From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Notre Dame Cem. v. Labor Relat'ns Bd.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island
May 26, 1977
118 R.I. 336 (R.I. 1977)

Summary

holding that when review of the affirmance of an administrative action was solely available by petition for certiorari, appeal was unavailable and therefore fatally defective

Summary of this case from Dietz v. R.I. Board of Professional Land Surveyors

Opinion

May 26, 1977.

PRESENT: Bevilacqua, C.J., Paolino, Joslin, Kelleher and Doris, JJ.

1. APPEAL AND ERROR. Procedural Defect Immaterial Where Appeal Cannot Prevail for Other Reasons. Where plaintiff's notice of appeal was filed four days before judgment was entered and plaintiff claimed to be appealing from decision of the trial court rather than from final judgment, appeal was premature; however, such procedural defects became immaterial where plaintiff could not for other reasons prevail.

2. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE. Appeal Unavailable to Parties Aggrieved by Affirmance of Administrative Action. In light of Administrative Procedures Act provision that review in Supreme Court shall be sought solely by petition for writ of certiorari, normal route of appeal in civil actions is unavailable to parties aggrieved by affirmance of administrative action. G.L. 1956, §§ 42-35-1 et seq., 42-35-16.

3. LABOR RELATIONS. Labor Relations Board. Superior Court Affirmance Reviewed by Certiorari. Appeal Fatally Defective. In light of Administrative Procedures Act provision that review in Supreme Court shall be sought solely by petition for writ of certiorari by parties aggrieved by affirmance of administrative action, appeal by employer, which had been found by Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board to have engaged in unfair labor practices in firing of two employees for union activities, from decision of the Superior Court affirming Board's order was fatally defective. G.L. 1956, §§ 42-35-1 et seq., 42-35-16.

4. APPEAL AND ERROR. Supreme Court Will Not Engage in Piecemeal Review. Even if motions for judgment on the pleadings or in the alternative for summary judgment had been properly invoked, their denial still would not have been appealable since such a denial is in no sense a final determination on the merits and since, except in rare instances, Supreme Court will not engage in piecemeal review of proceedings in the trial courts.

5. LABOR RELATIONS. Judicial Review of Administrative Action. Appellate Proceeding Not Civil Action. In judicial review of administrative action by the State Labor Relations Board, which found employer to have engaged in unfair labor practices, no responsive pleading had to be filed unless required by statute or by court order, and thus, since none was required and none filed, employer was not entitled to appeal from denial of its motion for summary judgment on the pleadings or in the alternative for summary judgment, which latter motion plays no part in appellate proceedings, involved in judicial review of contested administrative action. Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 12(c), 80(a); G.L. 1956, § 42-35-15.

The Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties, Orton, J., affirmed State Labor Relations Board's order finding employer to have engaged in unfair labor practices in firing of two employees for union activities, and employer filed notice of appeal. On motions to remand and to dismiss, the Supreme Court held that in light of Administrative Procedures Act provision that review in Supreme Court shall be sought solely by petition for writ of certiorari by parties aggrieved by affirmance of administrative action, appeal was fatally defective.

Motion to dismiss appeal granted, appeal denied and dismissed, and order of the Superior Court affirmed.

Breslin, Sweeney Gordon, David F. Sweeney, for plaintiff.

Abedon, Stanzler, Biener, Skolnik Lipsey, Richard A. Skolnik, for Intervenors.

Vincent F. Kane, for defendant.


The plaintiff is an employer who was found by the defendant Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board (the board) to have engaged in unfair labor practices in the firing of two employees for union activities. The discharged employees were given leave to intervene as parties defendant in proceedings before the Superior Court wherein the plaintiff sought to have the board's ruling set aside. The Superior Court Justice affirmed the board's order, and the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal to this court. Subsequently, the parties were directed to appear before us for oral argument on the plaintiff's motion to remand the case to the Superior Court and on the intervenors' motion to dismiss the appeal for procedural deficiencies.

