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Peiffer v. Allstate Ins. Co.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin
Jun 2, 1971
187 N.W.2d 182 (Wis. 1971)

Summary

In Peiffer, the plaintiff executed a release identical to the one in the case at bar except that it involved a specific reservation of rights against the driver of the automobile involved in the accident and the driver's insurer.

Summary of this case from Swanigan v. State Farm Ins. Co.

Opinion

No. 109.

Argued May 3, 1971. —

Decided June 2, 1971.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Sheboygan county: FERDINAND H. SCHLICHTING, Circuit Judge. Affirmed.

For the appellant there was a brief by O'Meara O'Meara of West Bend, and oral argument by Stephen O'Meara.

For the respondent there was a brief by Fulton, Menn Nehs, attorneys, and Peter S. Nelson of counsel, all of Appleton, and oral argument by Mr. Nelson.


Facts.


The plaintiff-appellant, Jerome Peiffer, seeks recovery for personal injuries sustained in an accident that occurred on October 31, 1967, at the intersection of state Highways 32 and 144 in the town of Holland in Sheboygan county.

The highway accident involved two motor vehicles: one driven by Anita Peiffer and insured by Allstate Insurance Company, the second driven by Violet Treichel and insured by American Family Mutual Insurance Company.

On November 20, 1968, the plaintiff-appellant received $10,000, the limit of coverage under the policy, from American Family Insurance Company, and the following release was executed by plaintiff-appellant:

"For the sole consideration of Ten-thousand and No/100 DOLLARS ($10,000.00), the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, I/we hereby fully and forever release and discharge Herbert And Violet Treichel and theAmerican Family Mutual Insurance Co. of Madison, Wisconsin, their heirs, administrators, executors, successors and assigns from all claims, demands, damages, actions, rights of action of whatever kind or nature which I/we now have or may hereafter have arising out of, in consequence of or on account of all injuries to person, including any latent injuries and all developments and results therefrom, known and unknown injuries, whether developed or undeveloped, and anticipated and unanticipated consequences of all such injuries, and damages to property resulting to me/us in any way from an accident which occurred on or about the 31st day of October, 1967, at or near the Intersection of State Highway 32 and 144 in the twp. of Holland, Sheboygan County,Wisconsin. In accepting said sum I/we hereby release and discharge that fraction, portion or percentage of the total cause of action of claim for damages I/we now have or may hereafter possess against all parties responsible for my/our damages which shall by trial or other disposition, be determined to be the sum of the fractions, portions or percentages of causal negligence for which the parties herein released are found to be liable to me/us as a consequence of the above accident.

"I/We hereby accept said sum as a compromise and settlement of all claims on account of the dispute between the parties hereto as to whether the above named parties are liable to me/us or not, and also as to the nature, extent and permanency of the injuries sustained by me/us.

"I/We agree that in making this release, I/we am/are relying on my/our own judgment, belief and knowledge as to all phases of my/our claims and that I/we am/are not relying on representations or statements made by any of the persons hereby released or anyone representing them or physicians or surgeons employed by them.

"I/We agree that the payment of the above sum is not to be construed as an admission of any liability whatsoever by or on behalf of the above named parties, by whom liability is expressly denied.

"I/We further agree that any claim of whatever kind or nature the above named parties might have or hereafter have growing out of the above accident, is hereby expressly reserved to them.

"This release is intended to release only the parties specifically named. The undersigned expressly reserve the balance of the whole cause of action or any other claim of whatever kind or nature not released hereby which I/we may have or hereafter have against any other person or persons arising out of the above accident.

"As a further consideration, we the undersigned, agree to indemnify said parties released and save them harmless from any claims for contribution made by others so adjudged jointly liable with said parties released, and the undersigned agrees to satisfy any judgment which may be rendered in favor of the undersigned, satisfying such fraction, portion or percentage of the judgment as the causal negligence of the parties released is adjudged to be of all causal negligence of all adjudged tort-feasors. In the event the undersigned fails to immediately satisfy any such judgment to the extent of the fraction, portion or percentage of the negligence as found against the parties released, the undersigned hereby consents and agrees that upon filing a copy of this agreement, without further notice, an order may be entered by the court in which said judgment is entered directing the Clerk thereof to satisfy said judgment to the extent of such fraction, portion or percentage of the negligence as found against the parties released and discharged under this release.

"The undersigned does hereby specifically reserve any rights he might have against Anita Peiffer and Allstate Company and any of the above printed form in conflict with this reservation of rights is null and void.

