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N.B. by D.G. v. Alachua County School Bd.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
Jun 7, 1996
84 F.3d 1376 (11th Cir. 1996)

Summary

holding that plaintiffs cannot avoid the exhaustion requirement by limiting relief to money damages because otherwise, "future litigants could avoid the exhaustion requirement simply by asking for relief that administrative authorities could not grant"

Summary of this case from J.M. v. Francis Howell Sch. Dist.

Opinion

No. 95-3214 Non-Argument Calendar.

Decided June 7, 1996.

N. Albert Bacharach, Jr., N. Albert Bacharach P.A., Gainesville, FL, for appellant.

Francis H. Sheppard, Francis H. Sheppard, P.A., Orlando, FL, for appellees.

John M. Cacciatore, Gregory David Swartwood, Unger, Cacciatore Swartwood, P.A., Orlando, FL, for Suwannee County School Board Charles F. Blalock, Jr.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida.

Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, and DUBINA and BLACK, Circuit Judges.


We affirm the judgment of the district court for the reasons stated in the district court's dispositive order of July 20, 1995, which appears in the Appendix.

AFFIRMED.

APPENDIX

ORDER

BACKGROUND

20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 42 U.S.C. § 1983 42 U.S.C. § 1983 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., 20 U.S.C. § 1400 Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 311-12 108 S.Ct. 592 597-98 98 L.Ed.2d 686 Id. 108 S.Ct. at 598 20 U.S.C. § 1415 Id. Ass'n for Retarded Citizens of Alabama v. Teague, 830 F.2d 158 160 Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 104 S.Ct. 3467 82 L.Ed.2d 746 Id. Id. McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479 483 91 S.Ct. 1565 1568 29 L.Ed.2d 47 Id. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. at 1014 104 S.Ct. at 3469 Torrie By and Through Torrie v. Cwayna, 841 F. Supp. 1434 Torrie, 841 F. Supp. at 1442 Torrie Teague, 830 F.2d at 160 See Buffolino v. Board of Education of Sachem Central School District, 729 F. Supp. 240 247 Waterman v. Marquette-Alger Intermediate School District, 739 F. Supp. 361 368 Torrie, 841 F. Supp. at 1442 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748 756 This cause comes before the Court upon motion to dismiss plaintiff's first amended complaint by defendants Alachua County School Board and Columbia County School Board (doc. 6). For the reasons stated below, the motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff N.B. is a hearing impaired child. During the relevant time periods, N.B. lived in either Columbia or Suwannee County, Florida. Sometime prior to March 1986, N.B. was bused from her home in Columbia or Suwannee County to attend a special school for hearing impaired children in Alachua County. Plaintiff claims that this decision caused her to be segregated from hearing students. She also claims that the long bus ride caused her to miss a significant portion of class work each school day. N.B. left the State of Florida at the end of the 1992/93 school year and is no longer in the Florida educational system. N.B. has brought this suit alleging violations of the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act ("IDEA"), She seeks compensatory damages under the IDEA (Count I) and (Count II). In the motion to dismiss, defendants move for dismissal of the first amended complaint based on the following four grounds: 1) the plaintiff has failed to exhaust administrative remedies; 2) the plaintiffs claims are barred by the statute of limitations; 3) compensatory damages are not available under the IDEA; and 4) compensatory damages are not available under for violations of the IDEA. Because the Court finds dismissal is appropriate for plaintiff's failure to exhaust necessary administrative remedies as a prerequisite to filing this action, the Court need not reach the remaining three issues concerning the statute of limitations and the availability of compensatory damages under the IDEA and . DISCUSSION The IDEA, formerly known as the Education for All Handicapped Act ("EHA"), provides federal money to state and local education agencies in order to assist them in educating handicapped children, on the condition that the states and local agencies implement the substantive and procedural requirements of the Act. The principal purpose of the Act is "to assure that all children with disabilities have available to them . . . a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet the handicapped child's unique needs, . . . [and to ensure] that the rights of handicapped children and their parents or guardians are protected." (c). To carry out these objectives, the IDEA provides procedural safeguards to permit parental involvement in all matters concerning the child's educational program and allows parents to obtain administrative and judicial review of decisions they deem unsatisfactory or inappropriate. , , , , (1988). Under this scheme of procedural protections, parents are entitled to 1) examination of all relevant records pertaining to evaluation and educational placement of their child, 2) prior written notice whenever the responsible educational agency proposes, or refuses, to change the child's placement, 3) an opportunity to present complaints concerning any aspect of the local agency's provision of a free appropriate public education, and 4) an opportunity for an "impartial due process hearing" with respect to any such complaints. at 312, . In the event that a party is dissatisfied with or aggrieved by the findings and decisions made after the impartial due process hearing, that party may obtain additional administrative review by the state educational agency. (c). If that party is still dissatisfied or remains aggrieved after the administrative appeal, a judicial review is available in either state court or federal court to contest the decisions of the educational agency. § 1415(e)(2). "The philosophy of the [IDEA] is that plaintiffs are required to utilize the elaborate administrative scheme established by the [IDEA] before resorting to the courts to challenge the actions of the local school authorities." , (11th Cir. 1987) (citing , , (1984)). Key reasons for requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies are as follows: 1) to permit the exercise of agency discretion and expertise on issues requiring these characteristics; 2) to allow the full development of technical issues and a factual record prior to court review; 3) to prevent deliberate disregard and circumvention of agency procedures established by Congress; and 4) to avoid unnecessary judicial decisions by giving the agency the first opportunity to correct any error. The exhaustion requirement, however, is not jurisdictional and therefore "`is not to be applied inflexibly'" (quoting , , , , (1971)). The exhaustion of the administrative remedies is not required where resort to administrative remedies would be 1) futile or 2) inadequate. (citing to n. 17, 1019 n. 22, n. 17, 3472 n. 22). In the amended complaint, plaintiff does not allege that she has exhausted her administrative remedies. Instead, plaintiff argues that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required in this case because she no longer attends any of the defendant school districts. This argument was squarely rejected in (W.D.Mich. 1994). In that case, an emotionally impaired student and his mother brought an action against a school district and its employees for alleged violations of IDEA, Rehabilitation Act, false arrest and false imprisonment. The student and his mother neither requested an impartial due process hearing nor filed a complaint with the school district before filing the action. In responding to the school district's motion to dismiss based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the plaintiffs argued that exhaustion was not required under the futility exception because they no longer lived in the defendant school district. Reasoning that parents' unilateral act of removing their child from a public school could not excuse their failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the court dismissed the action for failure to exhaust remedies. . The rationale of is persuasive. If parents can bypass the exhaustion requirement of the IDEA by merely moving their child out of the defendant school district, the whole administrative scheme established by the IDEA would be rendered nugatory. Permitting parents to avoid the requirements of the IDEA through such a "back door" would not be consistent with the legislative intent of the IDEA. The plaintiff's second argument is equally unpersuasive. The plaintiff argues there is no point pursuing administrative remedies because the defendant school districts lack authority to grant the relief requested, namely money damages. Again, if the plaintiff's argument is to be accepted, then future litigants could avoid the exhaustion requirement simply by asking for relief that administrative authorities could not grant. This goes against the very reason that we have the exhaustion requirement, which is "[to prevent] deliberate disregard and circumvention of agency procedures established by Congress." . In fact, courts that considered this argument have all rejected it. , (E.D.N.Y. 1990); , (W.D.Mich. 1990) ("A procedure that may result in any substantial relief is not futile"); . Nor does the fact that the plaintiff also seeks money damages under for violations of the IDEA make any difference. "[W]hen parents choose to file suit under another law that protects the rights of handicapped children — and the suit could have been filed under the [IDEA] — they are first required to exhaust the [IDEA]'s remedies to the same extent as if the suit had been filed originally under the [IDEA]'s provisions." , (2d Cir. 1987). As the plaintiff has failed to exhaust administrative remedies, the plaintiff may not proceed with her § 1983 claims for violations of the IDEA.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the defendants' motion to dismiss (doc. 6) is GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to dismiss the first amended complaint with prejudice.


Summaries of

N.B. by D.G. v. Alachua County School Bd.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
Jun 7, 1996
84 F.3d 1376 (11th Cir. 1996)

holding that plaintiffs cannot avoid the exhaustion requirement by limiting relief to money damages because otherwise, "future litigants could avoid the exhaustion requirement simply by asking for relief that administrative authorities could not grant"

Summary of this case from J.M. v. Francis Howell Sch. Dist.

holding litigants cannot "avoid the exhaustion requirement simply by asking for relief that administrative authorities [cannot] grant," such as money damages or relief from a former school district

Summary of this case from Laura A. v. Limestone Cnty. Bd. of Educ.

