Filed September 14, 2009
Two criteria must be met to satisfy this exception to the mootness doctrine: (1) the injury must be of a type such that a reasonable chance exists that it will happen to the plaintiff again; and (2) the injury must be a type that is of inherently limited duration so that it is likely to become moot before federal litigation is completed. See, e.g., Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969) (finding exception applied in case challenging state requirement that independent candidate obtain a certain number of signatures to get on the ballot where election had been held before case was heard). Plaintiff’s claims readily satisfy these two criteria.
Filed August 31, 2009
of DOE 4 at ¶¶ 4, 5, 10.) They are not going to stop voicing their opinions and will continue to use strong, often shocking, language to do so, 12 394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969). The court found that the burden placed on the nomination of candidates for statewide offices remained and would control future elections.
Filed June 17, 2009
Id. at 105 (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555); see also Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 233 (1982); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 115 (1980); Moore, 394 U.S. at 818. With respect to the franchise, the concept of equal participation requires application of the principle of “one person, one vote.”
Filed June 17, 2005
See also Moorev. Ogilve (1969) 394 U.S. 814; Gray v. Sanders (1963) 372 U.S. 368. There are no statewide standards to guide the prosecutor’s discretion. Some offenders will be chosen as candidates for the death penalty by one prosecutor, while others with similar factors in different counties will not.
Filed June 28, 2017
The other cases cited by the State, notably Marijuana Policy Project v. United States, 304 F.3d 82 (D.C. Cir. 2002) and Skrzypczak v. Kauger, 93 F.3d 1050 (10th Cir. 1996) are equally inapposite because they simply approve limitations on the kind of issues which can be the subject of initiatives, and are therefore restrictions on the legislative process and do not involve the First Amendment at all. Amendment 71’s Two Percent Requirement Violates the One Person One Vote Rule The one person one, vote rule of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) was extended to candidate nominating petitions in Moore v. Olgive, 394 U.S. 814 (1969), where the Court struck an Illinois law which required that a nominating petition contain the signatures of at least 25,000 electors and that included in this number there must be the signatures of at least 200 electors from each of at least fifty counties. The Court held that, “It is no answer to the argument under the Equal Protection Clause that this law was designed to require statewide support for launching a new political party rather than support from a few localities. . . . .The idea that one group can be granted greater voting strength than another is hostile to the one man, one vote basis of our representative government.”
Filed June 30, 2006
Id. Plaintiff’s Response to Court’s Show Cause Order 4 granted as applied to the particular application for certification for the Illinois ballot that gave rise to the claim, because “the burden . . . allowed to be placed on the nomination of candidates for statewide offices remains and controls future elections . . . The problem is therefore ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review . . .’” 394 U.S. 814, 816 (U.S. 1969) (citation omitted). If the original application for certification itself had to be “capable of repetition,” then Moore’s claims would have been moot.