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People v. Castillo

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Jun 9, 2020
F076685 (Cal. Ct. App. Jun. 9, 2020)

Opinion

F076685

06-09-2020

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MANUEL CASTILLO, Defendant and Appellant.

John P. Dwyer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler and Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Lewis A. Martinez, and Amanda D. Cary, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Kern Super. Ct. No. MF012263A)

OPINION

THE COURT APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. John W. Lua, Judge. John P. Dwyer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler and Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Lewis A. Martinez, and Amanda D. Cary, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Before Levy, Acting P.J., Poochigian, J. and Detjen, J.

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INTRODUCTION

Appellant Manuel Castillo was convicted of multiple felonies after beating and raping his girlfriend, assaulting the arresting officer, and urging the victim not to cooperate with the prosecution. He was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 50 years to life, plus a determinate term of 25 years four months in prison.

On appeal, appellant argues the matter must be remanded for the trial court to determine whether to dismiss the prior serious felony enhancements based on subsequent enactments to Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a). He further argues the court improperly ordered him to pay a restitution fine and other fees in violation of his due process rights pursuant to People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157.

All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.

We remand for several sentencing issues and otherwise affirm.

FACTS

In February or March 2016, C.D. and appellant began a dating relationship and lived together. On or about September 17, 2016, C.D. disagreed with appellant about whether to leave a visit with her father. Appellant punched her in the forehead and left a knot.

On the evening of September 18, 2016, appellant and C.D. were drinking and smoking marijuana. They argued and appellant called her names. Appellant wanted to have sex, but C.D. said no. Appellant punched her in the jaw. C.D. believed she passed out. When she regained consciousness, she was lying on the floor and not wearing underwear, and her legs were apart. Appellant was standing over her and he was not wearing any clothes. He was still calling her names. C.D. tried to sit up and said she was going to leave. Appellant hit her again and split her lip. Appellant smiled and asked if she wanted a glass of water. When appellant left the room, C.D. grabbed her clothes and climbed out of the bedroom window.

C.D. ran to a neighbor's house for help. They found her with "a very bloody face," and she was scared, screaming, crying, and generally incoherent. C.D. told her neighbor, "He hurt me between my legs" and repeatedly said the name "Manuel."

Around 1:30 a.m. on September 19, 2016, Officer Arroyo responded to the neighbor's house. C.D.'s face was bloody, she had a large cut on her lip, and she was crying and afraid. C.D. gave her address and said, "Go get him." Arroyo called for an ambulance and C.D. was taken to the hospital. Resisting arrest

As C.D. was being placed in an ambulance, appellant appeared at the neighbor's house and appeared upset. In response to Officer Arroyo's questions, appellant said he knew C.D. and she lived at his address. Arroyo recognized the address as the same one C.D. gave for her assailant. Arroyo asked for identification and appellant reached into his pocket. Arroyo was concerned he was reaching for a weapon. He grabbed appellant's arm and told him not to reach into his pocket. Appellant punched Arroyo in the face and Arroyo started to bleed from his nose. Arroyo pushed appellant back, and appellant punched Arroyo in the jaw. Arroyo punched appellant and broke his right hand doing so. A struggle ensued, and the emergency personnel at the scene helped Arroyo take appellant into custody. C.D.'s injuries

When C.D. reached the hospital, she was treated for bruises and abrasions on her face and neck, and a laceration on her upper lip that required stitches. She reported that that she was sexually assaulted and lost consciousness. A vaginal swab tested positive for semen; further tests indicated it had been deposited within 24 hours; and DNA tests showed a match to appellant. Dissuading a witness

After his arrest, appellant called C.D. from jail several times and told her to say he was not the assailant and someone else attacked her. When C.D. refused, appellant threatened to kill C.D. and her family.

On September 26, 2016, about a week after his arrest, appellant called an unknown woman from jail, and the call was recorded. He asked the woman to tell his mother to contact C.D. and tell her to "drop the case cause I'mma [sic] about to do like thirty years. They're trying to give me life." Appellant's mother regularly contacted C.D. for a couple of weeks and asked her not to testify against appellant and to tell the authorities that he did not rape her. C.D. threatened to call the police and his mother stopped calling. Evidence of prior acts of domestic violence

The prosecution also introduced evidence about appellant's prior acts of domestic violence.

