Filed July 16, 2012
Further, without more, evidence that an officer merely violated a policy is not sufficient to show inadequate training or supervision. See, e.g., Barney, 143 F.3d at 1307; Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 821 (liability cannot be inferred that single unusually excessive use of force by “bad apple” was attributable to inadequate training or supervision amounting to deliberate indifference); see also Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1162 (10th Cir. 2008) (§ 1983 “does not recognize a concept of strict supervisor liability; the defendant’s role must be more than one of abstract authority over individuals who actually committed a constitutional violation.”) As set forth above, Duran has absolutely no evidence that Denver’s use of force training protocols or the supervision provided for its sheriff deputies were in any way inadequate or deficient.
Filed December 19, 2014
A Monell claim is the only claim under which a municipality can be held liable under § 1983. Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 824 n.8; Nagle, 663 F.3d at 116. Further, a municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 on the basis of respondeat superior.
Filed February 22, 2007
Furthermore, once a plaintiff has proven––by any of the above methods––that a municipality has adopted a policy or custom of vio lating constitutional rights, the plaintiff still must prove that the policy or custom caused the constitutional injury in question. Oklahoma City, 471 U.S. at 823. The plaintiff must prove that the policy was the “moving force” behind the alleged constitutional violation.
Filed October 11, 2005
The Supreme Court further held in Oklahoma City that, “at the very least there must be an affirmative link between the policy and the particular constitutional violation alleged.” Oklahoma City, 471 U.S. at 824. The Oklahoma City decision interpreted Monell as holding that “municipal liability should not be imposed when the municipality was not itself at fault.”
Filed September 18, 2017
Id. (quoting Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 823). Proving an affirmative link requires showing a “close fit” between the custom and the constitutional violation.
Filed March 31, 2017
See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478 n.6 (1986) (citing Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 831-32 (1985). 27 See Plaintiffs’ First Amended Original Complaint, pp.15-17 (Doc. 17, PageID 136).
Filed February 16, 2017
Section 1983 liability is not imposed where the municipality merely employs an alleged tortfeasor, see id., or “when the municipality was not itself at fault.” City of Case 1:16-cv-01580-JEB Document 11 Filed 02/16/17 Page 6 of 13 7 Oklahoma, 471 U.S. at 818 (emphasis added). Plaintiff’s complaint fails to meet these stringent standards.
Filed January 17, 2017
Section 1983 liability is not imposed where the municipality merely employs an alleged tortfeasor, see id., or "when the municipality was not itself at fault." City of Oklahoma, 471 U.S. at 818 (emphasis added). Here, Plaintiff has failed to make any allegations in his complaint regarding the existence of a policy, custom, or practice on the part of the District of Columbia and therefore he has failed to plead a viable Monell claim.
Filed November 17, 2016
Accordingly, “[i]n passing § 1983, Congress did not disturb the 1 Although not specifically stated as such in the Complaint, Udeigwe’s constitutional claims must be brought under Section 1983, which provides the vehicle through which plaintiffs can allege violations of constitutional rights. See, e.g., City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985) (noting that Section 1983 “creates no substantive rights; it merely provides remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere.”).
Filed April 11, 2016
Napolitano, 404 F.3d 4, 28 (1st Cir. 2005) (same); Long v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1188 (9th Cir. 2006) (reversing summary judgment on failure-to-train claim not based on pattern or practice); Allen v. Muskogee, Okl., 119 F.3d 837, 844 (10th Cir. 1997) (collecting cases and stating that “City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985), and Canton do not require evidence of more than one incident to establish a policy of inadequate training and that the training caused the constitutional deprivation. These cases simply require evidence in addition to the occurrence of a single incident.