From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Novak v. Danesi

United States District Court, D. New Jersey
Aug 17, 1999
Civil Action No. 97-1760 (NHP) (D.N.J. Aug. 17, 1999)

Opinion

Civil Action No. 97-1760 (NHP).

August 17, 1999.

Charles X. Gormally, Esq., BRACH, EICHLER, ROSENBERG, SILVER BERNSTEIN, HAMMER GALDSTONE, Roseland, N.J., Attorneys for Plaintiff.

Jeffrey E. Gorrin, Esq., GORRIN GORRIN, Livingston, N.J., Attorney for Defendant, Nicole C. Danesi.

Karen L. Suter, Deputy Attorney General, JOHN J. FARMER, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY, Trenton, N.J., Attorneys for Defendants, State of New Jersey.

Michael Dougherty, Esq., ISAACSON, DOUGHTERTY ZIRULNIK, Roseland, N.J., Attorneys for Defendant, Branchville Boro.

Robert Zimmerer, Esq., SIMMERER, MURRAY CONYNGHAM, Saddle Brook, N.J., Attorneys for Defendants, Carey R. Orr, Daniel Mattos.



LETTER OPINION ORIGINAL ON FILE WITH CLERK OF THE COURT


Dear Counsel:
This matter comes before the Court on defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the Complaint. The Court heard oral argument on May 24, 1999. For the reasons explained below, the State of New Jersey and the Borough of Branchville's motions for summary judgment are DENIED. The Mattos' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This litigation arises out of an automobile accident that occurred on State highway Route 206, at its intersection with Kemah Lake Road in Sussex County, New Jersey.

On July 1, 1996, defendant Nicole C. Danesi drove her father's car from Kemah Lake through an allegedly obstructed stop sign, across the two northbound lanes of Route 206, and into the two southbound lanes of Route 206, where she collided with a vehicle owned and operated by Patricia A. Novak.

Kemah Lake Road is a hilly municipal road that runs through a rural and heavily wooded area in the Borough of Branchville, New Jersey; the posted speed limit is 25 miles per hour. Route 206 is a four-lane State highway that has been designated a "through street" by N.J.A.C. 16:30-2.1(107); its posted speed limit is 50 miles per hour. The intersection is controlled by a stop sign on Kemah Lake Road. It is undisputed that the stop sign was installed and maintained by the State of New Jersey and that it is located on a right-of-way owned by the State. There is evidence in the record that the stop sign was at least partially obstructed by trees and vegetation at the time of the accident. There is also evidence that there was a fully obstructed "Stop Ahead" sign on Kemah Lake Road, although the plaintiff has so far been unable to identify the party responsible for the sign's installation and maintenance.

Plaintiff seeks to recover from the State of New Jersey and the Borough of Branchville on the theory that, at the time of the accident, the intersection constituted a dangerous condition within the meaning of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act. Plaintiff also alleges that defendants Daniel and Carey Mattos are liable because the traffic signs were obstructed by trees and other vegetation located on their adjacent private property.

DISCUSSION

I. Summary Judgment

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment may only be granted if, drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 896 (3d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987). Summary judgment may be granted against a party who fails to adduce facts sufficient to establish the existence of any element essential to that party's case, for which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. Once that burden has been met, the nonmoving party must set forth "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," or the factual record will be taken as presented by the moving party and judgment will be entered as a matter of law. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).

The nonmovant must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Id. at 586. Speculation, conclusory allegations, and mere denials are insufficient to raise genuine issues of material fact. To defeat "a properly supported summary judgment motion, the party opposing it must present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find in its favor." Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995).

II. Tort Claims Act

Claims against New Jersey public entities are subject to the immunities conferred by the Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1, et seq. "[I]mmunity is the dominant theme of the Act." Weiss v. New Jersey Transit, 128 N.J. 376, 383 (1992). Liability may be imposed only where there is a clear expression of the State's intention to waive its sovereign immunity; courts should resolve all doubts in favor of immunity. See Pico v. State, 116 N.J. 55, 59 (1989).

In this case, plaintiff concedes that, in order to prevail, it must prove that "the public entities' property was in a "dangerous condition" at the time of the accident; that such condition proximately caused the accident; that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of accident; and that the public entities had actual or constructive notice in a sufficient time prior to the accident to have taken corrective measures to protect against the dangerous condition." See Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment at 22 (citing N.J.S.A. 59:4-2); see also N.J.S.A. 59:4-4 (requiring signs to warn of emergency or dangerous condition).

The Court notes, at the outset, that there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether the stop sign, or Route 206 itself, was visible to drivers on Kemah Lake Road. For the purposes of the instant summary judgment motions, the Court assumes, as it must, that both the sign and the intersecting Route 206 were obstructed by trees and vegetation such that a driver exercising due care along Kemah Lake Road would not have seen them. The Court must therefore determine whether a jury could find that there was a dangerous condition within the meaning of the Tort Claims Act.

A. Existence of Dangerous Condition

This Court's inquiry begins with the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Civalier v. Estate of Trancucci, 138 N.J. 52 (1994), where the Court held that, "in this context of previously-posted traffic signals, our `trap liability' provision, N.J.S.A. 59:4-4, limits recovery to those plaintiffs injured by motorists' reliance on the proper functioning or presence of a previously posted signal to their detriment." 138 N.J. at 64. The Appellate Division subsequently held thatCivalier's reliance requirement may be satisfied by "the reliance of an out-of-towner upon the presence of duly authorized traffic controls marking the through streets in the community." Eason v. Njafiua, 278 N.J. Super. 343, 346 (App.Div. 199 5) (following remand to reconsider summary judgment in light of Civalier).

