Mitchell v. United States

13 Citing briefs

  1. PEOPLE v. POTTS

    Appellant’s Opening Brief

    Filed April 30, 2009

    Time after time the court spoke not of whether a case against the child with access to the pie was proven, but of the other question, i.e., of whether the child actually "committed the act[]." (Mitchell v. United States, supra, 526 U.S. at p. 330.) "[Y]ou don't need any other evidence ... to conclude that your child got into the pie."

  2. PEOPLE v. TRUJEQUE (TOMMY ADRIAN)

    Respondent’s Brief

    Filed December 12, 2012

    [Citation.] The privilege is waived for the matters to which the witnesstestifies, and the scope ofthe “waiveris determined bythe scope of relevant cross-examination.” [Citation.] (Mitchell v. United States (1999) 526 U.S. 314, 321 [119 S.Ct. 1307, 143 L.Ed.2d 424]; see Rogers v. United States (1951) 340 U.S. 367, 374 [71 S.Ct. 438, 95 L.Ed. 344] [a witness may not invokethe privilege as to details after voluntarily disclosing incriminating facts].) In other words, a witness who chooses to make a statementortestify waives the privilege against compulsoryself-incrimination only “‘with-respect to the testimony he gives....’ [Citation.]” (People v. Malone (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1245.)

  3. The People, Respondent,v.Victor Gonzalez, Appellant.

    Brief

    Filed January 9, 2014

    The waiver is justified to guard against a defendant distorting the truth-seeking process by “pick[ing] and choos[ing] what aspects of a particular subject to discuss.” Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 322 (1999). Consistent with this policy, this Court has expressed concern about the “unfair[ness]” of permitting a defendant to present psychiatric evidence on his mental state while denying the People the opportunity to rebut it.

  4. PEOPLE v. TOM

    Appellant’s Answer Brief on the Merits

    Filed November 26, 2012

    The Supreme Court later extended Griffin’s holding to sentencing procedures, holding that a trial court could not make an adverse sentencing finding based uponthe defendant’s refusal to answer. (Mitchell v. United States (1999) 526 U.S. 314, 330.) ““{T]here can belittle doubt that the rule prohibiting an inference of guilt from a defendant’s rightful silence has becomean essential feature of our legal tradition.”

  5. PEOPLE v. TRUJEQUE (TOMMY ADRIAN)

    Appellant’s Opening Brief

    Filed March 23, 2012

    Accordingly,it is well established that once a witnesstestifies voluntarily about a subject, she may not thereafter, in the same proceeding, invokethe privilege against 119 self-incrimination when questioned further about the matter. (/d. at p. 373; accord Mitchell v. United States (1999) 526 U.S. 314, 321; People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 615.) Elena Trujeque’s lawyer also argued that she could properly refuse to testify at the penalty phase because she could be vulnerable to a charge of perjury based on hertestimony at the guilt-innocence phase, which was “very different than the tape that I heard and the reports that I read.”

  6. MALDONADO v. S.C. (PEOPLE)

    Petitioner's Petition for Review

    Filed June 28, 2010

    (Powell v. Texas (1989) 492 U.S. 680, 684.) The fact that waiver does not occur until the actual introduction of evidenceattrial is implicit in another of the Court’s rulings: “The privilege is waived for the matters to which the witnesstestifies, and the scope of relevant cross-examination.’” (Mitchell v. United States (1999) 526 U.S. 314, 321; citing Brown v. United States (1958) 356 U.S. 148, 154-155 [Mitchell v. United States extended Smith’ to non-capital sentencing phase of any criminal case].) ?

  7. Milke v. Phoenix, City of et al

    RESPONSE to Motion re: 113 MOTION for Ruling re: that Detective Saldate Will Not Waive his Fifth Amendment Privilege as to Other Alleged Misconduct

    Filed October 21, 2016

    Although it seems generally unobjectionable that Saldate may answer some questions (related to the C.M. investigation) while not automatically waiving his right to invoke his privilege as to other questions (related to other allegations of misconduct), waiver, too, may ultimately only be assessed with respect to particular questions and answers. See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 322 (1999) (“A witness may not pick and choose what aspects of a particular subject to discuss without casting doubt on the trustworthiness of the statements and diminishing the integrity of the factual inquiry. . . . [A] contrary rule ‘would open the way to distortion of facts by permitting a witness to select any stopping place in the testimony,’ [i]t would . . . ‘make of the Fifth Amendment not only a humane safeguard against judicially coerced self-disclosure but a positive invitation to mutilate the truth a party offers to tell.’” (citations omitted)).

  8. USA v. Khan

    REPLY TO RESPONSE to Motion

    Filed May 18, 2015

    Indeed, this is the whole purpose behind drafting a plea agreement and performing a Rule 11 plea colloquy—to memorialize the understanding of the parties as to all material terms and consequences of both the plea agreement and the guilty plea at the time of the plea colloquy. See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 322 (1999) (“The purpose of a plea colloquy is to protect the defendant from an unintelligent or involuntary plea.”).

  9. PEOPLE v. TRUJEQUE (TOMMY ADRIAN)

    Appellant’s Reply Brief

    Filed December 10, 2013

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  10. Barrera et al v. Boughton et al

    REPLY to Response to 284 MOTION for Protective Order Regarding Discovery Requests on Immigration Status and Alienage Reply to City of Danbury Response

    Filed October 1, 2009

    First, unlike a refusal to answer based on a protective order entered pursuant to Rule 26, invoking the Fifth Amendment allows an adverse inference to be drawn. See Mitchell v. U.S., 526 U.S. 314, 328 (1999). Second, there are limitations on when the Fifth Amendment may be invoked that do not apply in the context of a Protective Order.