From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

People v. Haqq

California Court of Appeals, First District, First Division
May 30, 2007
No. A110301 (Cal. Ct. App. May. 30, 2007)

Opinion


THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. KELVIN ANDREW HAQQ, Defendant and Appellant. A110301 California Court of Appeal, First District, First Division May 30, 2007

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. SCO56322A

Margulies, J.

Defendant was found guilty of several charges growing out of a violent assault on his girlfriend. After the only two African-Americans in the jury pool were excused, he unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality of the county’s jury pool selection procedures. In addition, before deliberations began, a sitting juror was discharged by the court after making remarks to other jurors suggesting that she believed defendant was being treated unfairly by the prosecution. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in concluding that he had failed to demonstrate that the jury pool selection process was unconstitutional and in discharging the juror. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant was charged in a lengthy information with infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a); count 1), assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 2), using force or violence upon a person (§ 243, subd. (d); count 3), mayhem (§ 203; count 4), making a criminal threat (§ 422; count 5), first degree burglary (§ 460, subd. (a); count 6), three counts of unlawfully dissuading a victim from making a police report (§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1); counts 7–9), two counts of violating the personal liberty of another by violence (§ 236; counts 10–11), unlawfully severing a telephone line (§ 591; count 12), sexual misconduct involving a child under the age of 14 (§§ 288.5, subd. (a) & 1203.066, subd. (b); count 13), and three counts of commission of a lewd act toward a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a); counts 14–16). As enhancements, the information alleged that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury under circumstances involving domestic violence, as to counts 1, 2, and 7 (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)), and that he personally used a deadly weapon, as to counts 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, and 11. (§ 12022, subd. (b).) It was also alleged that he had suffered two prior serious convictions. (§ 1203, subd. (e)(4).)

All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

Defendant lived with his girlfriend and her two children, one of whom was a preteen girl. The girlfriend testified that one night she caught defendant lying next to her daughter in bed while the girl slept and ordered him out of the house. Defendant climbed back in through a window, cut the telephone lines, and attacked the girlfriend with a baseball bat. The beating was severe enough to break her arm. Defendant then refused to let her leave the house, forcing the girlfriend and her daughter to lie in a bed with him for three to four hours before permitting her to seek medical help.

Because the details of defendant’s crimes are not pertinent to the issues he raises on appeal, we have provided only a brief account of the evidence relating to them.

Defendant testified in his own defense. He explained that on the night of the incident, he was pulling the dog off the children’s bed when his girlfriend first saw him. He left the house when ordered to do so, but he decided he needed to get some things from the house before leaving. When his girlfriend would not let him in through the door, he found an open window. As he entered, the girlfriend met him with a bat and struck him at least twice. He grabbed at the bat to take it away. Defendant claimed not to recall subsequent events until a voice snapped him to consciousness, at which time he discovered the bat in his hand. He recalled lying on the bed with the girlfriend and her daughter, but he did not recall compelling them to stay.

A psychologist who examined defendant testified that he was suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) growing out of traumatic events in his past, including two serious blows to the head several years before. The psychologist testified that PTSD can cause, in some sufferers, irritability, rage, and an exaggerated startle response. It can also cause the sufferer to dissociate from events, resulting in loss of memory about particularly stressful events. The psychologist testified that defendant’s PTSD could explain his excessively violent response when confronted with the bat and his failure of memory about the incident.

During jury selection, defendant’s counsel had made a motion to quash the jury venire, which contained only two African-Americans out of a total of 142 potential jurors. Both of the African-Americans had been dismissed without objection for hardship. In support of his claim, defendant presented the testimony of Melvin Toomer, the court’s deputy executive officer in charge of judicial operations. Toomer testified that the court drew its list of venirepersons from a combination of voter registration rolls and records maintained by the Department of Motor Vehicles, which had been purged to eliminate duplication. This resulted in a list of 620,000 persons, drawn from a total county population of over 700,000. Each month, the county mails summonses to approximately 20,000 persons randomly drawn from that list. Because the county does not prescreen to select eligible jurors from the list, it frequently finds that summonses are returned because of changes of address and that summoned persons prove to be ineligible for reasons of youth, lack of citizenship, or other disqualification. In addition, some of the summoned jurors simply fail to appear. Those who fail to appear are sent two warning letters, but no enforcement action is taken if they do not respond to the letters.