We note that the plaintiff's notice of appeal was filed on November 26, 1976, 4 days before judgment was entered on November 30, and that the plaintiff claimed to be appealing from the decision of the trial court rather than from a final judgment. The appeal was therefore premature. City of Pawtucket v. Council #70, AFL-CIO, Local 1012, 116 R.I. 198, 201, 353 A.2d 607, 609 (1976). In the view we take, however, this procedural defect becomes immaterial since the plaintiff cannot, for other reasons, prevail.

[2, 3] The intervenors contend correctly that these proceedings are governed by the Administrative Procedures Act, G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) ch. 35 of title 42, wherein it is provided that review in this court shall be sought solely by petition for a writ of certiorari, it being within our discretion to issue or to withhold the writ, § 42-35-16. The normal route of appeal in civil actions is thus unavailable to parties aggrieved by the affirmance of administrative action. This, the intervenors maintain, renders plaintiff's appeal fatally defective. We agree for the reasons set forth in Portsmouth Educ. Ass'n v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Bd., 108 R.I. 342, 275 A.2d 280 (1971).

The plaintiff, however, now argues that its appeal is "separate and apart" from the order entered by the court pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, in that it is appealing the denial by the trial court of its motion for judgment on the pleadings or in the alternative for summary judgment. Clearly, neither of these motions is applicable in proceedings for judicial review under § 42-35-15.

It should be noted that even if these motions had been properly invoked, their denial still would not be appealable because such a denial is in no sense a final determination on the merits. Berberian v. O'Neil, 111 R.I. 354, 356 n. 2, 302 A.2d 301, 302 n. 2 (1973); Balme v. Gold-Bro, Inc., 108 R.I. 930, 277 A.2d 134 (1971); Rao v. Lombardi, 96 R.I. 499, 502, 194 A.2d 836, 837 (1963); Fisher v. Sun Underwriters Ins. Co., 55 R.I. 175, 186, 179 A. 702, 707 (1935); 1 Kent R.I. Civ. Prac. § 56.12 (1969). Except in rare instances, none of which are applicable here, this court will not engage in piecemeal review of proceedings in the trial courts. Borland v. Dunn, 113 R.I. 337, 321 A.2d 96 (1974); Sarni v. Meloccaro, 110 R.I. 566, 294 A.2d 844 (1972).

A plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings under Super. R. Civ. P. 12(c) tests the legal sufficiency of a defendant's answer in a civil action. In a judicial review of the administrative action, which is essentially an appellate proceeding and not a civil action, no responsive pleading need be filed unless required by statute or by order of the court, Super. R. Civ. P. 80(a). In the case at bar none was required and none was filed. Similarly, the motion for summary judgment, appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact in a civil action, can play no part in the appellate proceedings involved in judicial review of contested administrative actions.

Cf. Bassi v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 107 R.I. 702, 271 A.2d 210 (1970) where we said of a similar statute that nothing "even remotely suggests that an appeal from a decision of a zoning board to the Superior Court is a civil action * * *." Id. at 705, 271 A.2d at 212 (emphasis in original).

The intervenors' motion to dismiss the appeal is granted and the plaintiff's motion to remand denied. The appeal of the plaintiff is denied and dismissed, and the order of the Superior Court affirmed.


Summaries of

Notre Dame Cem. v. Labor Relat'ns Bd.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island
May 26, 1977
118 R.I. 336 (R.I. 1977)

holding that when review of the affirmance of an administrative action was solely available by petition for certiorari, appeal was unavailable and therefore fatally defective

Summary of this case from Dietz v. R.I. Board of Professional Land Surveyors
Case details for

Notre Dame Cem. v. Labor Relat'ns Bd.

Case Details

Full title:NOTRE DAME CEMETERY vs. RHODE ISLAND STATE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

Court:Supreme Court of Rhode Island

Date published: May 26, 1977

Citations

118 R.I. 336 (R.I. 1977)
373 A.2d 1194

Citing Cases

Green Dev., LLC v. Town of Exeter Zoning Bd. of Review

Judicial review of an administrative agency is essentially an appellate proceeding. Notre Dame Cemetery v.…

Genexion, Inc. v. R.I. Dep't of Labor & Training

Gott, 417 A.2d at 1357; see also id. at 1357 n.6 ("administrative appeals are not civil actions within the…