C.D. testified that about a month after they started dating, appellant looked through her cell phone because he suspected she was seeing another man, and he deleted her schoolwork. She grabbed her phone and yelled at him. Appellant punched her in the eye and left a small scar. On another occasion, appellant hit her while they were arguing. C.D. threatened to call the police, and appellant beat her "so bad" that he gave her black eyes and knots on her head. C.D. testified about another incident where she tried to run away, but appellant dragged her back to the house and "slapped [her] around a couple of times." C.D. testified that throughout their relationship, appellant forced her to have sex whenever she refused to do so.

The prosecution introduced evidence about an incident in December 2013, when officers responded to appellant's apartment in response to a 911 "hang-up" call. There was blood on the floor, and appellant was in the kitchen and cleaning blood off a large butcher knife. The officer found P.B., appellant's girlfriend at the time, locked in the bathroom. The officers convinced her to come out; she was crying, frightened, and had bloody knife wounds to her chin and neck. Appellant was later convicted of committing assault with a deadly weapon on P.B. Defense evidence

The defense called Officer Lona, who contacted C.D. at the hospital. Lona testified C.D. appeared intoxicated, but medication may have also affected her appearance. C.D. said they had been drinking all day, and appellant hit her after they argued. C.D. never said appellant raped her.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 21, 2016, a felony complaint was filed against appellant.

In September 2016, the court declared a doubt as to appellant's competency and suspended criminal proceedings pursuant to section 1368 and appointed an expert to examine him. After reviewing the expert's report, the court found appellant was not competent to stand trial and committed him to the jurisdiction of the Department of State Hospitals. In April 2017, the court found appellant had been restored to competency and criminal proceedings were resumed.

In issue 1, post, we will address the specific dates that appellant received competency treatment and how his presentence credits were calculated.

On September 19, 2017, an amended information was filed in the Superior Court of Kern County charging appellant with the following offenses:

Count 1, unlawful infliction of corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition on a person he was in a dating relationship with, committed on September 19, 2016 (§ 273.5, subd. (a)), with a prior domestic violence conviction (§ 273.5, subd. (f)), and that he personally inflicted great bodily injury under circumstances involving domestic violence (§ 12022.7, subd. (e));

Count 2, felony resisting arrest by force or violence (§ 69);

Count 3, unlawful sexual intercourse by means of force, violence, or fear (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)), with the special allegation that he personally inflicted great bodily injury within the meaning of the "One Strike" law, which
would trigger a sentence of 25 years to life (§ 667.61, subds. (d)(6), (a), (c)(1));

Count 4, unlawfully attempting to dissuading a witness, between September 30, 2016, and April 4, 2017 (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(2)); and

Count 5, unlawful infliction of corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition on a person he was in a dating relationship with, on or about September 17-18, 2016 (§ 273.5, subds. (a)), with a prior domestic violence conviction (§ 273.5, subd. (f)).

As to all counts, it was alleged appellant had one prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (c)-(j), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(e)); as to counts 1, 3, and 4, one prior serious felony conviction enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)); and as to counts 1, 2, and 3, one prior prison term enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Convictions

On October 4, 2017, after a jury trial, appellant was convicted of all counts and the jury found true the great bodily injury enhancements as to counts 1 and 3. The court found true all of the prior conviction allegations. Sentencing hearing

On December 6, 2017, the court conducted the sentencing hearing. It accepted appellant's briefing and exhibits relevant to a future youthful offender parole hearing pursuant to People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, and sections 3051 and 4801.

The court acknowledged appellant was being sentenced under both One Strike law (§ 667.61, subd. (d)(6)) and the "Three Strikes" law, and the parties agreed.

The court advised appellant: "... I am going to sentence you to the sentence prescribed by law based on the convictions that you have suffered, and it is my hope and desire that when you get to the California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation that you receive the counseling necessary because of your past criminal conduct, as well as this case, in particular."

The court found no mitigating circumstances and found aggravating factors that that appellant had engaged in violent conduct, which indicated a serious danger to society based on the current offenses and a prior assault; he was on parole when the current offenses were committed; and his prior performance on misdemeanor probation was unsatisfactory. The court further found:

"Considering these circumstances qualitatively, it does appear to the Court that the [appellant] does qualify for the upper term in a triad sentencing scheme for determinate sentencing purposes. As to the counts for which the [appellant] has been found guilty, in determining concurrent and consecutive sentencing, the Court does agree with the probation department regarding Counts 1 and 3 and is going to sentence the [appellant] concurrently to those counts recognizing that the force utilized, based on the theory relied upon by the People, was the same force that justified the conviction for ... Section 273.5 and, therefore, the Court finds it most appropriate to sentence the [appellant] concurrently for those two counts.