Toomer testified that of those summoned, approximately 55 to 60 percent appear for service, with the absentees including both those excused as ineligible and those who simply failed to respond. Toomer could not provide a breakdown among the various reasons for nonappearance because the county does not maintain the necessary records. Nor could he provide information about the race or residence of those failing to appear, since the county does not maintain records reflecting the race or ethnicity of those excused and views the residential information as confidential.

The trial court held that defendant had failed to carry his burden because he presented no evidence of the proportion of African-Americans residing in the county and of county procedures that screened out African-Americans. The court denied the motion to quash, concluding that the juror selection process was race and ethnicity neutral.

After closing argument and before final instructions were given to the jury, the court received a note from one of the jurors. The note stated that during a ride in the elevator that morning, before defense counsel’s argument, Juror No. 5 remarked, “Before this is over, you are going to hate my guts. I can’t stand a railroad.”

Juror No. 10, who had written the note, confirmed the remark, which was made to her and another juror. That second juror recalled a comment that struck him as improper, but he could not recall its exact content.

Concerned that the comment suggested Juror No. 5 had prejudged the case, the court investigated. Juror No. 5 acknowledged that she had said to other jurors in the elevator, “I really didn’t want to come this morning. I walked as slow as I could from the car to here.” When they asked why, Juror No. 5 responded, “[F]rom experiences in my family and my life, I d[o]n’t like trains especially when it’s a railroad.” Asked by the court to explain her comment, Juror No. 5 said that she found defendant to be similar to her brother, who had recently passed away. “My brother was born not retarded, but he was born slow and he was over 30 when he got his GED. . . . I know that people who are very brilliant don’t understand if they have not lived in a home where there is someone who doesn’t have the facilities other people have. When [defendant] got on the stand, in essence, I saw my brother. Now, he was not dumb. He could handle certain things beautifully, but there was something where there was a wire that was not connected and you have probably one of the most brilliant attorneys prosecuting as today [sic], but for the county, I am saying prosecuting for the county, but he doesn’t—I know he probably can’t show any sympathy for someone who isn’t as connected as he might be.” She analogized the district attorney’s argument to bullying of her brother: “I heard all of [the prosecutor’s] comments striking out at someone that I have sympathy for. I don’t say that he did not do what he did, I am not saying that. What I am saying is I saw [my brother] and I am thinking that he is being pounded when maybe he couldn’t help himself.” The court then engaged in extended questioning of Juror No. 5 regarding her ability to weigh the evidence impartially. The juror insisted that she had not made up her mind about the case, that her experience with her brother would not affect her impartiality, and that she would deliberate with the other jurors. Nonetheless, she said that, “I do have to sort of soften some of the evidence in my own mind and I cannot lie about that. That is not right, that is where I am at.”

There was also evidence that Juror No. 5 had remarked to another juror that she might be removed from the jury because she had reacted visibly to one of the prosecutor’s remarks. Because this testimony was deemed immaterial by the trial judge, we do not address it further.

The court removed Juror No. 5, concluding, “I am convinced she has lost the ability to render a fair, impartial and unbiased verdict so I am going to discharge her.” Explaining the decision, the court stated: “The first conversation . . . clearly was juror misconduct. . . . I am also concerned, however, by the fact that she has, and I don’t doubt her veracity. I think she is being totally honest with me, but she has very candidly admitted that she feels sympathy for [defendant]. My instructions have said time and time again you cannot judge this case by sympathy. [¶] Secondly, and this is probably my major concern about allowing her to remain on the jury because of her experience with her own brother who apparently had some kind of mental disorder that affected his memory, what she has already done and what I fear she will do with the other jurors is she will, in essence, be another expert witness.” Juror No. 5 was replaced with an alternate.

