Miller v. City of Philadelphia

4 Citing briefs

  1. Bridges v. Wetzel et al

    RESPONSE in Opposition re MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment

    Filed October 5, 2017

    “[I]n the custodial situation Case 2:17-cv-03443-AB Document 30 Filed 10/05/17 Page 24 of 30 25 of a prison, forethought about an inmate’s welfare is not only feasible, but obligatory,” and therefore a “deliberate indifference” standard of culpability is appropriate for establishing a conscience-shocking conduct. Miller v. City of Phila., 174 F.3d 368, 375 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 851). Defendants held Mr. Bridges in solitary confinement for nearly 20 years without a valid penological or other justification.

  2. Igwe v. Skaggs et al

    BRIEF in Support re Motion for Summary Judgment

    Filed May 17, 2017

    In the Third Circuit, this intermediate standard however has not been applied to police officers' emergency responses in their patrol vehicle. See Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 368, 375 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying conscious disregard where a social worker believed children were subject to abuse and removed from the mother's car). See also Sanford, 456 F.3d at 306 (citing Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 800-01 (3d Cir. 2000) (applying this standard to the Case 2:16-cv-01403-MAK Document 70 Filed 05/17/17 Page 18 of 25 19 placement of a minor in a foster care home); Ziccardi v. City of Philadelphia, 288 F.3d 57, 58-59 (3d Cir. 2002) (discussing paramedics carelessly lifting an individual and dropping him, resulting in paralysis)).

  3. Igwe v. Skaggs et al

    BRIEF in Opposition re Motion to Dismiss, and Motion for Summary Judgment

    Filed December 27, 2016

    At 850. In Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 368, Case 2:16-cv-01403-MAK Document 39 Filed 12/27/16 Page 5 of 21 6 375 (3d Cir. 1999), the Third Circuit stated that in substantive due process cases, “[t]he exact degree of wrongfulness necessary to reach the conscience-shocking level depends upon the circumstances of a particular case.” Plaintiff concedes that if this court determines that Defendant SKAGGS was involved in a high-speed pursuit, the applicable standard is an “intent to harm” which the Plaintiff herein, as well as any other Plaintiff on the Planet, is unable to prove.1 However, it is respectfully submitted that Defendant SKAGGS was not involved in a high-speed pursuit at the time he voluntarily took it upon himself to proceed towards Officer Frisk’s location.

  4. WELLER v. RANSOM-GARNER et al

    Memorandum of Law in support of plff CHRISTOPHER JOSEPH WELLER'S response to deft's motion for summary judgment, Certificate of Service.

    Filed January 17, 2007

    Miller v. The City ofPhiladelphia, 174 F.3d 368, 376 (3d. Cir 1999). As well, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has refused to grant absolute immunity for expert witnesses in their negligence in formulating an opinion.