"As to the remaining counts, however, Counts 2, 4, and 5, it does appear to the Court that those convictions occurred either on separate dates and times, with separate objectives, or, if committed on or around the same date and time, certainly contained their own independent objectives from the other charges."

The court first sentenced appellant to an indeterminate term for count 3, unlawful sexual intercourse with force or violence, of 25 years to life pursuant to the One Strike law (§ 667.61, subd. (d)(6)) doubled to 50 years to life as the second strike sentence (§ 667, subd. (e)), plus five years for the prior serious felony enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)).

The court then imposed an aggregate determinate second strike sentence of 25 years four months. As to count 5, infliction of corporal injury with a prior conviction, the court imposed the consecutive upper term of five years, doubled to 10 years (§ 667, subd. (e)), plus five years for the prior serious felony enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)); as to count 2, felony resisting arrest, a consecutive term of eight months (one-third the midterm) doubled to 16 months (§ 667, subd. (e)); as to count 4, dissuading a witness, a consecutive midterm of two years, doubled to four years (§ 667, subd. (e)); and stayed the term for count 1, infliction of corporal injury with a prior conviction and the attached great bodily injury enhancement.

Appellant's total term was 50 years to life, plus 25 years four months in prison. The court awarded appellant 510 days of presentence credits, consisting of 444 days of actual custody and 66 days of conduct credits. The court stated that credits were calculated based on 15 percent basis under section 2933.1.

As to count 3, the court imposed a $300 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)) and suspended the $300 parole revocation fine (§ 1202.45) plus a $300 fine pursuant to section 290.3 and penalty assessments of $930. The court imposed a $40 court security fee for each conviction, for a total of $200 (§ 1465.8); and a $30 criminal conviction assessment for each conviction, for a total of $150 (Gov. Code, § 70373).

On December 11, 2017, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

I. Sentencing Issues

During the pendency of this appeal, this court sent a letter to both parties on February 27, 2019, raising several sentencing issues that appeared to require remand, and requested supplemental briefing. Appellant agreed that remand was appropriate. The People did not respond. We briefly review these issues for guidance on remand.

A. The Prior Prison Term Enhancement

First, we noted that while the trial court found true the section 667.5, subdivision (b) prior prison term enhancement, it could not impose a one-year sentence for that enhancement since it was based on the same prior conviction as the section 667, subdivision (a) prior serious felony enhancement. We further noted, however, the trial court did not address the prior prison term enhancement at the sentencing hearing, and it should have ordered it stricken.

B. Conduct Credits

We found the court erroneously calculated appellant's conduct credits for the period of time prior to trial when he was not competent, criminal proceedings were suspended, and he received treatment at a state hospital. We explained:

"Appellant was in custody in this matter 445 days from the date of his arrest on September 19, 2016, through the date of his sentencing on December 6, 2017. On November 10, 2016, the court found appellant was not competent to stand trial and beginning February 7, 2017, appellant was detained at Metropolitan State Hospital for treatment. On March 22, 2017, the hospital's medical director certified that appellant's competency was restored and he was returned to local custody on March 27, 2017, where he remained through the date of his sentencing on December 6, 2017.

"Appellant was not entitled to conduct credit for time in custody while being treated at Metropolitan State Hospital. (People v. Bryant (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 175, 182.) However, when the uncontradicted evidence demonstrates the accused's competency was unquestionably regained as of a date certain, he is entitled to section 4019 conduct credit as of that date. (Id. at p. 184.) Thus, although appellant was entitled to custody credit for the 43 days he was in custody from February 8, 2017, the first whole day he was in treatment, through March 21, 2017, the day before his competency was declared restored, he was not entitled to conduct credit for those days. Consequently, appellant was entitled to presentence conduct credit only for the 402 days he was not in treatment (445 days - 43 days = 402 days)."

We found appellant's convictions in this case for rape and domestic violence limited him to earning a maximum of "15 percent of conduct credits (§ 2933.1, subds. (a) &(c)) because they were both violent felonies (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(3) & (8)). Further, based on his days in custody, excluding treatment days, it appears appellant was entitled to 60 days of presentence conduct credit (402 days x.15 = 60.3) and a total of only 505 days of presentence custody credit (402 days + 60 days + 43 days = 505 days). Thus, it appears the court also erred in its award of presentence custody credit."