Defendant was convicted of the domestic violence counts, Nos. 1–5 and 7–12, and the associated enhancements were found true, but he was found not guilty on the counts charging sexual misconduct with a minor. The court imposed an aggregate prison term of 13 years.

The court had previously granted defendant’s motion for acquittal on count 6. On count 14, the jury was unable to form a verdict. On counts 13 and 16, defendant was found guilty of two lesser misdemeanor charges.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Exclusion of African-Americans from the Jury Pool

Defendant contends that the pool from which members of the jury were chosen was unconstitutional because it was not selected in a manner that resulted in a proportion of African-Americans commensurate with their numbers in the community.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the opportunity to select a jury “from a representative cross section of the community.” (Taylor v. Louisiana (1975) 419 U.S. 522, 528.) Accordingly, “the jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires from which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably representative thereof.” (Id. at p. 538.) To make out a prima facie case for a violation of this “fair-cross-section requirement,” a defendant must show “(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.” (Duren v. Missouri (1979) 439 U.S. 357, 364 (Duren).) Article I, section 16 of the California Constitution provides the same guarantee (People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 272), and the state and federal legal analyses are identical. (People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1159.)

Since Duren, the California Supreme Court has elaborated on the basic analysis. The “community,” for purposes of Duren, is defined as the geographic area from which the particular court draws its jurors. (See generally People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1088–1089.) It is now well established that a defendant must offer evidence of more than a statistical disparity between the proportion of the underrepresented group in the venire and its proportion in the community at large to demonstrate a violation. “A defendant does not discharge the burden of demonstrating that the underrepresentation was due to systematic exclusion merely by offering statistical evidence of a disparity. A defendant must show, in addition, that the disparity is the result of an improper feature of the jury selection process.” (People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 857 (Burgener).) In addition, the Supreme Court has accepted the use of merged voter and vehicle registration records as a constitutionally adequate source of venirepersons, so long as the merged list is nonduplicative. (Ibid.)

Defense counsel cites People v. Buford (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 288, for the proposition that “in a proper case the . . . third prong of the prima facie case can be satisfied by statistics alone” (id. at p. 296), arguing, “This is such a proper case where the disparity is overwhelming and statistics alone are sufficient.” Buford, however, is no longer good law on this issue. The notion that a violation of the Sixth Amendment can be demonstrated by statistical evidence alone, which would read the “systematic exclusion” requirement entirely out of the Duren elements, has been rejected several times by the California Supreme Court since Buford, beginning no later than People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 530, and has been reaffirmed repeatedly since. (E.g., People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1160; People v. Horton, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1088; Burgener, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 857.)

Defendant failed to carry his burden of demonstrating a Sixth Amendment violation for at least three distinct reasons. First, he provided no evidence of the proportion of African-Americans residing in the relevant community, San Mateo County. Without that evidence, it is impossible to know whether any disparity, assuming one existed, was so large that it was “not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community.” (Duren, supra, 439 U.S. at p. 364.) The Supreme Court has held, for example, that disparities as great as 25 percent, on a comparative basis, and 2 percent, on an absolute basis, do not violate the Constitution. (See Burgener, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 860.) While defendant may well be correct that the proportion of African-Americans among persons eligible to sit as jurors in San Mateo County is greater than the 1.4 percent present in the venire at his trial, there is no way to know whether the discrepancy is of constitutional dimension without evidence demonstrating exactly how much greater.

Although defendant contends that African-Americans constituted only “.014 percent” of the venire, the true number is 1.4 percent (2 out of 142).

