NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. JV83891)
Ana C. (Minor), a ward of the juvenile court, appeals a dispositional order continuing her wardship, removing her from parental custody, committing her to the San Mateo County Juvenile Rehabilitation Facility, Margaret J. Kemp Camp for Girls (Girls Camp), and imposing various conditions of probation. The sole focus of her appeal is on whether six of these probation conditions are facially unconstitutional for vagueness. After we issued our opinion in this case, the Supreme Court granted the Attorney General's petition for review pending the Court's decision in People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494 (Hall). Now that the Court has decided Hall, this case has been transferred back to us for further consideration in light of that opinion. Applying Hall, we now reject the principal argument Minor advances to attack five of the six probation conditions at issue here—her contention that an express scienter requirement must be added to the language of those conditions—but, with one exception, we see no need for any change in our prior disposition, since most of the relief we ordered was based on other defects. Accordingly, we will vacate one of the six challenged conditions and modify another, but otherwise affirm.
In August 2014, Minor, then 17 years old, was arrested following a joyriding incident involving a stolen car. According to the probation report, a California Highway Patrol officer spotted the car driving erratically on Highway 101 and initiated a traffic stop, but the car accelerated to a speed exceeding 90 miles per hour and eventually crashed along the side of a freeway off-ramp. Appellant and two friends emerged from the car. The two others, one of whom was Minor's boyfriend, Eduardo F., fled the scene, but Minor was arrested. Minor falsely reported to the arresting officer that she had been driving. The officer determined that Eduardo F. had been driving, which was confirmed when, following Eduardo F.'s later arrest, he admitted to having been the driver. There was also evidence that, before the crash, Minor had been drinking. Following her arrest, she submitted to a blood test, which showed a blood alcohol level of .01 percent.
Based on this incident, the district attorney filed a petition under section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code charging Minor with stealing a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), driving a vehicle with wanton disregard for the safety of others (Pen. Code, § 2800.2), possession of stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)), selling a vehicle without the vehicle registration number (Veh. Code, § 10751, subd. (a)), displaying a false license plate (Veh. Code, § 4463, subd. (a)(1)), resisting a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)), possessing burglary tools (Pen. Code, § 466), giving false information to a peace officer (Veh. Code, § 31), and falsely reporting a crime to a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 148.5, subd. (a)). Minor admitted two misdemeanor counts (resisting arrest, and falsely reporting a crime) and the remaining counts were dismissed.
Unless otherwise specifically designated, all further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
In August and September 2014, the juvenile court sustained the section 602 petition, as modified, and declared Minor to be a ward of the court with a maximum confinement time of 14 months, detaining her in the custody of her mother, and imposing various conditions of probation. Among the conditions of probation was a curfew requiring Minor to be home between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.; a stay-away order barring Minor from seeing Eduardo F.; a ban on possession or use of alcohol, drugs or tobacco (the Alcohol, Drugs and Smoking Ban); a ban on possession of drug paraphernalia (the Drug Paraphernalia Ban); and a requirement that Minor attend school regularly (the School Attendance Requirement). For the first 30 days of Minor's wardship, the court placed her under house arrest in her mother's home, subject to electronic monitoring (the Electronic Monitoring Condition). Minor was directed to "obey all rules and regulations of the Electronic Monitoring Program," and, while she was subject to electronic monitoring, the probation department was given discretion to detain her for up to five days in [Juvenile Hall] for any "violation of Court orders or the Electronic Monitoring Agreement."
Within three weeks of the declaration of her wardship, according to a probation report, Minor left her mother's home without permission and cut her electronic monitoring bracelet from her ankle. As a result, she was charged in a second section 602 petition with misdemeanor vandalism, and in a section 777 notice of probation violation she was charged with violating the terms of her probation. On November 5, 2014, Minor admitted the vandalism allegation, and her maximum confinement time was extended to 18 months. Minor was detained in juvenile hall for 27 days, and ordered to participate in family preservation services so that she and her mother could receive counseling assistance designed to facilitate successful at-home completion of her probation. The Electronic Monitoring Condition, which was limited by its terms to a 30-day period, was vacated.
