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People v. Dago

Supreme Court of Colorado. En Banc
Jun 19, 1972
179 Colo. 1 (Colo. 1972)

Summary

applying fact/opinion distinction in private libel

Summary of this case from Myers v. Boston Magazine Co., Inc.

Opinion

No. 24867

Decided June 19, 1972.

Defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery and appealed.

Affirmed

1. CRIMINAL EVIDENCESimilar Offenses — Admissible — Limited Purpose. Evidence of similar offenses is admissible when it is offered for the limited purpose of providing motive, intent, scheme, plan or identity.

2. ROBBERYAggravated — Testimony — Witness — Again Robbed — Probative — Scheme and Design — Modus Operandi — Same. In prosecution for aggravated robbery, committed on November 10, 1969, testimony of complaining witness, that he was again robbed on January 24, 1970 by a man whom he recognized as defendant, had probative value to show scheme, motive, plan or design and identification; especially, where such witness gave unrefuted testimony that his identification of defendant as his assailant in first robbery was strengthened because he recognized defendant in the second robbery and modus operandi was the same as that of the first.

3. INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINALWorded — Language of Statute — Proper. Where the instruction is worded substantially in the language of the statute, no more is required if the language is clear.

4. Aggravated Robbery — Language of Statute — Failure to Instruct — Simple Robbery — Lesser Included Offense — No Error. Where, in prosecution for aggravated robbery, trial court gave instruction which was worded substantially in language of statute proscribing robbery but failed to instruct jury as to what it meant in referring to simple robbery as a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery, held, as such, trial court did not err; especially, where instruction when read as a whole was not complicated or difficult to understand.

Appeal from the District Court of the City and County of Denver, Honorable Don D. Bowman, Judge.

Duke W. Dunbar, Attorney General, John P. Moore, Deputy, George E. DeRoos, Assistant, for plaintiff-appellee.

Rollie R. Rogers, State Public Defender, J. D. MacFarlane, Chief Deputy, Randolph M. Karsh, Deputy, for defendant-appellant.


George Dago appeals from his conviction for aggravated robbery. He contends that the trial court erred (1) in permitting testimony concerning a second, subsequent robbery allegedly involving Dago but for which he was not on trial; and (2) in failing to define the term "simple robbery" when alluding to it as a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery. We find no error and therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

During Dago's trial on the charge of aggravated robbery committed on November 10, 1969, the complaining witness was allowed to testify that he was again robbed on January 24, 1970, by a man whom he recognized as Dago. After the witness testified as to the events of the second robbery, the judge cautioned the jury that evidence of the second robbery " . . .only goes as to scheme, motive, plan or design and possibly identification of the defendant. . . . That's the purpose of it and that only."

[1] We do not agree with the contention that Dago was unfairly prejudiced by the testimony reported above. It is the rule in Colorado that evidence of similar offenses is admissible when it is offered for the limited purposes of proving motive, intent, scheme, plan or identity. Clews v. People, 151 Colo. 219, 377 P.2d 125; Stull v. People, 140 Colo. 278, 344 P.2d 455.

As pointed out above, the court carefully gave the limiting instruction ordinarily required by Stull v. People, supra, in cases where similar transactions are admitted into evidence.

[2] The record adequately evinces the probative value of the testimony as it related to the purposes for which it was offered. The complaining witness gave unrefuted testimony that his identification of Dago as his assailant in the first robbery was strengthened because he recognized Dago in the second robbery. Moreover, it should be noted that the modus operandi of the second robbery was the same as that of the first.

II.

Dago's second contention is that the trial court committed error in failing to instruct the jury as to what the court meant in referring to "simple robbery" as a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery.

[3,4] The instruction in question here was worded substantially in the language of the statute, C.R.S. 1963, 40-5-1, and under the laws of our state, no more than this is required if the language is clear. Simms v. People, 174 Colo. 85, 482 P.2d 974; Jordon v. People, 161 Colo. 54, 419 P.2d 656, cert. denied 386 U.S. 992, 87 S.Ct. 1308, 18 L.Ed.2d 388. The record shows that the instructions when read as a whole are not complicated nor difficult to understand, and the jury was fully capable of understanding the concept of "simple robbery" as a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery.

The judgment is affirmed.


Summaries of

People v. Dago

Supreme Court of Colorado. En Banc
Jun 19, 1972
179 Colo. 1 (Colo. 1972)

applying fact/opinion distinction in private libel

Summary of this case from Myers v. Boston Magazine Co., Inc.
Case details for

People v. Dago

Case Details

Full title:The People of the State of Colorado v. George Dago

Court:Supreme Court of Colorado. En Banc

Date published: Jun 19, 1972

Citations

179 Colo. 1 (Colo. 1972)
497 P.2d 1261

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