Second, defendant provided no evidence of the proportion of African-Americans typically present in the venire at the San Mateo County Superior Court, making it impossible to determine whether the composition of the venire in his case was caused by the court’s procedures or was merely an example of the variance that results from a random selection process. As held in People v. Harris (1984) 36 Cal.3d 36 (overruled on other grounds in People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 765–768), a defendant “is constitutionally entitled to a petit jury that is as near an approximation of the ideal cross-section of the community as the process of random draw permits.” (Id. at p. 49, italics added.) The laws of probability predict that, on occasion, the proportion of various categories of persons in a particular venire will depart dramatically from their representation in the community at large, even if the selection process is neutral as to such categories. It is not this type of variance, caused by the vagaries of a random draw, that creates a constitutional violation but the systematic variance that results when the court’s procedures selectively screen out certain types of people. Without information about the composition of the venire over a reasonable period of time, there is no way to know whether the composition of any particular venire is the result of random chance or systematic bias.

Third, defendant provided no evidence of any practice of the county that differentially excluded African-Americans. As noted above, defendant was required to show that “an improper feature” of the jury selection process caused the disparity. (Burgener, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 857.) He provided no evidence that any feature of the process created a disparity, let alone that an improper feature did so. Defendant attempts to blame the county for his failure of proof, claiming that he was unable to present this evidence because the county failed to keep adequate statistics. The burden is not on the county, however, to collect the information necessary to make defendant’s prima facie case. (See, e.g., People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1157 [speculation about the source of the disparity is insufficient and cannot substitute for evidence suggesting a causal relationship].)

Yet even if the county’s uncollected data had supported defendant’s theory, his claim would have failed. Defendant’s speculation was that African-Americans are more likely not to appear for jury service than members of other racial and ethnic groups. It was his position that the county was required to take affirmative steps, beyond random selection from a neutrally-chosen list, to counter this tendency. Essentially the same argument was made with respect to young people in Burgener. The Supreme Court rejected the argument, holding, “So long as the state uses criteria that are neutral with respect to the underrepresented group, the state’s failure to adopt other measures to increase the group’s representation cannot satisfy Duren’s third prong.” (Burgener, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 858.) As the court had previously held in People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 427, the United States Constitution does not require “ ‘that venires created by a neutral selection procedure be supplemented to achieve the goal of selection from a representative cross-section of the population.’ ” Even if defendant had proven that San Mateo County venires are consistently lacking in African-Americans to a constitutional degree, the county would not have been required to take additional steps to increase their representation in the absence of evidence that its selection process was in some manner improper.

B. Discharge of the Juror

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in discharging Juror No. 5, arguing that there was insufficient evidence that she was biased or otherwise could not perform her duties as a juror.

“ ‘A trial court’s authority to discharge a juror is granted by Penal Code section 1089, which provides in pertinent part: “If at any time, whether before or after the final submission of the case to the jury, a juror dies or becomes ill, or upon other good cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform his duty, or if a juror requests a discharge and good cause appears therefor, the court may order him to be discharged and draw the name of an alternate, who shall then take his place in the jury box, and be subject to the same rules and regulations as though he had been selected as one of the original jurors.” (Italics added; see also Code Civ. Proc., §§ 233, 234.) “We review for abuse of discretion the trial court’s determination to discharge a juror and order an alternate to serve. [Citation.] If there is any substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s ruling, we will uphold it. [Citation.] We have also stated, however, that a juror’s inability to perform as a juror must ‘ “appear in the record as a demonstrable reality.” ’ [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 458, quoting People v. Williams (2001) 25 Cal.4th 441, 447–448, fn. omitted.)