Upon a referral from the probation department based on a report that Minor left her mother's home in violation of her curfew, on March 19, 2015 Minor was found to have violated her probation. The court ordered 30 days of detention in juvenile hall and committed Minor to the G.I.R.L.S. Program, an out-of-home placement, but stayed the G.I.R.L.S. Program commitment in order to give Minor another chance to demonstrate that she could meet the terms of her probation while detained at home. At the section 777 hearing, in light of the reportedly strained relationship between Minor and her mother, the court ordered mediation in addition to the previously-ordered family preservation services.
According to the website of the San Mateo County Probation Department, the "G.I.R.L.S. (Gaining Independence and Reclaiming Lives Successfully) Program is based on gender-responsive principles . . . . Gender-responsiveness is the idea that our girls commit crimes for different reasons than boys, therefore if we can address those issues we can reduce their criminal risk. . . . [¶] Referrals to the G.I.R.L.S. Program are made at the pre-trial and dispositional hearing stages. . . . The G.I.R.L.S. program is a three phase program with phase I beginning in custody [at Girls Camp]." (<http://probation.smcgov.org/girls-program> [as of April 27, 2017].) In light of the references to the G.I.R.L.S. Program in the appellate record, and for purposes of clarity in setting forth the probationary context here, we take judicial notice, on our own motion, of the official explanation of this program found on the website of the San Mateo County Probation Department. (See Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (c), 459, subd. (a); Cruz v. County of Los Angeles (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1131, 1134 [judicial notice may be taken of official acts of county].)
In April 2015, according to a probation report, Minor left her mother's home in violation of her curfew again, this time for a period of several days. After finding Minor to be in violation of her probation, on June 15, 2015, the juvenile court determined that in-home detention had failed, removed Minor from her mother's custody, and ordered her into the G.I.R.L.S. Program at Girls Camp (the June 15 Dispositional Order). The June 15 Dispositional Order was structured to anticipate what would occur once Minor completed phase one of the G.I.R.L.S. Program. When released from Girls Camp, Minor was to begin phase two of the G.I.R.L.S. Program and was to return to her mother's custody, but would remain subject to the conditions of probation that were originally imposed on her in September 2014, with some additions and modifications.
Several of the added conditions in the June 15 Dispositional Order focused on alcohol and drug use and on Internet activity. To prevent interference with chemical testing for drug usage, Minor was barred from "consum[ing] any poppy seed products or other substances known to adulterate or interfere with chemical testing" (the Poppy Seed Products Ban). To track Minor's Internet activities, the court imposed an electronic search condition requiring Minor to surrender, upon demand by her probation officer or a peace officer, all encryption keys or passwords to electronic devices used by her. And to prevent deletion of digital data from any of her electronic devices, the court ordered that "The Minor shall not possess or utilize any program or application, on any electronic data storage device, that automatically or through a remote command deletes data from that device" (the Data Deletion Tools Ban).
There was evidence in one of the probation reports that Minor's mother had seen images of her on Facebook using alcohol.
The June 15 Dispositional Order also reinstated the Electronic Monitoring Condition, placing Minor under electronically monitored house arrest for at least 30 days following her release from Girls Camp. Minor's probation officer was given discretion, as appropriate, to extend the time Minor will be subject to the electronic monitoring, to detain Minor at Girls Camp for violation of electronic monitoring program rules, to lift or impose house arrest, and to adjust Minor's curfew. The June 2015 Dispositional Order stated: "During the Minor's time in the Girls Program, the probation officer has the discretion . . . to place the Minor on and vacate the Electronic Monitoring Program, . . . or House Arrest/Supervision, and to impose or adjust a curfew."
Minor timely appealed, and now argues that the Alcohol, Drugs and Smoking Ban, the Drug Paraphernalia Ban, the Poppy Seed Products Ban, the Electronic Monitoring Condition, the Data Deletion Tools Ban, and the School Attendance Requirement are unconstitutionally vague.
