People v. Engram

13 Citing briefs

  1. BRIGGS v. BROWN

    Amicus Curiae Brief of Constitutional Law

    Filed March 30, 2017

    -27- Proposition 66’s stated goals manifest a clear expectation that courts will comply with its measures to advanceits purpose. Unlike the statute in Engram, which this Court construed as permissive in part because of its goal of expediting criminal trials “to the greatest degree that is consistent with the ends of justice,” Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1151, Proposition 66 includes no such limitation. Indeed,it barely mentions promoting fairness to the defendant sentenced to death.

  2. BRIGGS v. BROWN

    Amicus Curiae Brief of Los Angeles County Professional Peace Officers Association

    Filed March 30, 2017

    Nothing in Proposition 66 mandates a court to postponeortotally forgo consideration of an urgent or extremely important civil or criminal proceeding in which time is of the essence in order to make way for a habeas petition or direct appeal. See Engram, 50 Cal.4th at 1152. Surely, the citizens of California who enacted . Proposition 66 did not intend the absurd result that Proposition 66 would unconstitutionally interfere in the courts’ ability to control its cases so as to safeguard the interests of all those before the court.

  3. BRIGGS v. BROWN

    Petitioners, Ron Briggs and John Van de Kamp, Reply to Preliminary Opposition

    Filed January 23, 2017

    D. Proposition 66 Unreasonably Impairs the Courts’ Constitutional and Inherent Authority to Consider Successive and Untimely Petitions. New Pen. Code §1509(d), which severely limits court review of untimely and successive petitions for habeas corpus, invadesboth:(1) the courts’ constitutional jurisdiction over original habeas corpus proceedings; and (2) the courts’ inherent powerto “to fairly and efficiently administerall of the judicial proceedings that are pending before it.” Engram, 50 Cal. 4th at 1146. New Pen. Code §1509(d) provides that untimely and successive petitions for habeas corpus “shall be dismissed unless the court finds, by the ~ preponderanceofall available evidence, whether or not admissible attrial, that the defendantis actually innocent of the crime of which he or she was convicted oris ineligible for the sentence.”

  4. BRIGGS v. BROWN

    Petitioners, Ron Briggs and John Van de Kamp, Traverse

    Filed March 20, 2017

    D. Successive and Untimely Petitions Petitioners have argued that new Penal Code §1509(d), which severely limits court review of successive and “untimely”petitions for habeas corpus, invadesboth: (1) the courts’ constitutional jurisdiction over original habeas corpus proceedings; and (2) the courts’ inherent power“to 31 fairly and efficiently administerall of the judicial proceedingsthat are pending before it.” Engram, 50 Cal. 4th at 1146. In response, Intervenor makespolicy arguments about how successive and “untimely” habeas corpus petitions are a burden on the system.

  5. PEOPLE v. CLANCEY

    Respondent's Opening Brief on the Merits

    Filed June 20, 2012

    Unquestionably,the 66applicationofthis legislative directive would serveto “‘materially impair’”the core function of the trial court whichis to efficiently and justly manageits calendar and resolve cases. (Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1147.) Sinceit cannot be presumed that the Legislature intended to create a constitutional problem,sections 667, subdivision (g) and 1170.12, subdivision (e) cannot be construed as precluding the court from expeditiously concluding a case by way of an indicated sentence.

  6. BRIGGS v. BROWN

    Petitioners, Ron Briggs and John Van de Kamp, Petitioner for Writ of Mandate/Prohibition with Request for Stay

    Filed December 20, 2016

    Such an insensible schemeis not constitutional under the separation of powers doctrine. See Engram, 50 Cal. 4th at 1151 (“[P]ast decisions have recognized that [a statutory] provision cannot properly be interpreted as establishing an absolute or inflexible rule mandating . . . precedence [of certain cases] underall circumstancesorin total abrogation ofa trial court’s ultimate control or discretion over the order in which the cases pending before it should be considered.”); In re Shafter-Wasco Irrigation Dist., 55 Cal. App. 2d at 487-88 (addressing the unconstitutionality of a statutory provision imposing an unreasonably short time limit for the determination of an appeal).

  7. PEOPLE v. BANKS

    Appellant, Lovie Troy Matthews, Reply Brief on the Merits

    Filed July 25, 2014

    Clearly, this would not pass constitutional scrutiny. (Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1161 ["A statute must be construed, ifreasonably possible, in a mannerthat avoids a serious constitutional question"].) Wealso do notbelieve Tison stands for the proposition thatall armed robberies carry such a substantial risk of death that the mere commission ofthat crimeis sufficient to establish that the getawaydriver acted with reckless indifference to humanlife.

  8. APPLE v. S.C. (KRESCENT)

    Petitioner's Opening Brief on the Merits

    Filed May 14, 2012

    Another well-established principle of statutory construction is that “a statute must be construed, if reasonably possible, in a manner that avoids a serious constitutional question.” (People v. Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th 1131, 1161; see also In re Smith (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1251, 1269; Myers v. Philip Morris Cos. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 828, 846-847; Miller v. Municipal Court (1943) 22 Cal.2d 818, 828.) Here, construing the Act to apply to in-person, but not online, transactions, avoids two serious constitutional infirmities: (1) the violation of the notice requirements of due process; and (2) the impermissible regulation of interstate commerce.

  9. BRIGGS v. BROWN

    Amicus Curiae Brief of California District Attorneys Association

    Filed March 30, 2017

    The legislature may put reasonable restrictions upon constitutional functions of the courts provided they do not defeat or materially impair the exercise ofthose functions.” (Brydonjack v. State Bar, supra, 208 Cal., p. 442-444; People v. Engram (2010) 50 Cal. 4th 1131, 1147.) While there is no question that the courts are an independent branch of government, and possess broad inherent powersto properly and effectively carry out their judicial functions and managetheir calendars, “It does not follow that the Legislature necessarily violates the separation ofpowers doctrine wheneverit legislates with regard to such inherent judicial power or function.”

  10. BRIGGS v. BROWN

    Respondents, Xavier Becerra and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Written Return

    Filed February 27, 2017

    And this Court likewise interpreted a statute givingtrial preference to criminal cases in such a wayasto avoid a potential separation of powers problem. (People v. Engram (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1131, 1152-53; Lorraine v. McComb (1934) 220 Cal.753 [same].) In Le Francois, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1105, this Court noted that a statute which precluded courts from sua sponte reconsidering their own rulings “would directly and materially impair and defeat the court’s most basic functions, exercising its discretion to rule upon controversies between the parties and ensuring the orderly administration ofjustice,” and accordingly adopted a saving construction.