5 Analyses of this case by attorneys

  1. Capital Defense Weekly, November 29, 1999

    Capital Defense NewsletterNovember 29, 1999

    Id. See also Nobles v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 409, 423 (5th Circuit 1997) (in accord). We further noted that Section 4, the provision at issue here, adopts the same rule for non-capital felony cases(2).

  2. Capital Defense Weekly, December 10, 2001

    Capital Defense NewsletterDecember 10, 2001

    See Morris, 186 F.3d at 584 ("In this appeal, [the petitioner] argues that the state court's unreasonable instruction led to his conviction under a standard contrary to settled federal law"); Corwin, 150 F.3d at 472 ("Corwin argues that . . . all state court determinations of federal constitutional issues in habeas proceedings should be subject to de novo review by the federal courts"). In Nobles v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 1997), on which Morris relies for the "full and fair adjudication" proposition, we evinced concern that the state court had not adequately adjudicated the petitioner's claim. While we stated our concern, we resolved the petitioner's claim on other grounds and did not delve further into the possible import of the way in which the state habeas court adjudicated the petitioner's claim.

  3. Capital Defense Weekly, March 8, 1999

    Capital Defense NewsletterMarch 8, 1999

    That statute alters the standards and scope of our review in habeas corpus petitions filed after AEDPA's effective date. See Nobles v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 409, 415 (5th Cir. 1997) (applying AEDPA standards to a habeas petition filed after AEDPA's effective date of April 24, 1996). Applying these statutory amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) , we can grant a writ of habeas corpus only if the state court's determination of law, on a de novo review, violated Supreme Court precedent in existence at the time of the petitioner's conviction.

  4. Capital Defense Weekly, December 14, 1998

    Capital Defense NewsletterDecember 13, 1998

    Both arguments prove unavailing.Little has procedurally defaulted on his first due process theory. When the ground upon which the petitioner relies for habeas relief was not exhausted in state court and state procedural rules would bar subsequent presentation of the argument, this court may not consider the claim absent "cause" and "prejudice", neither of which exceptions is argued here.SeeMuniz v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 214, 221 (5th Cir. 1998);Nobles v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 409, 422-23 (5th Cir. 1997). The issue of reliability of Thomas's confession was not raised at trial.

  5. Capital Defense Weekly, August 31, 1998

    Capital Defense NewsletterAugust 30, 1998

    An application of federal law is "unreasonable" only if it is "so clearly incorrect that it would not be debatable among reasonable jurists." Nobles v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 409, 418 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1845, 140 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1998) (internal quotations and citation omitted).