In this case, the injured plaintiff was traveling on Route 206, which is a four lane highway that has been designated a "through street" by the New Jersey Department of Transportation. N.J.A.C. 16:30-2.1(107). The speed limit on Route 206 is 50 miles per hour. The question, then, is whether a driver on Route 206 could reasonably rely on the presence of stop signs regulating any intersecting local roads, such as Kemah Lake Road. In this Court's view, a jury might reasonably conclude plaintiff Novak relied on the presence of a well-maintained stop sign at the intersection of Route 206 and Kemah Lake Road. This is particularly true where, as here, the State of New Jersey had a statutory duty to install and maintain a stop sign at the intersection at Kemah Lake Road. See N.J.S.A. 39:4-141; N.J.A.C. 16:30-2.1(107).

Similarly, there is evidence in the record that, due to the hilly, curvy, and wooded condition of Kemah Lake Road as it approaches Route 206, a driver on Kemah Lake Road would not be able to see Route 206 in the absence of a warning sign. See Police Report of Trooper T. Caporrino, attached as Plaintiff's Exhibit A. If a driver exercising due care on Kemah Lake Road would not see either the intersecting Route 206 or the posted stop sign, then there was a dangerous condition on the public entities' property. See Weiss v. New Jersey Transit, 128 N.J. 376, 382 (1992). This Court cannot say, on summary judgment, that both the intersection and the stop sign were visible. A jury could reasonably conclude that the intersection presented a dangerous condition to drivers on both Route 206 and Kemah Lake Road.

B. Location of the Dangerous Condition

By its terms, "liability under this section [59:4-2] is limited to injuries proximately caused by a dangerous condition on the property owned by the public entity." Ball v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co., 207 N.J. Super. 100, 107 (App.Div. 1986). N.J.S.A. 59:4-1(c) defines "public property" as "real or personal property owned or controlled by the public entity, but does not include easements, encroachments and other property that are located on the property of the public entity but are not owned or controlled by the public entity." A public entity does not "control" property simply because it falls within the entity's geographic boundaries. See Brothers v. Borough of Highlands, 178 N.J. Super. 393, 398 (App.Div.), certif. Denied, 108 N.J. 193 (1987).

As noted above, it is undisputed that the State of New Jersey owns and maintains Route 206 and its right-of-way, including the stop sign itself. The Borough of Branchville owns Kemah Lake Road and its right-of-way.

The defendant State of New Jersey contends that, even assuming that the intersection was a dangerous condition, the danger was created by overgrown vegetation located on property owned and controlled by the Borough of Branchville or the Mattos defendants. Defendant Borough of Branchville argues that any dangerous condition was created by the State's failure to maintain its stop sign.

The Court cannot resolve this factual dispute on summary judgment. There is sufficient evidence in the record from which a jury could reasonably conclude that both the State of New Jersey and the Borough of Branchville are liable consistent with N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 and 59:4-4.

III. Defendants Daniel and Carey Mattos

Defendants Mattos own an eight-acre parcel of land, commonly known as 31 Main Street, Branchville, New Jersey. Approximately one acre is improved, containing the Mattos' single-family home, a driveway, grass and a small shed; there are no additional structures or improvements. It is undisputed that the remaining seven acres are undeveloped and consist of an entirely wooded area with a stream running through the property. A portion of the Mattos property borders Kemah Lake Road, but they own neither the corner of Main Street and Kemah Lake Road, nor the corner of Kemah Lake Road and Route 206.

Count Six of plaintiff's Complaint alleges that Mattos defendants "owe a duty of care to all members of the public to maintain their properties in reasonably good care so as to prevent injury resulting from the condition of the property . . . specifically [defendants] are obliged to maintain the trees bushes and undergrowth that obstruct the view and safe passage along Kemah Lake Road."

This Court is unprepared to hold that a private owner of undeveloped rural land is liable for an injury caused by an overgrown tree and an obstructed roadway. See Kolba v. Kusznier, 252 N.J. Super. 53, 54 (Law 1991) (following the common law rule that a landowner may be liable for injuries resulting from an artificial condition on the land, but not for injuries resulting from natural conditions). Although New Jersey appellate courts have not addressed this issue, plaintiff Novak maintains that many states have abandoned the common law distinction between natural and artificial conditions. In this case, however, the rule urged by plaintiff would require all rural landowners to maintain any and all natural vegetation that might create traffic hazzards along small country roads. In the absence of clear guidance from a New Jersey appellate court, this Court cannot say that the Mattos defendants owed a duty to maintain the visibility of the stop sign or the intersection at Route 206 and Kemah Lake Road.

CONCLUSION

For the reason explained above, the State of New Jersey and the Borough of Branchville's motions for summary judgment are DENIED. The Mattos' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

An appropriate Order accompanies this Letter Opinion.


Summaries of

Novak v. Danesi

United States District Court, D. New Jersey
Aug 17, 1999
Civil Action No. 97-1760 (NHP) (D.N.J. Aug. 17, 1999)
Case details for

Novak v. Danesi

Case Details

Full title:Re: George Novak v. Nicole C. Danesi, et al

Court:United States District Court, D. New Jersey

Date published: Aug 17, 1999

Citations

Civil Action No. 97-1760 (NHP) (D.N.J. Aug. 17, 1999)