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People v. Fagan

Court of Appeals of the State of New York
Nov 14, 1985
66 N.Y.2d 815 (N.Y. 1985)

Summary

In State v Fagan, 66 N.Y.2d 815; 498 N.Y.S.2d 335; 489 N.E.2d 222 (1985), and State v Alvey, 67 Haw. 49; 678 P.2d 5 (1984), the courts refused to apply collateral estoppel in a subsequent criminal case to an issue that was previously decided in a civil proceeding.

Summary of this case from People v. Gates

Opinion

Argued October 17, 1985

Decided November 14, 1985

Appeal from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department, Donald J. Mark, J.

Edward J. Nowak, Public Defender (Brian Shiffrin of counsel), for appellant.

Howard R. Relin, District Attorney (Melvin Bressler and Michael J. Nelson of counsel), for respondent.


MEMORANDUM.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

The courts below properly found that the dismissal, at the conclusion of a final parole revocation hearing of charges lodged against the defendant, did not bar a later prosecution of criminal charges based on the same acts. Collateral estoppel is a flexible doctrine, not to be applied automatically just because its formal prerequisites are met (Gilberg v Barbieri, 53 N.Y.2d 285, 292). Strong policy considerations militate against giving issues determined in prior litigation preclusive effect in a criminal case, and indeed we have never done so (see, People v Plevy, 52 N.Y.2d 58, 65, n 4). The correct determination of guilt or innocence is paramount in criminal cases (People v Berkowitz, 50 N.Y.2d 333, 345), and the People's incentive to litigate in a felony prosecution would presumably be stronger than in a parole revocation proceeding (cf. Gilberg v Barbieri, supra).

We have examined defendant's other contention and found it to be without merit.

Chief Judge WACHTLER and Judges JASEN, MEYER, SIMONS, KAYE, ALEXANDER and TITONE concur.

Order affirmed in a memorandum.


Summaries of

People v. Fagan

Court of Appeals of the State of New York
Nov 14, 1985
66 N.Y.2d 815 (N.Y. 1985)

In State v Fagan, 66 N.Y.2d 815; 498 N.Y.S.2d 335; 489 N.E.2d 222 (1985), and State v Alvey, 67 Haw. 49; 678 P.2d 5 (1984), the courts refused to apply collateral estoppel in a subsequent criminal case to an issue that was previously decided in a civil proceeding.

Summary of this case from People v. Gates

In People v. Fagan (66 N.Y.2d 815, supra), the Court of Appeals held that the dismissal of charges at a parole revocation tearing "did not bar a later prosecution of criminal charges based on the same acts" (supra, at 816).

Summary of this case from People v. Hilton

In Fagan the court said, "Collateral estoppel is a flexible doctrine, not to be applied automatically just because its formal prerequisites are met (Gilberg v Barbieri, 53 N.Y.2d 285, 292).

Summary of this case from People v. Walsh
Case details for

People v. Fagan

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v. ALONZO FAGAN, Appellant

Court:Court of Appeals of the State of New York

Date published: Nov 14, 1985

Citations

66 N.Y.2d 815 (N.Y. 1985)
498 N.Y.S.2d 335
489 N.E.2d 222

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