Filed November 20, 2017
In sum, because the Ordinance is undisputedly directed at, and only at, the interstate and foreign commerce conducted through a rail-to-ship export terminal (and undisputedly does, in fact, block the interstate rail transportation of coal and petcoke for marine export through Oakland) the Ordinance is a per se unconstitutional “direct regulation” of interstate and foreign commerce. See, e.g., NCAA, 10 F.3d at 640; West, 221 U.S. at 249; Bowman, 125 U.S. at 497. 2.
Filed December 18, 2017
Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 498-99 (1888) (regulation seeking to “prohibit and stop the[] passage” of liquor through jurisdiction a “regulation directly affecting interstate commerce”); West v. Kan. Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 249 (1911) (statute effectively prohibiting export of natural gas unconstitutional under DCC because “to prohibit interstate commerce is more than to indirectly affect it”). Indeed, there could hardly be a more plain violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause.