16 Analyses of this case by attorneys

  1. Resident Employees (906)

    California Department of Industrial RelationsApril 23, 2003

    7 (1998).)” (Morillion v. Royal Packing Co. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 575, 589) (Emphasis added)With this admonition from the California Supreme Court, you can clearly understand why it is imperative that we view this response in light of the fact that, as you state, the employees are not required to remain on the premises. “Resident employees are not ‘at work’ all the time they reside on premises, nor are they on call during all the time they reside on premises but may, on occasion, be called to service as needed.”

  2. "Hours of Work" for Public Transit Employees Required to Start and End Their Shifts at Different Locations

    California Department of Industrial RelationsJanuary 29, 2002

    Section 2(G) of Order 9-2001 defines "hours worked" as "the time during which an employee is subject to the control of an employer, and includes all the time the employee is suffered or permitted to work, whether or not required to do so." In Morillion v. Royal Packing Company (2000) 22 Cal.4th 575, 582, the Supreme Court construed identical language in IWC Order 14, and held that the two phrases -- "time during which an employee is subject to the control of an employer" and "time the employee is suffered or permitted to work, whether or not required to do so" -- are "independent factors, each of which defines whether certain time spent is compensable as hours worked'."Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that the , "an employee who is subject to an employer's control does not have to be working during that time to be compensated under Wage Order No.14-80."

  3. Whether Meal Periods During Which Employees Are Restricted to their Employer's Premises Constitute Hours Worked

    California Department of Industrial RelationsJanuary 12, 2001

    Bono Enterprises, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at 977 .The Bono Court's interpretation of "hours worked" was expressly approved by the California Supreme Court in Morillion v. Royal Packing Co. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 575 [holding that agricultural employees were subject to employer control during time spent riding to and from fields when required to ride in employer provided buses, and thus, that such time was compensable under the applicable IWC Order] . The Supreme Court held:"[T]he two phrases -- "time during which an employee is subject to the control of an employer" and "time the employee is suffered or permitted to work, whether or not required to do so" -- can also be interpreted as independent factors, each of which defines whether certain time spent is compensable as "hours worked.

  4. California Court of Appeal Analyzes Rounding and Grace-Period Policies

    Atkinson, Andelson, Loya, Ruud & RomoJonathan JudgeMarch 6, 2017

    However, Silva also acknowledged that she did not know if these employees had their schedule programmed into the timekeeping system, and did not know if these employees were paid for this time.Ultimately the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of See’s. Silva appealed.Appellate DecisionThe Court of Appeal distinguished the See’s employees who were clocked-in during the grace-period from an earlier Supreme Court decision in Morillion v. Royal Packing Co. (2000) 22 Cal. 4th 575, where employees were found to be under the employer’s control (and thus entitled to compensation) where they were confined to a bus to be transported to their next workplace.Nevertheless, even under the facts presented by See’s, the Court of Appeal recognized that Silva’s grace-period claims could have survived summary judgment had Silva presented evidence showing that employees performed work during the grace-period for which they failed to receive compensation. However, Silva failed to present any such evidence.

  5. California Court of Appeal Analyzes Rounding and Grace-Period Policies

    Atkinson, Andelson, Loya, Ruud & Romo PLCJonathan JudgeMarch 6, 2017

    However, Silva also acknowledged that she did not know if these employees had their schedule programmed into the timekeeping system, and did not know if these employees were paid for this time.Ultimately the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of See’s. Silva appealed.Appellate DecisionThe Court of Appeal distinguished the See’s employees who were clocked-in during the grace-period from an earlier Supreme Court decision in Morillion v. Royal Packing Co. (2000) 22 Cal. 4th 575, where employees were found to be under the employer’s control (and thus entitled to compensation) where they were confined to a bus to be transported to their next workplace.Nevertheless, even under the facts presented by See’s, the Court of Appeal recognized that Silva’s grace-period claims could have survived summary judgment had Silva presented evidence showing that employees performed work during the grace-period for which they failed to receive compensation. However, Silva failed to present any such evidence.

  6. Companies Must Consider Impact on Culture, Compensable Time with Employee Security Searches, Particularly In California

    Welter Law Firm, P.C.Eric WelterJuly 30, 2015

    In 2000, the California Supreme Court cited the IWC’s definition of hours worked and determined that “an employee who is subject to an employer’s control does not have to be working during that time to be compensated.” Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal. 4th 575, 582 (2000). The Supreme Court also held that time employees are required to spend travelling to and from a remote work site on their employers’ buses is compensable.

  7. No Lullaby for Employers: California Supreme Court Finds Sleep Periods Considered 'Hours Worked'

    Littler Mendelson, P.C.Benjamin EmmertJanuary 14, 2015

    The Mendiola court held California’s wage and hour laws do not “implicitly incorporate[]” the federal Fair Labor Standards Act’s (FLSA) regulations. Rather, the court reaffirmed the rule previously stated in Morillion v. Royal Packing Co. 22 Cal.4th 575 (2000) that California’s “courts should not incorporate a federal standard concerning what time is compensable ‘[a]bsent convincing evidence of the [Industrial Welfare Commission’s (“IWC”)] intent’” to do so.The Facts of the Case The defendant in Mendiola provided security guards to construction sites. The guards worked 16 hour shifts during weekdays, eight hours on patrol and eight hours “on call;” and 24 hour shifts on weekends, 16 hours on patrol and eight hours “on call.”

  8. The United States Supreme Court’s Decision on Non-exempt Employee’s Work Day

    Dorsey & Whitney LLPKevin HaDecember 12, 2014

    For example, California law states that employees are entitled to pay when they are subject to the control of the employer. See Morillion v. Royal PackingCo., 995 P.2d 139 (Cal. 2000). Thus, if an employer is subject to California’s wage and hour laws, it may nonetheless be required to pay employees for the types of preliminary and postliminary activities that the Supreme Court states are noncompensable under the FLSA.

  9. Security Screening Time Need Not Be Paid, SCOTUS Rules – Expect California Law to Differ

    Jackson Lewis P.C.Robert M. PattisonDecember 9, 2014

    Using this analysis, the California Supreme Court held that farmworkers had to be paid for time traveling by bus from a meeting point to the field even though they could read, sleep, or do other personal activities while on the bus. In Morillion v. Royal Packing Co. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 575, 578, the Court concluded that “the time agricultural employees are required to spend traveling on their employer’s buses is compensable under Wage Order No. 14-80 because they are ‘subject to the control of an employer’ and do not also have to be ‘suffered or permitted to work’ during this travel period.”Several security screening cases have been filed in California courts under California law as well as under the FLSA.

  10. Wage Order Series, Part II: Money for Nothing? Hours “Worked” And California’s Wage Orders

    Seyfarth Shaw LLPAugust 13, 2014

    California courts have held that employer-provided shuttles to work can convert this daily commuting time into “hours worked,” where the employer requires employees to use the employer-provided transportation. Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal. 4th 575 (2000). In contrast, commuting on truly optionalemployer-provided work shuttles need not be compensated.