The notice of appeal specifies the June 15 Dispositional Order as the order appealed from. Even though four of the six probation conditions challenged in the appeal were originally imposed in September 2014, there is no issue of appealability here since all six of the challenged probation conditions were either imposed or re-imposed in the June 15 Dispositional Order and are fully set forth in that order. (Cf. In re Shaun R. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1137 (Shaun R.) [in juvenile probation case where a probationer appealed from a 2009 dispositional order and sought to bring a vagueness challenge to multiple probation conditions, some of which were originally imposed in 2008 but were merely incorporated by reference in the 2009 order, the conditions imposed in 2008 were not appealable].)
A. Applicable Law in Probation Cases Involving Claims of Facial Vagueness
It is just as true for juveniles as it is for adults that probationers " ' " 'do not enjoy "the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled." ' " ' " (People v. Pirali (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1350 (Pirali).) If anything, "[t]he permissible scope of discretion in formulating terms of juvenile probation is even greater than that allowed for adults. '[E]ven where there is an invasion of protected freedoms "the power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults." ' [Citation.] This is because juveniles are deemed to be 'more in need of guidance and supervision than adults, and because a minor's constitutional rights are more circumscribed.' [Citation.] Thus, ' "a condition of probation that would be unconstitutional or otherwise improper for an adult probationer may be permissible for a minor under the supervision of the juvenile court." ' " (In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 910 (Victor L.).)
Whether adults or juveniles, however, probationers " 'are not divested of all constitutional rights. "A probation condition 'must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated,' if it is to withstand a [constitutional] challenge on the ground of vagueness . . . ." [Citation.]' " (Pirali, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1350.) "This doctrine, which derives from the due process concept of fair warning, bars the government from enforcing a provision that 'forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague' that people of 'common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. [Citations.] To withstand a constitutional challenge on the ground of vagueness, a probation condition must be sufficiently definite to inform the probationer what conduct is required or prohibited, and to enable the court to determine whether the probationer has violated the condition. [Citations.] In determining whether the condition is sufficiently definite, however, a court is not limited to the condition's text. [Citation.] . . . We must also consider other sources of applicable law [citation], including judicial construction of similar provisions. [Citations.] Thus, a probation condition should not be invalidated as unconstitutionally vague ' " 'if any reasonable and practical construction can be given to its language.' " ' " (Hall, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 500-501.)
A defendant may contend for the first time on appeal that a probation condition is unconstitutionally vague on its face when the challenge presents a pure question of law that the appellate court can resolve without reference to the sentencing record. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889 (Sheena K.).) If the vagueness of a probation condition may be corrected "without reference to the particular sentencing record developed in the trial court" (id. at p. 887), the condition is subject to de novo review on appeal as a matter of law. (Shaun R., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 1143.) When Sheena K. review is undertaken, it is important to bear in mind that not all cases of facial vagueness are cases of unconstitutional vagueness, involving language so obscure that it fails to give fair warning of potential violation. Context matters, even in a facial challenge. "In deciding the adequacy of any notice afforded those bound by a legal restriction, we are guided by the principles that 'abstract legal commands must be applied in a specific context,' and that, although not admitting of 'mathematical certainty,' the language used must have ' "reasonable specificity." ' " (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890.)
The traditional test in cases involving facial vagueness challenges to legislation is often phrased as whether the language or phrasing at issue is reasonably understandable to "ordinary people." (See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson (1983) 461 U.S. 352, 357 ["the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited"]; see also People v. Tapia (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1167.) More specifically stated, however, vagueness analysis looks to whether the language in question is definite enough to " ' "provide . . . a standard of conduct for those whose activities are proscribed . . . ." ' " (Williams v. Garcetti (1993) 5 Cal.4th 561, 567, italics added.) Thus, in a juvenile probation case, the most accurate way to frame the test for vagueness is that we must ask whether the language claimed to be vague is reasonably understandable to an ordinary juvenile of the age of the minor. After all, probation conditions, unlike generally applicable legislation, are in effect "special 'laws' tailored only to" an individual probationer (United States v. Loy (3d Cir. 2001) 237 F.3d 251, 260 (Loy)), and here that person is a juvenile.