"Signed and Sealed at Rt. 1, Belgium, Wisconsin, this20th day of November 1968.

"Milton E. Paske Jerome P. Peiffer (Seal) "Wm. Fiedler (Seal)"

"In Presence of: Caution: Read before signing On February 14, 1969, plaintiff-appellant commenced the present action against Allstate to recover damages incurred as a result of the highway accident. Defendant-respondent, Allstate, answered denying negligence on the part of its insured. As a further defense Allstate alleged that, as a result of the release, if its insured, Anita Peiffer, were found causally negligent and if such negligence were found to be greater than that of appellant, its liability would be only for the unsatisfied portion of the total damages as is represented by the percentage of its insured's causal negligence but not to exceed its policy limits.

The case was presented to the trial court on an agreed statement of facts, the parties agreeing that they sought a determination of insurance coverage afforded by the defendant, Allstate, as affected by the settlement made between American Family and plaintiff, as evidenced by the release above set forth.

On May 21, 1970, the trial court held that the defendant-respondent, Allstate, was liable only for the percentage of negligence attributable to its insured driver. From that judgment, plaintiff appeals.


Analysis of the impact of the partial settlement and release upon the rights and liabilities of the parties litigant begins with the Bielski Case, where this court held that, in the establishment of contribution rights between joint tort-feasors, damages were to be ratably allocated in proportion to the percentage of causal negligence attributable to each joint tort-feasor. Before Bielski, the percentage of liability of each joint tort-feasor was as a matter of law equal in proportion to the number of joint tort-feasors. A release of one of several joint tort-feasors satisfied a definite percentage of the cause of action, and, while the plaintiff in a personal injury action could bring suit against a nonsettling tort-feasor, he was limited in recovery to that portion of the action that had not been settled. Accordingly, there was no right to contribution against the tort-feasor who had been released from liability, nor could such settling party be made a party defendant in the action.

Bielski v. Schulze (1962), 16 Wis.2d 1, 6, 114 N.W.2d 105.

Heimbach v. Hagen (1957), 1 Wis.2d 294, 297, 83 N.W.2d 710.

Id. at page 296.

Id. at page 296.

In light of Bielski, the question arose whether it would be feasible to effect a settlement of claim with fewer than all of alleged multiple joint tort-feasors. Would the defendants who settled the claim against them and secured a release of such claim be protected from further liability under Bielski for contribution claims from nonsettling joint tort-feasors? Could such settling defendants still be named as defendants in lawsuits brought against those defendants who had not settled?

In the Pierringer Case, this court answered these questions, laying to rest any apprehension that Bielski would operate as a roadblock to the partial settlement of personal injury claims against multiple defendants by less than all of them. In that case it was made clear that:

Pierringer v. Hoger (1963), 21 Wis.2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106.

". . . As stated in Bielski, we did not believe the change in the rule of contribution presented insuperable difficulties in drafting releases and suggested in order for a plaintiff to give a release or covenant which would protect the settling tort-feasor from a claim of contribution that the plaintiff must agree to satisfy such percentage of the judgment he ultimately recovers as the settling tort-feasor's causal negligence bears to all the causal negligence of all the tort-feasors. This was descriptive of the situation where the plaintiff sued the nonsettling tort-feasor and recovered a judgment for the full amount of the cause of action. We might well have added `or by the release he satisfies his cause of action to the extent of and releases the nonsettling tort-feasor for such percentage,' and the effect would be the same. In the former case the plaintiff partially satisfies a judgment for the full damages while in the latter case the judgment is entered only for the unsatisfied percentage or portion of the damages." (Emphasis supplied.)

Id. at page 189.

It is a Pierringer-type release that the trial court held the release here involved to be. As such, it released the settling tort-feasor from any future liability, including contribution, deriving from the automobile accident involved. Additionally, it assured that the settling tort-feasor could not be made a party defendant in any action brought against nonsettling tort-feasors. Thus, since the plaintiff is limited in recovery to the unsatisfied percentage of the damages — the percentage attributable to the nonsettling tort-feasor — there is to be no payment sought beyond the nonsettling tort-feasor's share and there is no basis for contribution.