C. Fines and Assessments

Next, we found the trial court erroneously failed to "memorialize all the fines and penalty assessments it imposed. 'All fines and fees and their statutory authority must be set forth in the abstract of judgment.' (People v. High (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1200-1201.) Although appellant's abstract of judgment for his indeterminate sentence lists the $300 fine the court imposed pursuant to section 290.3 and the total of $930 in penalty assessments on that fine, it does not list the individual assessments that comprise this total amount or the statutory basis for each individual assessment."

D. Abstract of Judgment

Finally, we found the abstract of judgment did not properly reflect appellant's sentence. "[A]lthough this abstract of judgment indicates that appellant's indeterminate sentence was imposed pursuant to the Three Strikes law (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)), it does not indicate that it was also imposed pursuant to the One Strike law (§ 667.61). Further, this abstract of judgment has a potentially confusing entry in section 15 where appellant's presentence custody credit is supposed to be memorialized. This section contains three columns. The word 'SEE' appears in column 1, the letters 'CR' in column 2, and the number '290' in column 3. Although 'SEE CR 290' refers the reader to appellant's abstract of judgment for his determinate sentence to see appellant's presentence custody credit, the way it is memorialized on the abstract for his indeterminate sentence can be erroneously read to mean that he received 290 days of presentence custody credit."

This court advised the parties that we were considering whether to remand the matter to the trial court to correct these errors and omissions and requested supplemental briefing on any of these issues.

On March 8, 2019, appellant advised this court that he did not disagree with the issues and did not oppose remand. The People did not respond.

We thus remand the matter to the trial court to address the issues raised in this court's letter of February 27, 2019, and correct the record accordingly.

II. The Prior Prison Term Enhancement

In supplemental briefing, appellant separately asserts, and the People concede, that the trial court's true finding to the prior prison term enhancement must be stricken as a result of a subsequent amendment to section 667.5, subdivision (b).

Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill No. 136 amended section 667.5, subdivision (b), to limit prior prison term enhancements only to prior terms that were served for sexually violent offenses as defined by Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600, subdivision (b). (§ 667.5, subd. (b), as amended by Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2020.) The parties agree that appellant's prior prison term was not served for a sexually violent offense and that the court's true finding must be stricken.

There are thus two separate reasons that the trial court must strike the true finding on the section 667.5, subdivision (b).

III. The Prior Serious Felony Enhancement

The court found true the allegation that appellant had one prior serious felony enhancement pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a). At the time of the sentencing hearing, the court was required to impose the prior serious felony enhancement and did not have any discretion to strike it. (People v. Brown (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1228.) The court imposed consecutive five-year terms for the enhancement to the indeterminate sentence imposed for count 3, and the determinate sentence imposed for count 5.

Effective January 1, 2019, sections 667 and 1385 were amended by Senate Bill No. 1393 to remove the prohibitions on striking a prior serious felony enhancement. (See Stats. 2018, ch. 1013, §§ 1-2.) The amended statutes apply retroactively to all cases that are not yet final. (People v. Garcia (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 961, 971-973; People v. Zamora (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 200, 208.)

Appellant argues the matter must be remanded for the court to determine whether to exercise its discretion and strike the five-year terms imposed for prior serious felony enhancement under the amended statutes.

The People agree the amendments are retroactive but argue that remand is not required based on the court's sentencing decisions in this case. " '[W]hen the record shows that the trial court proceeded with sentencing on the ... assumption it lacked discretion, remand is necessary so that the trial court may have the opportunity to exercise its sentencing discretion at a new sentencing hearing. [Citations.] Defendants are entitled to "sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the 'informed discretion' of the sentencing court," and a court that is unaware of its discretionary authority cannot exercise its informed discretion.' [Citation.] But if ' "the record shows that the trial court would not have exercised its discretion even if it believed it could do so, then remand would be an idle act and is not required." ' [Citation.]" (People v. McDaniels (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 420, 425.)

We agree that remand would be an idle act in this case. After imposing the indeterminate one-strike term for count 3, the court had discretion to impose determinate terms for the other convictions. While it found counts 1 and 3 required concurrent terms, and stayed the sentence for count 1 because the counts involved the same use of force, it separately found that upper terms and consecutive sentences were otherwise appropriate for the remaining counts. We find the court's sentencing decisions indicate that it would not have stricken the prior serious felony enhancements and remanding would be an idle act in this case.