B. Conditions Barring Possession, Custody, or Control of Illegal Drugs and Related Items
Minor challenges five of the six probation conditions at issue here (the Alcohol, Drugs and Smoking Ban, the Drug Paraphernalia Ban, the Poppy Seed Products Ban, the Electronic Monitoring Condition, the Data Deletion Tools Ban) on grounds that the omission of an express scienter requirement renders them unconstitutionally vague. The Attorney General contends we should follow People v. Gaines (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1035, review granted and opinion superseded Feb. 17, 2016, S231723, review dismissed and cause remanded Mar. 22, 2017, and imply a scienter requirement in these five probation conditions. (See also People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 728; People v. Contreras (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 868, 887; People v. Moore (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1186.) Under this line of authority, we are told, so long as the proscribed conduct is described with sufficient clarity—which the Attorney General contends is the case for each of the conditions challenged as lacking an express knowledge requirement—the "willfulness" standard in probation revocation proceedings provides adequate protection against unwitting violation. Reminding us that Sheena K. "recognized a limited class of claims [eligible to be] raised . . . for the first time on appeal," the Attorney General argues that Sheena K. review for facial vagueness is subject to "the overriding principle" that " 'discretion to excuse forfeiture should be exercised rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue' " (quoting Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 892, fn. 7, italics added). Here, the Attorney General contends, Minor's claims of facial unconstitutionality raise no such issue, and in any event cannot be resolved without reference to the facts and circumstances surrounding the imposition of these conditions on Minor.
Until recently, this court followed a different rule, requiring modification of probation conditions to require the addition of an express scienter requirement in some circumstances, as we explained in our previously issued opinion in this case. Our Supreme Court has now addressed the express-vs.-implied scienter issue definitively, disapproving the authority on which our express scienter rule rested, In re Kevin F. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 351, 361-366, and People v. Freitas (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 747, 751-752. (Hall, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 503, fn. 2.) The Court also disapproved People v. Rodriguez (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 578, 594, and our prior opinion in this case, to the extent "they found that possessory probation conditions must include an express knowledge requirement where the prohibited item was not criminalized by statute but was merely related to criminality." (Hall, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 503-504, fn. 2.) The disagreement among the Courts of Appeal on this issue prior to Hall turned on whether the statutory willfulness standard in probation revocation proceedings (see id. at pp. 498-499, citing People v. Hartley (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 620, 634 and other authorities) provides adequate protection against unwitting violation where possession of firearms, illegal drugs, and related items is involved. The Supreme Court has now made clear that it does.
"In the context of conditions barring the possession, custody, or control of firearms, illegal drugs, and related items," the Supreme Court explained, "revocation requires knowledge. The unwitting possession of contraband does not sufficiently establish backsliding by the probationer, nor does it sufficiently threaten public safety, to merit revocation without regard to the probationer's state of mind. On the other hand, revocation can be justified where the probationer knows of the contraband's presence and its restricted character because of what possession in such circumstances is understood to convey about an individual's plans or potential for further criminal activity, the probability of success of such activity if attempted, and the risks associated with such activity. Requiring such knowledge before sustaining a violation of one of the probation conditions at issue here would be consistent with the state of mind implicitly required for conviction by statutes criminalizing possession of illegal drugs [citation] or dangerous weapons." (Hall, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 499.) Thus, "[g]iven the relevant case law, the firearms condition is properly construed as prohibiting defendant from knowingly owning, possessing, or having in his custody or control any handgun, rifle, shotgun, firearm, or any weapon that can be concealed on his person. So too with the narcotics condition, which is best read as proscribing defendant from knowingly using, possessing, or having in his custody or control any illegal drugs, narcotics, or narcotics paraphernalia, without a prescription." (Id. at p. 503.)