holding that plaintiffs cannot avoid the exhaustion requirement by limiting their requested relief to money damages because otherwise, "future litigants could avoid the exhaustion requirement simply by asking for relief that administrative authorities could not grant"

Summary of this case from Payne v. Peninsula School Dist

holding that parents' removal of a child from the school district does not excuse the failure to exhaust administrative remedies

Summary of this case from Payne v. Peninsula Sch. Dist

holding litigants cannot "avoid the exhaustion requirement simply by asking for relief that administrative authorities [cannot] grant," such as money damages

Summary of this case from M.T.V. v. Dekalb County School Dist

holding that plaintiffs cannot avoid the exhaustion requirement by limiting relief to money damages because otherwise, "future litigants could avoid the exhaustion requirement simply by asking for relief that administrative authorities could not grant"

Summary of this case from P.G. v. Rutherford Cnty. Bd. of Educ.

holding in the context of the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act that a plaintiff was required to exhaust her IDEA administrative remedies before proceeding with her § 1983 action based on the same claims

Summary of this case from Altstatt Servs., L.L.C. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Dep't of Soc. Servs.

holding that a plaintiff may not avoid exhausting the administrative remedies by requesting money damages

Summary of this case from Pope v. Cherokee County Board of Education

finding it irrelevant, for exhaustion purposes, that the plaintiff "no longer attends any of the defendant school districts"

Summary of this case from Covington v. Knox County School System

finding that plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the IDEA for its § 1983 claim based on denial of a FAPE and that parties cannot "avoid the exhaustion requirement simply by asking for relief that administrative authorities could not grant."

Summary of this case from Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty. v. C.B.

finding that plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies before proceeding with a § 1983 claim for violations of the IDEA

Summary of this case from Ely v. Mobile Cnty. Sch. Bd.

finding that plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies before proceeding with a § 1983 claim for violations of the IDEA

Summary of this case from Barnett v. Baldwin Cnty. Bd. of Educ.

concluding that the IDEA's exhaustion requirement applied to plaintiff's § 1983 claim for money damages

Summary of this case from Prunty v. DeSoto Cnty. Sch. Bd.

affirming district court's dismissal of IDEA claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies where exhaustion requirement found not to be futile even though remedy requested, i.e., money damages, was relief school district lacked authority to grant

Summary of this case from Boatright v. School Board of Polk County, Florida

affirming the principle that if parents choose to file suit under § 1983 when they could have filed suit under the IDEA, they must first exhaust the IDEA's remedies "to the same extent as if the suit had been filed originally under the IDEA's provisions."

Summary of this case from ED v. FOUNTAIN HILLS UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

affirming district court's reasoning and citing Torrie

Summary of this case from Franklin v. Frid

rejecting IDEA plaintiff's argument that exhaustion of administrative remedies would be futile because the defendant school districts lack authority to grant the relief requested, namely money damages

Summary of this case from Martin Pope v. Petruzielo

assuming availability of § 1983 for IDEA violation

Summary of this case from Stanek v. St. Charles Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist.

In N.B., we observed that "if the plaintiff's argument is to be accepted, then future litigants could avoid the exhaustion requirement simply by asking for relief that administrative authorities could not grant.

Summary of this case from Martin Pope v. Petruzielo

requiring exhaustion where the plaintiff's alleged injuries included segregation from non-disabled children and unnecessary absence from school

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requiring exhaustion where plaintiff asserted § 1983 claims for violations of IDEA

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requiring exhaustion of IDEA's administrative remedies even though the student had left the school and sought only compensatory damages which the school district lacked the ability to grant

Summary of this case from Prunty v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc.

noting that “exhaustion requirement ... is not jurisdictional and therefore is not to be applied inflexibly”

Summary of this case from Alboniga v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty.

opining that IDEA's "exhaustion requirement ... is not jurisdictional and therefore is not to be applied inflexibly"

Summary of this case from Reid v. Selma City Sch. Bd.

In N.B. v. Alachua County School Board, 84 F.3d 1376 (11th Cir.1996), decided on a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff made an argument similar to the one Plaintiffs make.

Summary of this case from Moore v. Chilton Cnty. Bd. of Educ.
Case details for

N.B. by D.G. v. Alachua County School Bd.

Case Details

Full title:N.B., by her mother and next friend, D.G. a/k/a N.B., Plaintiff-Appellant…

Court:United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit

Date published: Jun 7, 1996

Citations

84 F.3d 1376 (11th Cir. 1996)

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