In urging the contrary interpretation that the release left untouched the plaintiff-appellant's right to seek the whole cause of action against the defendant-respondent, the plaintiff-appellant relies entirely upon the last paragraph, added to the release. It is undisputed that, without such last paragraph, the release is a standard Pierringer-type release. To interpret the release as urged by appellant would make meaningless substantial portions of the release. The entire second sentence of the first paragraph wherein appellant releases and discharges a fraction of his cause of action equal to that of the settling tort-feasor's negligence would be voided. The sixth paragraph wherein appellant reserves the balance of his cause of action would be altered to reserve instead the whole cause of action. The next to last paragraph wherein the plaintiff-appellant agrees to indemnify the parties released from any claims of contribution would become meaningless unless read to require reimbursement by plaintiff-appellant, after the liability for contribution by the settling tort-feasor had been satisfied, an indirect route to respondent's claim that the appellant is entitled only to the unsatisfied portion of the total negligence attributable to the nonsettling tort-feasor's negligence.

A release is to be treated as a contract. A construction which gives effect to every word of a contract should be preferred to one which results in surplusage. ". . . An interpretation which gives a reasonable meaning to all provisions is to be preferred to one which leaves part of the language useless or inexplicable. . . ." It is a basic rule of construction that a contract is to be construed as a whole in order to carry out the true intent of the parties. It follows that ". . . the agreement must be considered as a whole and all parts harmonized as far as possible. . . ." In that endeavor the intent of the parties, as discernible from the contract and circumstances surrounding its execution, is a relevant factor.

Nelson v. Boos (1959), 7 Wis.2d 393, 96 N.W.2d 813.

McCullough v. Brandt (1967), 34 Wis.2d 102, 106, 148 N.W.2d 718.

Nelson v. Boos, supra, at page 399.

Estate of Schmitz (1962), 17 Wis.2d 412, 117 N.W.2d 249.

Goldmann Trust v. Goldmann (1965), 26 Wis.2d 141, 146, 131 N.W.2d 902.

If appellant's construction of the effect of the release were accepted, we would be holding that the plaintiff-appellant intended to give almost nothing and the American Family intended to receive almost nothing for the $10,000 paid. In the absence of a release, the plaintiff-appellant had a right to recover against any joint tort-feasor the total amount of the damages to which he was entitled, with the joint tort-feasor who pays more than his equitable share entitled to seek contribution from other joint tort-feasors. Each joint tort-feasor could be named as a party defendant in a suit for total damages. Under plaintiff-appellant's interpretation of the release, the right of contribution would not be extinguished and the right to name the settling tort-feasor as defendant would remain. In sum, the respective rights and liabilities, existing at the time of the execution of the release, would be unchanged by the release, except for entitlement to a $10,000 credit for an advance payment on eventual possible liability. So we find the trial court's construction of the effect of the release more reasonable, viewing the release in its entirety and seeking to harmonize its various provisions in light of the apparent intent of the parties to it. It is incidental, but not immaterial, that such construction of the release furthers the goal of encouraging settlements of claims against joint tort-feasors. The encouraging of settlements of personal injury claims contributes not only to the lessening of court case loads but also to the lessening of delays and the prompter recovery of damages sustained by those injured in accidents. Chilling out-of-court settlements of personal injury claims would not serve the interests of plaintiffs, defendants or the general public.

Zurn v. Whatley (1933), 213 Wis. 365, 372, 251 N.W. 435.

Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. (1954), 268 Wis. 6, 8, 66 N.W.2d 697. See also: Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Runquist (1932), 209 Wis. 97, 244 N.W. 757.

"The social policy favoring settlements is stronger than that favoring contribution among tort-feasors. . . ." Smith v. Rural Mut. Ins. Co. (1963), 20 Wis.2d 592, 603, 123 N.W.2d 496. See also: Heimbach v. Hagen, supra, wherein a plaintiff released one half of his cause of action, holding that the nonsettling tort-feasor did not have a right to contribution and that plaintiff could recover only one half of his claim against the nonsettling tort-feasor.

By the Court. — Judgment affirmed.


Summaries of

Peiffer v. Allstate Ins. Co.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin
Jun 2, 1971
187 N.W.2d 182 (Wis. 1971)

In Peiffer, the plaintiff executed a release identical to the one in the case at bar except that it involved a specific reservation of rights against the driver of the automobile involved in the accident and the driver's insurer.

Summary of this case from Swanigan v. State Farm Ins. Co.
Case details for

Peiffer v. Allstate Ins. Co.

Case Details

Full title:PEIFFER, Appellant, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent

Court:Supreme Court of Wisconsin

Date published: Jun 2, 1971

Citations

187 N.W.2d 182 (Wis. 1971)
187 N.W.2d 182

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