Accordingly, applying the California Supreme Court's holding in Hall, we now reject Minor's argument that an express scienter requirement must be added to the Alcohol, Drugs and Smoking Ban, the Drug Paraphernalia Ban, and the Poppy Seed Products Ban, since all of those probation conditions bar "the possession, custody, or control of . . . illegal drugs, and related items . . ." and are therefore governed by Hall. (Hall, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 499.) Thus, we will affirm the order under review here with respect to those conditions. Except for the requirement in our prior opinion that a "knowledge" component be added to the Drug Paraphernalia Ban, we conclude that Hall requires no change in the disposition, since for all of the other conditions challenged for lack of an express scienter requirement we reached the same result—concluding that the addition of such a requirement was unnecessary—by practical construction of the language of the condition, an approach that the Supreme Court cited with approval. (Id. at pp. 500-501.) To the extent we ordered other modifications to the language of the probation conditions imposed on Minor, we did so, as explained below, on other grounds.
C. Other Conditions
1. The Data Deletion Tools Ban
In an apparent effort to strengthen the electronic search condition by ensuring preservation of all of Minor's electronic communications, the juvenile court ordered that "Minor shall not possess or utilize any program or application, on any electronic data storage device, that automatically or through a remote command deletes data from that device." We are constrained to conclude that this clause is unconstitutionally vague on its face, not because of the absence of an express knowledge requirement, but because of its uncertain scope. To cure its vagueness, we would have to rewrite the condition, not merely place a practical narrowing construction on it.
Because all computing devices are "electronic data storage devices" and virtually all software programs available to consumers for those devices have the capability to "automatically" delete data—which is the purpose of the "delete" key on any keyboard and the "delete" command in any software application—the Data Deletion Tools Ban, plainly read, bans Minor from using or possessing any smartphone or computer. We doubt that is what the court intended, but it is the unavoidable meaning of the language used. Whether this infirmity is characterized as a problem of vagueness or of overbreadth, the Data Deletion Tools Ban, as phrased, fails to give fair warning of the scope of its prohibition. (See Victor L., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 926 [striking probation condition barring all access to Internet enabled computers on vagueness grounds, since the ban "could ensnare a minor in a claimed probation violation even if he were engaged in completely innocent and legitimate use of a computer for scholarly or job-related purposes"]; In re Stevens (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1239 ["the broad prohibition on use of the computer and Internet bore no relation to Stevens's conviction for child molestation and imposed a greater restriction of his rights than was reasonably necessary to accomplish the state's legitimate goal"].)
Perhaps the Data Deletion Tools Ban was designed to ban Minor from using apps, such as Snapchat, which allow electronic communications to be sent, received, and automatically deleted after they are read, thus effectively destroying all evidence that any communications occurred. Perhaps it was aimed at remote "erase" capability, which is available on many modern, cloud-enabled handheld devices such as iPhones to delete data from lost or stolen phones. Or perhaps the court had some other specific tool in mind. Rather than modify this condition on appeal in an effort to save it based on surmise, we think the better course is to vacate it and invite modification on remand by using examples designed to narrow it to its intended purpose. (See People v. Lopez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 615, 630 [" 'A contextual application of otherwise unqualified legal language may supply the clue to a law's meaning, giving facially standardless language a constitutionally sufficient concreteness.' "].)
2. The Electronic Monitoring Condition
The Electronic Monitoring Condition requires Minor to "obey all rules and regulations of the Electronic Monitoring Program" and grants to Minor's probation officer discretion to extend the duration of electronic monitoring and to detain Minor temporarily at Girls Camp for "violating the . . . Electronic Monitoring Agreement." Nowhere are the referenced "rules and regulations" set forth or summarized. This condition, too, is unconstitutionally vague on its face, wholly apart from the omission of an express knowledge requirement. Nothing on the face of the June 15 Dispositional Order, in the transcript of the hearing leading to its imposition, or anywhere else in the record, indicates that Minor was apprised of the "rules and regulations" of the Electronic Monitoring Program, or that steps were taken to make sure she understands those rules. There are references to a contract (the "Electronic Monitoring Agreement"), but these references are without content and provide no guidance about where to find whatever standards of conduct that instrument may impose.
