was enacted in 2017, while section 1237.5 was enacted in 1988. Senate Bill No. 620 is also more specific because it deals with a particular sentencing enhancement, whereas section 1237.5 deals more generally with appeals from pleas. Under these canons of construction, in the tug-of-war between our Legislature’s competing intents to have a screening mechanism for appeals following pleas and to give defendants whose convictions are not yet final the benefit of a possible sentencing reduction, the latter intent prevails.

In resisting this conclusion, the People cite Enlow , supra , 64 Cal.App.4th 850, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 402. In Enlow , the defendant entered a plea with an agreed-upon sentence calculated in part under a statute that dictated a temporarily elevated sentence would "sunset" to a lower penalty the next year. ( Id. at pp. 852-853, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 402.) Enlow held on the merits that the defendant was not entitled to be resentenced under the post-"sunset" version of the statute ( id. at p. 855, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 402 ), and also held that his appeal was procedurally improper because he did not obtain a certificate of probable cause ( id. at pp. 853-854, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 402 ). Enlow is both distinguishable and unpersuasive. It is distinguishable because the statutory change in Enlow was not truly a "new law"; the statute’s anticipated sunset was already on the books (and thus part of the legal landscape) at the time the plea agreement was negotiated, such that the parties’ agreement to a specific sentence that did not account for the sunset was "part of the deal," and thus his attack on that sentence went to the validity of the plea itself. Senate Bill No. 620 did not become law until after defendant’s plea agreement was negotiated and executed. Enlow is also unpersuasive insofar as it does not make any effort to reconcile section 1237.5 with the second line of authority involving the retroactive application of new laws ameliorating criminal sentences.

For these reasons, defendant was not required to obtain a certificate of probable cause.

II. Futility of Remand for Resentencing

See footnote *, ante .
--------

DISPOSITION

The judgment is vacated, and the case remanded to the trial court to exercise its discretion whether to lessen defendant’s sentence pursuant to amended section 12022.53, subd. (h).

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION.

We concur:

LUI, P.J.

ASHMANN-GERST, J.


Summaries of

People v. Hurlic

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.
Jul 9, 2018
25 Cal.App.5th 50 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018)

stating that "the courts have unanimously concluded that Senate Bill No. 620's grant of discretion to strike firearm enhancements under Section 12022.53 applies retroactively to all nonfinal convictions"

Summary of this case from Stroud v. Madden

In People v. Hurlic (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 50, 57 (Hurlic), the Second District Court of Appeal held that Senate Bill No. 620 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), which amended section 12022.53 to grant trial courts the discretion to strike section 12022.53's firearm enhancements (§ 12022.53, subd. (h), as amended by Stats. 2017, ch. 682, § 2), applied to reduce a sentence in a case in which the defendant entered into a plea agreement.

Summary of this case from People v. Tannahill

In Hurlic, the defendant pleaded no contest to attempted murder and admitted a 20-year firearm enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (c) in exchange for a stipulated sentence.

Summary of this case from People v. Andrade

In Hurlic, the appellate court ruled that a defendant may challenge even an agreed-upon sentence if the challenge is "based on [the] Legislature's enactment of a statute that retroactively grants a trial court the discretion to waive a sentencing enhancement that was mandatory at the time [the enhancement] was incorporated into the agreed-upon sentence."

Summary of this case from People v. Abraria

In Hurlic, the defendant's judgment was nonfinal because he timely appealed the judgment shortly after Senate Bill No. 620 was enacted, and his appeal was still pending when Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (h), went into effect.

Summary of this case from People v. Ivy

In Hurlic, the defendant pled no contest to attempted murder and admitted a firearm enhancement allegation under section 12022.53, subdivision (c), pursuant to a negotiated plea bargain that did not include a waiver of the right to appeal.

Summary of this case from People v. Ellis

In Hurlic, the defendant entered a no contest plea and admitted a sentencing enhancement allegation under section 12022.53, subdivision (c).

Summary of this case from People v. Leon

In People v. Hurlic (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 50 (Hurlic), the court relied on Harris and Doe, and held that "[u]nless a plea agreement contains a term requiring the parties to apply only the law in existence at the time the agreement is made," the defendant's plea agreement will be " 'deemed to incorporate' the subsequent enactment of Senate Bill No. 620... and thus give defendant the benefit of its provisions without calling into question the validity of the plea."

Summary of this case from People v. Sanchez

In People v. Hurlic (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 50 (Hurlic I), we remanded this case to enable the trial court to exercise its discretion whether to strike the 20-year firearm enhancement imposed in this case.