IV. The Restitution Fine and Fees

Appellant relies on Dueñas and argues the court improperly imposed the restitution fine and fees in violation of his constitutional rights without determining whether he had the ability to pay these amounts. Appellant asserts the order imposing the fine and fees must be reversed and stayed until the People prove he has the ability to pay. Appellant argues he did not forfeit review of the issue since Dueñas had not been decided at the time of the sentencing hearing, it constituted an unforeseen change in the law, and any objection would have been futile.

We decline to reverse or stay the court's orders for the restitution fine and fees. As we recently explained in People v. Aviles (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1055 (Aviles), we believe Dueñas was wrongly decided and an Eighth Amendment analysis is more appropriate to determine whether restitution fines, fees, and assessments in a particular case are grossly disproportionate and thus excessive. (Aviles, at pp. 1068-1072.) Under that standard, the fine and fees imposed in this case are not grossly disproportionate to Appellant's level of culpability, and thus not excessive under the Eighth Amendment. (Aviles, at p. 1072.)

The California Supreme Court is currently considering whether trial courts must consider a defendant's ability to pay before imposing or executing fines, fees, and assessments; and if so, which party bears the applicable burden of proof. (See People v. Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47, 94-98, review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S257844.) --------

The People argue appellant forfeited any challenge to his alleged inability to pay the fine and fees because he did not object at the sentencing hearing When the court imposes a restitution fine greater than the $300 statutory minimum amount, "[s]ection 1202.4 expressly contemplates an objection based on inability to pay." (People v. Frandsen (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1126, 1153 (Frandsen); Aviles, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 1073; § 1202.4, subds. (c), (d).) In this case, however, the court imposed the statutory minimum restitution fine of $300 and, as a result, appellant did not have the statutory right to object and did not forfeit review of this issue. (Cf. Frandsen, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 1154; Aviles, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1073-1074.)

Even though appellant did not forfeit review, we would still reject appellant's constitutional claims and find any error arising from the court's failure to make an ability to pay finding was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt since appellant has the ability to pay the fines and fees imposed in this case. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24; People v. Jones (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 1028, 1030-1031; Aviles, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1075-1077.)

" ' "Ability to pay does not necessarily require existing employment or cash on hand." [Citation.] "[I]n determining whether a defendant has the ability to pay a restitution fine, the court is not limited to considering a defendant's present ability but may consider a defendant's ability to pay in the future." [Citation.] This include[s] the defendant's ability to obtain prison wages and to earn money after his release from custody. [Citation.]' " (Aviles, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 1076.)

We can infer from the instant record that appellant has the ability to pay the aggregate amount of fines and fees from probable future wages, including prison wages. (Aviles, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 1076; People v. Douglas (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1397; People v. Ellis (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 1090, 1094.) There is nothing in the record to show that appellant would be unable to satisfy the fine and fees imposed by the court while serving his lengthy prison term, even if he fails to obtain a prison job. While it may take appellant some time to pay the amounts imposed in this case, that circumstance does not support his inability to make payments on these amounts from either prison wages or monetary gifts from family and friends during his prison sentence. (See, e.g., People v. Lewis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1255, 1321; People v. DeFrance (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 486, 505.)

In People v. Potts (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1012, the trial court ordered a defendant convicted of capital murder to pay the statutory maximum restitution fine of $10,000, partially based on the probation officer's erroneous statement that a condemned inmate would be assigned a job in prison. Potts clarified that a defendant sentenced to death would not be permitted to work but found the court's error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and the court's restitution order was otherwise lawful. (Id. at pp. 1055-1056.) The defendant's alleged inability to pay because he lacked a prison job would be "blunted by the fact that he would retain at least some of the money sent to him" by family and friends. (Id. at p. 1056.) Potts held the trial court was "permitted to conclude that the monetary burden the restitution fine imposed on defendant was outweighed by other considerations," such as the seriousness and gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of its commission. (Id. at p. 1057.)

We conclude that to the extent Dueñas applies in this case, any error is harmless and the matter need not be addressed on remand.

DISPOSITION

The matter is remanded for the trial court to address only the sentencing issues addressed in issues I and II, ante, and strike the true finding on the section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement. The trial court is directed to prepare and forward to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and all relevant parties a new abstract of judgment reflecting the modifications and corrections. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.


Summaries of

People v. Castillo

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Jun 9, 2020
F076685 (Cal. Ct. App. Jun. 9, 2020)
Case details for

People v. Castillo

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MANUEL CASTILLO, Defendant and…

Court:COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Date published: Jun 9, 2020

Citations

F076685 (Cal. Ct. App. Jun. 9, 2020)