People v. Chestnut

14 Citing briefs

  1. The People, Respondent,v.Joel Joseph, Appellant.

    Brief

    Filed March 31, 2016

    In fact, it is entirely reasonable to conclude that Gonzalez delivered the cocaine to defendant in a generic plastic bag precisely because it appeared “innocuous” from the outside (Defendant’s Brief at 32), and thus, it would be less likely to stand out as containing drugs. See, e.g., McRay, 51 N.Y.2d at 599 (the defendant stored glassine envelopes containing heroin in a grocery bag); Graham, 211 A.D.2d at 59 (brown paper bag); Matter of Shaheem F., 229 A.D.2d 436, 437 (2d Dept. 1996) (plastic bag). In that regard, it bears emphasizing that the Appellate Division recognized that defendant’s white plastic bag could appear “innocuous” “if viewed in isolation,” but stressed that the bag had to be viewed “in context,” where “it clearly indicated the presence of a drug transaction.”

  2. The People, Respondent,v.Scott F. Doll, Appellant.

    Brief

    Filed September 3, 2013

    The Defendant attempts to support his argument that the detention was illegal by pointing out that the Deputies could not be sure that the substance they observed on him was human blood. What the Defendant fails to apprehend in making this claim is that a determination of reasonable grounds to believe that an emergency exists is founded upon probabilities, not certainties (People v Chestnut, 51 NY2d 14 [Reasonable suspicion, not absolute certainty, is the applicable standard, and it is clear that the officer's concerns were predicated upon specific and articulable facts"]; People v Rodriguez, 77 AD3d 280, Iv denied 15 NY3d 955). Despite the fact that the Appellate Division correctly concluded that the Deputies had "ironclad proof that a serious life-threatening injury" had occurred (A. 9), such definitive indicia are not required for the application of the emergency doctrine (Michigan v Fisher, 558 US 45).

  3. The People, Appellant,v.William Brown, Respondent.

    Brief

    Filed February 12, 2015

    After all, reasonable suspicion -- and even probable cause -- does not require “proof beyond a reasonable doubt or evidence sufficient to warrant a conviction.” McRay, 51 N.Y.2d at 602 (citations omitted); see also People v. Mercado, 68 N.Y.2d 874, 877 (1986) (“Probable cause does not require proof to a mathematical certainty, or proof beyond a reasonable doubt”). 8 Simply put, considering all of the circumstances, it was reasonable for the officers to deduce that defendant and Thomas were fleeing, and looking back over their shoulders, because they had just committed a crime.

  4. The People, Appellant,v.William Brown, Respondent.

    Brief

    Filed February 12, 2015

    For that reason, “[c]ourts simply must not . . . attempt to dissect each individual act by the police[]; rather, the events must be viewed and considered as a whole, remembering that reasonableness is the key principle.” People v. Chestnut, 51 N.Y.2d 14, 23 (1980). To guide courts in assessing the reasonableness of police conduct, this Court has defined four stages of police-citizen interactions.

  5. The People, Respondent,v.Josefina Jimenez, Appellant.

    Brief

    Filed January 15, 2014

    None of these cases bears even remote similarity to this burglary investigation. 35 Defendant’s remaining arguments represent factual disputes that are not properly before this Court. See Harrison, 57 N.Y.2d at 477; McRay, 51 N.Y.2d at 601. Sgt. Manzari’s hearing testimony that defendant was “cooperative” during the arrest is meaningless.

  6. The People, Respondent,v.Steven Berrezueta, Appellant.

    Brief

    Filed June 5, 2018

    The touchstone of any analysis of police conduct is reasonableness. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968); People v. Wheeler, 2 N.Y.3d 370, 374 (2004); People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976); People v. Chestnut, 51 N.Y.2d 14, 23 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1018 (1980).

  7. The People, Respondent,v.Lawrence Parker, Appellant.

    Brief

    Filed March 20, 2018

    This claim should be rejected because defendant, in addition to fleeing from police, possessed a sledgehammer, which represented a legitimate safety concern that permitted Officer Fraterrigo to place him in handcuffs during the remainder of the investigation. See People v. Tiribio, 88 A.D.3d 534, 535 (1st Dept. 2011), citing People v. Chestnut, 51 N.Y.2d 14, 21 (1980) (“officers’ display of their weapons, use of force to bring defendant to the ground, and application of handcuffs were precautionary measures that were justified by the circumstances and did not elevate the detention to an arrest”); People v. Mabeus, 68 A.D.3d 1557, 1562 (3d Dept. 2009) (police had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant, place him in handcuffs, and secure him for “approximately 30 minutes, since each of these actions was justified by particular exigencies involved in the investigation”); People v. Gatling, 38 A.D.3d 239, 240 30 (1st Dept. 2007) (defendant’s “resistance to the police at the time of his detention fully justified the use of handcuffs as a precautionary measure during the brief period in which police awaited arrival of the victim”); People v. Alford, 186 A.D.2d 43 (1st Dept. 1992) (defendant was reasonably placed in handcuffs during an investigative detention because he had “already attempted to flee”); People v. Smith, 228 A.D.2d 173, 174

  8. The People, Respondent, v Stanley Hardee, Appellant.

    Brief

    Filed October 11, 2017

    That is, police-citizen interactions must be viewed as an evolving whole rather than being broken down into discrete elements. See People v. Chestnut, 51 N.Y.2d 14, 23 (1980); People v. Benjamin, 51 N.Y.2d 267, 271 (1980). Accordingly, a court’s “focus must be directed on whether the conduct of -14- the police was reasonable in view of the totality of the circumstances.”

  9. The People, Respondent, v Stanley Hardee, Appellant.

    Brief

    Filed October 11, 2017

    96 A.D.3d at 42. In any event, the Newman decision is not before this Court. -24- which “turns upon the facts of each case”), citing People v. Chestnut, 51 N.Y.2d 14, 22 (1980), and People v. Moore, 32 N.Y.2d 67, 69 (1973). Now, though, defendant essentially maintains that the specific factual circumstances present in Mundo and Carvey must also be present in any other car stop before the police may legally conduct a protective vehicle search.

  10. The People, Respondent,v.John Gayden, Appellant.

    Brief

    Filed October 14, 2016

    Accordingly, defendant's shout of "oh shit" and immediate flight upon observing Officer Jorge exit his vehicle, when combined with the infonnation from the anonymous report, generated a reasonable suspicion a crime was being committed and justified Officer Jorge's pursuit of the fleeing defendant (see Moore, 6 NY3d at 501; People v Martinez, 80 NY2d 444, 448 [1992]).2 Indeed, the record is clear that Officer Jorge did not pursue defendant until defendant actively fled (R 44, 68, 73). Moreover, Officer Jorge's pursuit of defendant was reasonable given the quickly developing circumstances (see People v Chestnut, 51 NY2d 14, 23 [1980] ["Courts simply must not, in this difficult area of street encounters between private citizens and law enforcement officers, attempt to dissect each individual act by the policemen; rather, the events must be viewed and considered as a whole, remembering that reasonableness is the key principle when undertaking the task of 2 Reasonable suspicion ripened into probable cause to arrest when, moments after he began fleeing, defendant reached for his waistband and dropped a handgun (see People v Pines, 99 NY2d 525 [2002]; Martinez, 80 NY2d 448-449). 17 balancing the competing interests presented"]).