Oklahoma City v. Tuttle

49 Citing briefs

  1. Duran v. Koehler

    MOTION for Summary Judgment

    Filed July 16, 2012

    Further, without more, evidence that an officer merely violated a policy is not sufficient to show inadequate training or supervision. See, e.g., Barney, 143 F.3d at 1307; Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 821 (liability cannot be inferred that single unusually excessive use of force by “bad apple” was attributable to inadequate training or supervision amounting to deliberate indifference); see also Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1162 (10th Cir. 2008) (§ 1983 “does not recognize a concept of strict supervisor liability; the defendant’s role must be more than one of abstract authority over individuals who actually committed a constitutional violation.”) As set forth above, Duran has absolutely no evidence that Denver’s use of force training protocols or the supervision provided for its sheriff deputies were in any way inadequate or deficient.

  2. White v. Ocasio

    MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 58 MOTION to Dismiss . . Document

    Filed December 19, 2014

    A Monell claim is the only claim under which a municipality can be held liable under § 1983. Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 824 n.8; Nagle, 663 F.3d at 116. Further, a municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 on the basis of respondeat superior.

  3. Chandler v. Williams et al

    MOTION to Dismiss Complaint and All Pending Motions

    Filed February 22, 2007

    Furthermore, once a plaintiff has proven––by any of the above methods––that a municipality has adopted a policy or custom of vio lating constitutional rights, the plaintiff still must prove that the policy or custom caused the constitutional injury in question. Oklahoma City, 471 U.S. at 823. The plaintiff must prove that the policy was the “moving force” behind the alleged constitutional violation.

  4. Malik v. District of Columbia et al

    MOTION to Dismiss

    Filed October 11, 2005

    The Supreme Court further held in Oklahoma City that, “at the very least there must be an affirmative link between the policy and the particular constitutional violation alleged.” Oklahoma City, 471 U.S. at 824. The Oklahoma City decision interpreted Monell as holding that “municipal liability should not be imposed when the municipality was not itself at fault.”

  5. Jones v. Jordan et al

    MEMORANDUM OPINION Signed

    Filed September 18, 2017

    Id. (quoting Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 823). Proving an affirmative link requires showing a “close fit” between the custom and the constitutional violation.

  6. May et al v. Andres et al

    Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, Second MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction

    Filed March 31, 2017

    See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478 n.6 (1986) (citing Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 831-32 (1985). 27 See Plaintiffs’ First Amended Original Complaint, pp.15-17 (Doc. 17, PageID 136).

  7. Wilson v. District of Columbia, et al

    MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment

    Filed February 16, 2017

    Section 1983 liability is not imposed where the municipality merely employs an alleged tortfeasor, see id., or “when the municipality was not itself at fault.” City of Case 1:16-cv-01580-JEB Document 11 Filed 02/16/17 Page 6 of 13 7 Oklahoma, 471 U.S. at 818 (emphasis added). Plaintiff’s complaint fails to meet these stringent standards.

  8. Sutton v. Billings, et al

    MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

    Filed January 17, 2017

    Section 1983 liability is not imposed where the municipality merely employs an alleged tortfeasor, see id., or "when the municipality was not itself at fault." City of Oklahoma, 471 U.S. at 818 (emphasis added). Here, Plaintiff has failed to make any allegations in his complaint regarding the existence of a policy, custom, or practice on the part of the District of Columbia and therefore he has failed to plead a viable Monell claim.

  9. Udeigwe v. Texas Tech University

    Brief/Memorandum in Support

    Filed November 17, 2016

    Accordingly, “[i]n passing § 1983, Congress did not disturb the 1 Although not specifically stated as such in the Complaint, Udeigwe’s constitutional claims must be brought under Section 1983, which provides the vehicle through which plaintiffs can allege violations of constitutional rights. See, e.g., City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985) (noting that Section 1983 “creates no substantive rights; it merely provides remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere.”).

  10. The Estate of Robert Ethan Saylor et al v. Regal Cinemas, Inc. et al

    RESPONSE in Opposition re MOTION for Summary Judgment , 98 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 102 MOTION for Summary Judgment with correct filing attorney's name Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment

    Filed April 11, 2016

    Napolitano, 404 F.3d 4, 28 (1st Cir. 2005) (same); Long v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1188 (9th Cir. 2006) (reversing summary judgment on failure-to-train claim not based on pattern or practice); Allen v. Muskogee, Okl., 119 F.3d 837, 844 (10th Cir. 1997) (collecting cases and stating that “City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985), and Canton do not require evidence of more than one incident to establish a policy of inadequate training and that the training caused the constitutional deprivation. These cases simply require evidence in addition to the occurrence of a single incident.