Summary of this case from People v. Hurlic

In Hurlic, a division of the Second Appellate District perceived that two lines of authority were in irreconcilable conflict and it was necessary to decide which line prevailed.

Summary of this case from People v. Antuna

In Hurlic, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th 50, a case from the Second Appellate District, the defendant entered his plea and was sentenced before Senate Bill No. 620 came into effect.

Summary of this case from People v. Espana

In Hurlic, the defendant's plea agreement did not contain a term applying only the law in effect at the time his plea was executed, so the plea agreement was deemed to incorporate the changes enacted by Senate Bill No. 620, including the trial court's newfound discretion to strike firearm enhancements.

Summary of this case from People v. Espana

In Hurlic, the court of appeal considered a claim similar to that raised by Madrigal here. Hurlic had entered a plea agreement including a term for an admitted firearm enhancement, but on appeal he sought remand for resentencing under a legislative amendment to section 12022.53 granting trial courts the discretion not to impose the enhancement.

Summary of this case from People v. Madrigal

In Hurlic, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at page 57, the court concluded a remand was required in a case where the court had imposed a stipulated sentence that had been reached as part of a plea bargain made before Senate Bill No. 620 became effective.

Summary of this case from People v. Joaquin

In Hurlic, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th 50, the court concluded that because the defendant's plea agreement "[did] not contain a term incorporating only the law in existence at the time of execution, [the] plea agreement will be 'deemed to incorporate' the subsequent enactment of Senate Bill No. 620 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), and thus give defendant the benefit of its provisions without calling into question the validity of the plea."

Summary of this case from People v. Sanchez

In Hurlic, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at pages 53-54, the defendant reached a plea agreement for a 25-year sentence and received that sentence in 2017.

Summary of this case from People v. Hof

In Hurlic, the defendant pled no contest and accepted an offer from the prosecution for a 25-year prison sentence that included a 20-year firearm enhancement.

Summary of this case from People v. Galindo

In Hurlic, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th 50, the court concluded that because the defendant's plea agreement did "not contain a term incorporating only the law in existence at the time of execution, [the] plea agreement [would] be 'deemed to incorporate' the subsequent enactment of Senate Bill No. 620..., and thus give defendant the benefit of its provisions without calling into question the validity of the plea."

Summary of this case from People v. Makboul

In Hurlic, the defendant pleaded no contest to attempted murder and "admitted to a 20-year sentencing enhancement for the personal discharge of a firearm under section 12022.53, subdivision (c)" in exchange for a 25-year prison sentence and the dismissal of a premeditation allegation and two other charges of attempted premeditated murder.

Summary of this case from People v. Fox

In Hurlic, the court concluded the defendant did not require a certificate of probable cause, despite having entered into an agreed-term plea agreement, to raise a claim that Senate Bill No. 620 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) should apply to him.

Summary of this case from In re Aguilar

In Hurlic, the court concluded the defendant did not require a certificate of probable cause, despite having entered into an agreed-term plea agreement, to raise a claim that Senate Bill 620 should apply to him.

Summary of this case from People v. Roman

In Hurlic, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th 50, 235 Cal.Rptr.3d 255, defendant was charged with three counts of attempted premeditated murder with gang and firearm enhancements. (Id. at p. 53, 235 Cal.Rptr.3d 255.) Defendant agreed to a 25-year state prison sentence in exchange for a plea of no contest to one count of attempted murder and admitted a 20-year firearm enhancement (§ 12022.

Summary of this case from People v. Kelly

In Hurlic, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th 50, the court concluded that because the defendant's plea agreement "[did] not contain a term incorporating only the law in existence at the time of execution, [the] plea agreement will be 'deemed to incorporate' the subsequent enactment of Senate Bill No. 620, and thus give defendant the benefit of its provisions without calling into question the validity of the plea."

Summary of this case from People v. Garcia

In Hurlic, the court of appeal considered a claim identical to that raised by Lopez here. Hurlic had entered a plea agreement including a term for an admitted firearm enhancement, but on appeal he sought remand for resentencing under the legislative amendment to section 12022.53.

Summary of this case from People v. Lopez

In Hurlic, without a discussion in the published portion of the opinion, our colleagues in Division Two remanded the matter to the trial court to determine whether, in furtherance of justice, it would exercise its newly-granted discretion to strike that portion of a negotiated sentence that was imposed for a firearm enhancement.

Summary of this case from People v. El
Case details for

People v. Hurlic

Case Details

Full title:The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Daryl Glen HURLIC, Defendant and…

Court:Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

Date published: Jul 9, 2018

Citations

25 Cal.App.5th 50 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018)
235 Cal. Rptr. 3d 255

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