Although courts must be cautious in discharging a juror solely on grounds of bias (People v. Thomas (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1477, 1485), a juror who has violated the express instructions of the court is viewed differently. “[A] juror’s serious and wilful misconduct is good cause to believe that the juror will not be able to perform his or her duty.” (People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 864 (Daniels).) Accordingly, “a court may exercise its discretion to remove a juror for serious and wilful misconduct, . . . even if this misconduct is ‘neutral’ as between the parties and does not suggest bias toward either side.” (Id. at pp. 863–864.) As explained by the court in Daniels, it is particularly important to consider the discharge of a juror who has committed misconduct and the substitution of an alternate because “[m]isconduct raises a presumption of prejudice [citations], which unless rebutted will nullify the verdict. The likelihood of the People rebutting that presumption is, of course, far less when the offending juror remains on the jury and participates in the verdict than when the juror is promptly removed. Consequently, ‘[s]ubstitution of an alternate juror upon a showing of good cause is desirable to maintain judicial efficiency. By means of substitution retrial of lengthy cases may be avoided.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 864; see similarly People v. Thomas (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1328, 1333 (Thomas).) In Daniels, the discharged juror discussed the case and expressed his opinions outside the courtroom prior to deliberations and read a newspaper account of the trial. (Daniels, at p. 863.) In Thomas, the discharged juror had hidden the notes he made during trial in his socks in order to take them from the courtroom, despite being instructed not to. (Thomas, at p. 1333.) The discharge of both jurors was affirmed on appeal.

In arguing that the trial court erred because “the record does not establish as a demonstrable reality that this juror had made up her mind prior to deliberations and thus would refuse to deliberate, or that she would use sympathy upon which to render her verdict,” defendant disregards the fact that Juror No. 5 committed serious misconduct, wholly apart from her capacity dispassionately to deliberate. One of the rules central to every judge’s pretrial instructions to the jury is the direction not to discuss the case with anyone outside formal deliberations. Prior to submission of this case to the jury, Juror No. 5 attempted to engage two of her fellow jurors in elevator conversation about the case, thereby violating the instructions not to discuss the case prior to submission or outside the presence of all 12 jurors. The two jurors to whom she spoke immediately told her to stop, demonstrating that they were well aware of their duty not to discuss the case. This breach alone justified the juror’s discharge.

As the trial court here instructed the jury, “You must not converse amongst yourselves or with anyone else on any subject connected with the trial except when all the following conditions exist: [(a)] the case has been submitted to you for your decision by the court . . . [(b)] you are discussing the case with a fellow juror, and [(c)] all 12 jurors and no other persons are present in the jury deliberating room.”

Moreover, Juror No. 5 not only disobeyed the court’s instructions by speaking to her colleagues prematurely, but her comment also revealed that she had formed a very distinct view of the case. In Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 2000) at page 962, to “railroad” means “to convict with undue haste and by means of false charges or insufficient evidence.” By claiming to her fellow jurors that defendant was being railroaded, Juror No. 5 made clear that she had formed a very definite opinion about the merits of the prosecution’s case, her subsequent disavowal notwithstanding. Further, as the trial judge concluded, the juror’s subsequent description of her heartbreaking experiences with her brother and her difficulty in separating those experiences from her reaction to the prosecutor’s conduct made it very likely that she would have difficulty deciding the case on the evidence and the law, rather than on the sympathies she had admittedly formed. When all of these factors are taken together, they constitute substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that Juror No. 5 had “lost the ability to render a fair, impartial and unbiased verdict.” There was no abuse of discretion in the court’s conclusion that this juror could not properly perform her duties.

Defendant relies heavily on People v. Cleveland (2001) 25 Cal.4th 466 (Cleveland), a case largely irrelevant here. In Cleveland, two jurors sent the court a note suggesting that a juror was refusing to deliberate. (Id. at p. 470.) Questioned by the court, the recalcitrant juror said that he believed he was deliberating properly. He said that he did not disagree with, and would apply, the law given in the court’s instructions, but he disagreed with his fellow jurors that a detailed discussion was necessary because he was not convinced that the prosecution had shown all the facts necessary to the crime. (Id. at p. 473.) In concluding that the trial court’s dismissal of the juror was an abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court found that there was no evidence he refused to deliberate or had made up his mind in advance. He simply viewed the evidence differently than the other jurors. (Id. at pp. 485–486.)