The Attorney General asks that we presume the trial court fulfilled its duty to ensure Minor was aware of her obligations of compliance. But this appeal raises claims of facial vagueness, our review is de novo, and there is nothing in the challenged probation condition or anywhere else in the June 15 Dispositional Order to justify indulging such a presumption. Here, at least on the face of the challenged order, one can only guess at what the "rules and regulations" of the Electronic Monitoring Program may be. The vagueness problem is exacerbated by the broad delegation of authority to Minor's probation officer. "A [probation] condition with no core meaning . . . cannot be cured by allowing the probation officer an unfettered power of interpretation, as this would create one of the very problems against which the vagueness doctrine is meant to protect, i.e., the delegation of 'basic policy matters to policemen . . . for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis.' " (Loy, supra, 237 F.3d at p. 266.)
The Attorney General argues that Minor waived any right to appeal the Electronic Monitoring Condition because it was originally imposed at a hearing on September 22, 2014 and Minor failed to supply a transcript of that hearing in the record. We are not persuaded. Minor appeals from the June 15 Dispositional Order, mounts a facial challenge to the language of probation conditions imposed in that order, and the record she supplied to us—which includes the June 15 Dispositional Order itself and enough of the remainder of the record to show the procedural context surrounding that order—is sufficient to satisfy her burden of furnishing an adequate record supporting her appeal, as she framed it. To the extent anything in the September 22, 2014 hearing transcript might have undercut Minor's argument that her claims of vagueness are susceptible of resolution facially—the Attorney General posits, for example, that there might be something in that transcript showing that the court explained the terms of the Electronic Monitoring Condition then—that transcript could have been supplied by the Attorney General by counter-designation or request to augment, to show that Minor's vagueness challenges can only be resolved by reference to "the particular sentencing record developed in the trial court . . . ." (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 887.) The Attorney General made no such counter-designation or request for augmentation. --------
Because the Electronic Monitoring Condition, on its face, is standardless, without content and potentially exposes Minor to arbitrary deprivations of her liberty, we find it to be unconstitutionally vague. We will modify it to specify that Minor shall "obey all rules and regulations of the Electronic Monitoring Program, as posted on the probation department's website, as approved by the court, and as explained to her by her probation officer."
3. The School Attendance Requirement
The School Attendance Requirement requires Minor to "attend school regularly without tardiness or unexcused absence . . . and to . . . behave at all times while in school." Minor contends the word "regularly" renders this condition so ambiguous and susceptible of multiple meanings that it cannot be understood by an average person. She asks that we modify it to make it more precise, replacing "regularly" with language requiring that she "attend school every day that school is in session without tardiness or unexcused absence." We decline to do so.
This condition does not implicate any "important issue of constitutional law or a substantial right." (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 887, fn. 7.) Absent a chilling effect on constitutionally protected conduct, a broadly stated prohibition phrased in inexact terms may in some instances be perfectly appropriate to use, by design, with the aim of ensuring that a probationer errs on the side of compliance. We cannot say that that approach is improper here. The manifest purpose of the School Attendance Requirement is to prohibit truancy. Read with that purpose in mind, we think its phrasing is clear enough for an average person to understand. (See In re D.H. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 722, 730 [rejecting vagueness challenge to school attendance probation condition].)
III. CONCLUSION AND DISPOSITION
The conditions of probation imposed on Minor in the June 15 Dispositional Order are modified as follows:
1. The condition that "Minor shall not possess or utilize any program or application, on any electronic data storage device, that automatically or through a remote command deletes data from that device" is vacated, subject to reinstatement in narrower form should the juvenile court wish to reinstate it after further consideration.
2. The condition that Minor shall "obey all rules and regulations of the Electronic Monitoring Program" is modified to provide that Minor shall "obey all rules and regulations of the Electronic Monitoring Program, as posted on the probation department's website, as approved by the court, and as explained to her by her probation officer."
Except as so modified, the June 15 Dispositional Order is affirmed.
Streeter, J. We concur: /s/_________
Ruvolo, P.J. /s/_________