Northeast Maryland Waste Disposal v. E.P.A

6 Citing briefs

  1. Post Acute Medical at Hammond, Llc v. Burwell

    MOTION for Summary Judgment

    Filed April 7, 2017

    Allina Health Servs. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 75, 85-86 (D.D.C. 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 746 F.3d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Int’l Union, UMWA, 407 F.3d at 1259; Ne. Md. Waste Disposal Auth. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 936, 952 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Plaintiff could not ‘divine [the Agency’s] unspoken thoughts’ on variability in their wage index amount coming off of the 1-year transition period.

  2. Barbosa et al v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security et al

    MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support

    Filed February 27, 2017

    Where statutes demand regulations and agencies respond with vague regulations, the D.C. Circuit has repeatedly demanded satisfactory reasons for regulatory vagueness under Chevron step two. Shays v. FEC, 528 F.3d 914, 931-32 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (rejecting a regulation for unexplained vagueness under Chevron step two); Cement Kiln, 493 F.3d at 23 (evolving scientific understanding “reasonably explained” EPA’s choice of regulatory specificity); Northeast Md. Waste Disposal Auth. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 936, 949 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“Without a readily accessible statement of the agency’s rationale, [neither] interested parties [nor] the courts [can] determine whether the agency[’s] statutory interpretation is reasonable under Chevron’s second step.”); State of New Mexico v. EPA, 114 F.3d 290, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Where a statute required radioactive material storage regulations to address contingencies over a period of ten thousand years, the court 22 The Fifth Circuit read the D.C. Circuit jurisprudence to require a reasoned explanation only when: (a) an agency changes its prior interpretation of a statute or regulation; or (b) a statute specifically requires a reasoned explanation.

  3. Bloomberg L.P. v. United States Commodity Futures Trading Commission

    MOTION for Preliminary Injunction

    Filed May 2, 2013

    Under this test, a “rule is deemed a logical out- growth if interested parties should have anticipated that the change was possible, and thus rea- sonably should have filed their comments on the subject during the notice-and-comment period.” Ne. Md. Waste Disposal Auth. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 936, 952 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted). PROTECTED INFORMATION DELETED PURSUANT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER Case 1:13-cv-00523-BAH Document 13 Filed 05/02/13 Page 33 of 54 26 Thus, for example, in CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Surface Transportation Board, 584 F.3d 1076 (D.C. Cir. 2009), the Surface Transportation Board proposed a rule that allowed par- ties in railroad rate cases to suggest “comparison groups” from the most recent year of data.

  4. Oregon Restaurant and Lodging Association et al v. United States Department of Labor

    Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment 25 , and Response in Support of Cross Motion for Summary Judgment 26 . Oral Argument requested.

    Filed November 16, 2012

    A final rule is a “logical outgrowth” of a proposed rule only if interested parties “‘should have anticipated’ that the change made in the final rule was possible, and thus reasonably should have filed their comments on the subject during the notice-and-comment period”. NE Md. Waste Disposal Auth. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 936, 952 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting City of Waukesha v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 245 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). The “logical outgrowth” doctrine does not extend to a final rule that finds no roots in the agency’s proposal because “something is not a logical outgrowth of nothing,” nor does it apply where interested parties would have had to “divine [the agency’s] unspoken thoughts,” because the final rule was “surprisingly distant” from the agency’s proposal.

  5. Sierra Club et al v. McCarthy

    MOTION for Summary Judgment

    Filed January 16, 2015

    ....24 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)………………….……….….….13 Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2001)………………………………………..…16 Celotex Corporationv. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)………………………….….………..13 Environmental Defense v. Leavitt, 329 F. Supp. 2nd 55 (D.D.C. 2004)…………………….11,12 EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 574 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014)…3,5,7,10,11,19,23 FEC v. Akin, 524 U.S. 11, 20-25 (1998)…………………………………………………..15 Maryland v. EPA, 13-1070 (D.C. Cir. 5/30/13)……………………………………………….11 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 22 F.3d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1994)…………………………………………………..................16 Occidental Eng’g Co. v. INS, 753 F.2d 766, 770 (9th Cir. 1985)…………………………..13 Sierra Club v. Thomas, 658 F. Supp. 165 (N.D.Cal. 1987)………………………………..24 Summers v. A. Teichert & Son,Inc., 127 F.3d 1150, 1152 (9th Cir.1997)…………..….….12 FEDERAL STATUTES 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)…………………………………………………………………………….6 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(1)………………………………………………………………………....6 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1)…………………………………………….……….…………6,9,13,17 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)………………………………………………………………………….13 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A)…………………………………...……………………………..7 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A)-(M)……………………………………...…... ………………...7 Case4:14-cv-05091-YGR Document21 Filed01/16/15 Page5 of 32 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 28 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT P

  6. National Restaurant Association et al v. Solis et al

    Memorandum in opposition to re Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment

    Filed December 5, 2011

    "Agencies, are free - indeed, they are encouraged - to modify proposed rules as a result of the comments they receive." Ne. Md. Waste Disposal Auth. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 936, 951 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). And while it may be true, as Plaintiffs assert, that agency's cannot bootstrap notice from a few individual comments, the fact that multiple insightful comments were submitted on this issue, as is the case in this rulemaking, is certainly most relevant to the issue of whether notice was adequate.