Miranda-Godinezv.Lynch

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUITApr 28, 2016
No. 14-71485 (9th Cir. 2016)
No. 14-71485649 Fed. Appx. 456

No. 14-71485

04-28-2016

JUAN JOSE MIRANDA-GODINEZ, AKA Juan Miranda, AKA Juan Jose Miranda, Petitioner, v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.


NOT FOR PUBLICATION

Agency No. A036-421-357 MEMORANDUM On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted April 28, 2016 San Francisco, California Before: PAEZ, CLIFTON, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). --------

Petitioner Juan Jose Miranda-Godinez petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) determining that Miranda-Godinez's conviction for arson under California Penal Code § 451(d) was an "aggravated felony" within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). Specifically, the BIA determined that Miranda-Godinez's arson conviction constituted a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).

However, as the Attorney General concedes, our recent decision in Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2015), controls the outcome of this case. In Dimaya, we adhered to the rationale articulated in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2558 (2015), where the Court held that the definition of a "violent felony" in the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act was unconstitutionally vague. We held that similar language in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), as incorporated into 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F)'s definition of a "crime of violence," is also unconstitutionally vague. See Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1111. We are bound by this precedent, which does not support the BIA's determination.

The petition for review is GRANTED and we REMAND to the BIA for termination of removal proceedings.