Neitzke v. Williams

195 Citing briefs

  1. Fischer v. County of Hudson et al

    BRIEF in Opposition

    Filed May 16, 2017

    .12 Marino v. Industrial Crafting Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004)………………………………….……………….....8 McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973)………………………...……………….......... ……….17 Mitchell v. Horn 318 F.3d 523,530 (3d Cir. 2003)………………………………………......................22 Mondzelewski v. Pathmark Store, Inc., 162 F.3d 773,778 (3d Cir. 1998)…………………………………………………….14 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)……………...........................................................................6 Nelson v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 244 F.Supp.2d 382, 389 (E.D.Pa 2002)………………………………………………15 Parker v. Hahnemann Univ. Hosp., 234 F.Supp.2d 478, 492 n. 15 (D.N.J.2002)……………………………….

  2. Striplin v. FBI et al

    MOTION to Dismiss Case as Frivolous

    Filed February 21, 2017

    III. ARGUMENT A. The Complaint Fails for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) A court can invoke Rule 12(b)(1) to dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint that is “ ‘patently insubstantial,’ presenting no federal question suitable for decision.” Best v. Kelly, 39 F.3d 328, 330 (D.C.Cir.1994) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 n. 6, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989)). This standard requires that the “claims be flimsier than ‘doubtful or questionable’ – they must be ‘essentially fictitious.’ ”

  3. Jibreel v. Chin et al

    MOTION to Dismiss SENATOR AND EXECUTIVE DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS

    Filed February 27, 2014

    See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (stating that a complaint is frivolous within the meaning of Section 1915 where it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact”). Plaintiff’s action is thus “clearly baseless,” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992), and, accordingly, should be dismissed pursuant to Section 1915(e)(2)(B). Washington v. Harrington, 2013 WL 6492448, *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 11, 2013) (affirming Section 1915 dismissal, stating that even “though pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, a plaintiff must still present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief”). Case3:13-cv-03470-JST Document22 Filed02/27/14 Page12

  4. Saccato v. Zwicker & Associates, P.C. et al

    Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

    Filed August 9, 2011

    In addition, when ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint. Bell Atlantic Corp., supra, at 1955, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (slip op., at 8-9) (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, n. 1, 122 S.Ct. 992,152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,236,94 S.Ct. 1683,40 L. Ed.2d 90 (1974)). Erickson, 127 S.Ct. at 2200. (5)

  5. Kinder, et al v. Department of Treasury, et al

    MEMORANDUM in Opposition re MOTION to Dismiss Case

    Filed January 25, 2011

    Dismissal cannot be based on “a judge’s disbelief of a complaint’s factual allegations.” See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; see also Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (complaint may proceed even if it appears that relief “is very remote and unlikely”). Defendants fail to give even a passing nod to this legal standard and premise their motion on factual assumptions and substantive argument not properly considered in a motion to dismiss.

  6. St. Croix Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin v. Kempthorne et al

    Memorandum in opposition to re MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order MOTION for Preliminary Injunction

    Filed December 21, 2007

    “[I]f as a matter of law ‘it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations,’ a claim must be dismissed, without regard to whether it is based on an outlandish legal theory or on a close but ultimately unavailing one.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327 (quoting Hishon, 467 U.S. at 73). Thus, claims should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) where “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his legal claim which would entitle him to relief.”

  7. St. Croix Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin v. Kempthorne et al

    MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Failure to State a Claim

    Filed December 21, 2007

    “[I]f as a matter of law ‘it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations,’ a claim must be dismissed, without regard to whether it is based on an outlandish legal theory or on a close but ultimately unavailing one.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327 (quoting Hishon, 467 U.S. at 73). Thus, claims should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) where “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his legal claim which would entitle him to relief.”

  8. Planete Bleue Television, Inc., et al. v. A&E Television Networks, LLC, et al.

    MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 60 MOTION to Dismiss . . Document

    Filed January 5, 2018

    LEGAL STANDARD Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) enables the Court to terminate lawsuits that are fatally flawed in their legal premises, thereby sparing the litigants the burdens of unnecessary pretrial and trial activity. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1989). To survive a 12(b)(6) motion

  9. Biermann v. Helicopters, Inc.

    REPLY BRIEF to Opposition to Motion

    Filed October 10, 2017

    Group, LLC, 590 Fed. Appx. 132, 137 (3d Cir. 2014): That argument [that discovery should be allowed before ruling on the defendant’s motion to dismiss] of course, puts the cart before the horse. The Rule 12(b)(6) procedure “streamlines litigation by dispensing with needless discovery and factfinding,” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326–27, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989), and motions to dismiss filed under it should typically “be resolved before discovery begins.” Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1367 (11th Cir.1997).

  10. Stephanie Patton et al v. Forest Laboratories, LLC

    OPPOSITION to to Dismiss 60 re: TEVA

    Filed September 21, 2017

    The motion to dismiss may not be based upon the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact), see, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A ., 534 U. S. 506, 508, n. 1 (2002); Neitzke v. Williams , 490 U. S. 319, 327 (1989) ("Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance. . . dismissals based on a judge's disbelief of a complaint's factual allegations"); Scheuer v. Rhodes , 416 U. S. 232, 236 (1974) (a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it appears "that a recovery is very remote and unlikely"). TEVA’s attempt to mischaracterize and simplify the Complaint as one which is only about a “duty to warn” (See Moving Papers at page 1, line 22 – page 2, line 4) is revelatory of their failure to overcome the high bar for granting a motion under FRCP 12(b)(6).