Cleveland must be considered together with its companion case, People v. Williams, supra, 25 Cal.4th 441, in which the court affirmed the discharge of a juror who admittedly disagreed with and refused to follow the law on statutory rape during deliberations. (Id. at pp. 447, 461.) Both Cleveland and Williams were concerned with delineating the proper role of the court in inquiring into the conduct of ongoing juror deliberations. Because the misconduct here occurred in advance of deliberations, the analysis of these two cases has only limited applicability. Even if Juror No. 5’s claim that she could put her sympathy for the defendant aside is taken at face value, a dubious proposition given her uncompromising statements in the elevator, her misconduct in disobeying the court’s instructions would have justified the trial court’s action.

Defendant also contrasts this situation with People v. Feagin (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1427, in which the discharged juror had insisted that the local police were biased against African-Americans and that she could not find their testimony credible. (Id. at pp. 1436–1437.) While it is true that the evidence of bias and sympathy was stronger in Feagin than here, the Feagin case did not feature the additional pre-deliberations misconduct found here.

C. Petition for Rehearing

On March 22, 2007, we entered the foregoing written decision. Defendant thereafter filed a petition for rehearing in light of Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. ___ [127 S.Ct. 856] (Cunningham), contending that the trial court erred by imposing an upper term sentence based on facts that were neither found by the jury nor admitted by appellant. Appellant explained his failure to raise this issue on appeal by pointing out that, at the time the appeal was briefed, People v. Black (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1238 held that such a practice was constitutional. In an order entered April 17, 2007, we granted the petition for rehearing and permitted the Attorney General to file an opposition addressing this claim. The Attorney General argues that defendant has waived any claim under Cunningham.

A review of the record at sentencing demonstrates that the trial court did, indeed, rely on facts not found by the jury or admitted by defendant in sentencing him to the upper term—that defendant was a member of the same household as the victim and a minor and that the offense occurred in the presence of the minor. However, the record also demonstrates that defendant waived any claim under Cunningham that this was improper. On the day the jury returned its verdict, immediately after polling the jury, the trial court asked the jury to step outside the courtroom. The court then addressed defense counsel, “Mr. Johnson[,] you have indicated to me in a side bar that [defendant] may be willing to waive his right to have the jury make findings on the aggravated factors that the People have requested a Blakely hearing on; is that correct?” Counsel confirmed that this was the case and that he and defendant had discussed the waiver and its consequences. The court then explained to defendant his right under Blakely,to have the jury find aggravating factors in sentencing, ensured that defendant was aware of the consequences of any waiver of that right, and confirmed that he was willing to have the court make the factual determinations instead. Defendant noted that he understood his rights under Blakely and that he was making a voluntary waiver of those rights.

Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 (Blakely).

By the same reasoning under which a defendant may waive a jury determination of his or her guilt, a defendant may also waive the right to have a jury make sentencing enhancement findings. Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted, in discussing the impact of Blakely, that “any fact other than a prior conviction sufficient to raise the limit of the possible federal sentence must be found by a jury, in the absence of any waiver of rights by the defendant.” (Shepard v. United States (2005) 544 U.S. 13, 24, italics added; see, e.g., U.S. v. Lewis (7th Cir. 2005) 405 F.3d 511, 513.) Defendant expressly made such a waiver here. Accordingly, we reject defendant’s claim that his constitutional rights were violated under the standards announced in Cunningham.

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

We concur:

Marchiano, P.J.

Swager, J.


Summaries of

People v. Haqq

California Court of Appeals, First District, First Division
May 30, 2007
No. A110301 (Cal. Ct. App. May. 30, 2007)
Case details for

People v. Haqq

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. KELVIN ANDREW HAQQ, Defendant and…

Court:California Court of Appeals, First District, First Division

Date published: May 30, 2007

Citations

No. A110301 (Cal. Ct. App. May. 30, 2007)