Nix v. Whiteside

7 Analyses of this case by attorneys

  1. Due Process – Defendant’s Right to Testify, as Affected by Intent to Commit Perjury – Counsel’s Role

    Wisconsin State Public DefenderFebruary 21, 2003

    State v. Derryle S. McDowell, 2003 WI App 168, affirmed, 2004 WI 70, ¶¶42-47 For McDowell: Christopher J. Cherella Amici: Keith A. Findley, John T. Savee, John A. Pray, Frank Remington Center & WACDLIssue/Holding: The defendant’s right to testify does not include a right to testify falsely, Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986):¶37. From Nix, we derive five principles that lay the foundation for our analysis:• Whether simply “assumed,” or as a corollary to the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled testimony, or as a corollary to the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel, a defendant in a criminal trial has a right to testify.

  2. Capital Defense Weekly, April 17, 2000

    Capital Defense NewsletterApril 17, 2000

    Even if a defendant's false testimony might have persuaded the jury to acquit him, it is not fundamentally unfair to conclude that he was not prejudiced by counsel's interference with his intended perjury. Nix v. Whiteside,475 U. S. 157, 175-176 (1986).Similarly, in Lockhart, we concluded that, given the overriding interest in fundamental fairness, the likelihood of a different outcome attributable to an incorrect interpretation of the law should be regarded as a potential "windfall" to the defendant rather than the legitimate "prejudice" contemplated by our opinion in Strickland.

  3. Capital Defense Weekly, April 17, 1999

    Capital Defense NewsletterApril 17, 1999

    Even if a defendant's false testimony might have persuaded the jury to acquit him, it is not fundamentally unfair to conclude that he was not prejudiced by counsel's interference with his intended perjury. Nix v. Whiteside,475 U. S. 157, 175-176 (1986).Similarly, in Lockhart, we concluded that, given the overriding interest in fundamental fairness, the likelihood of a different outcome attributable to an incorrect interpretation of the law should be regarded as a potential "windfall" to the defendant rather than the legitimate "prejudice" contemplated by our opinion in Strickland.

  4. Dale J. Atkins v. Zenk, 7th Cir No. 11-1891, 1/31/12

    Wisconsin State Public DefenderFebruary 2, 2012

    As Atkins’s brief acknowledges, the rule against presenting false evidence to the jury is to protect the integrity of the truth-finding function of courts—not to protect the rights owed to the defendant. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 174 (1986) (attorney’s responsibility to prevent perjured testimony is a duty to the court). …Compare, State v. Fritz, 212 Wis. 2d 284, 293, 569 N.W.2d 48 (Ct. App. 1997) (“a lawyer who counsels perjury as a way of beating a ‘he says-she says’ charge is ‘not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment'” – the court then referring counsel for disciplinary investigation).

  5. BARRY BONDS: HOME RUN KING OR STEROID USER?

    John T. Floyd Law FirmJohn T. FloydJune 12, 2008

    A defense attorney cannot put a defendant on the witness stand knowing that he/she is going to lie under oath – and if a defense attorney has information that his client has testified falsely under oath, he has an ethical and public duty to disclose that information. See: Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 147 (1986); McKissick v. United States, 379 F.3d 754 (5th Cir. 1967). See also: American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct.Second, U.S. Sentencing Guideline § 3C1.1 provides that the offense level shall be increased two levels “if the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the … prosecution … of the instant offense … ‘though the court may not penalize a defendant for denying his guilt as an exercise of his constitutional rights, a sentence may be enhanced if the defendant commits perjury.

  6. Counsel – Ineffective Assistance – Deficient Performance: Presentation/Examination of Witnesses – Defendant’s Testimony: Waiver of and Revocation of Waiver

    Wisconsin State Public DefenderFebruary 22, 2004

    Nor was counsel’s performance deficient with respect to revoking this waiver: before resting, counsel confirmed that Arredondo did not in fact want to testify, ¶29. And, given the trial court’s subsequent finding “that Arredondo’s belated desire to testify was an attempt to manipulate the system[,] … Arredondo’s attorney was not required to help Arredondo pursue that ‘strategy.’ See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 168-169 (1986) (attorney’s duty to prevent fraud upon the court).” Id.

  7. Capital Defense Weekly, March 25, 2002

    Capital Defense NewsletterMarch 24, 2002

    The purpose of ourHollowayandSullivanexceptions from the ordinary requirements ofStrickland, however, is not to enforce the Canons of Legal Ethics, but to apply needed prophylaxis in situations whereStricklanditself is evidently inadequate to assure vindication of the defendants Sixth Amendment right to counsel. SeeNixv.Whiteside,475 U.S. 157, 165(1986) ([B]reach of an ethical standard does not necessarily make out a denial of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel). In resolving this case on the grounds on which it was presented to us, we do not rule upon the need for theSullivanprophylaxis in cases of successive representation.