13 Analyses of this case by attorneys

  1. Capital Defense Weekly, May 23, 2005

    Capital Defense NewsletterMay 23, 2005

    It is true that the COA is jurisdictional in the sense that it is a "gateway" device. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). By obliging applicants to make a threshold showing before their cases are aired out on appeal, the COA serves an important screening function and conserves the resources of appellate courts.

  2. Jury Selection – Batson; Privileged (Mental Health) Records – In Camera Review; Evidence – Relevance; Expert Witness

    Wisconsin State Public DefenderMarch 7, 2012

    Keep in mind that, determination of “honesty” being paramount, “comparative data” becomes significant. E.g., Henderson v. Briley, 354 F.3d 907, 910 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Indeed, in Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003), the Supreme Court provided support for our approach when it explicitly considered comparative data showing similarities between rejected black jurors and empaneled white jurors in determining the merits of a Batson claim, id. at 343, 123 S.Ct. 1029.

  3. Capital Defense Weekly, July 3, 2006

    Capital Defense NewsletterJuly 2, 2006

    Such a result cannot be considered "happenstance." See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 342, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1042, 154 L. Ed. 2d 931 (2003). n13P65.

  4. Capital Defense Weekly, July 2, 2006

    Capital Defense NewsletterJuly 1, 2006

    Such a result cannot be considered "happenstance." See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 342, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1042, 154 L. Ed. 2d 931 (2003). n13P65.

  5. Capital Defense Weekly, May 1, 2006

    Capital Defense NewsletterMay 1, 2006

    As the Supreme Court noted in Miller-El:"The rule in Batson provides an opportunity to the prosecutor to give the reason for striking the juror, and it requires the judge to assess the plausibility of that reason in light of all evidence with a bearing on it. 476 U.S., at 96-97, 106 S. Ct. 1712; Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. [322] at 339, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 154 L. Ed. 2d 931 [(2003)]. It is true that peremptories are often the subjects of instinct, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S., at 106, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (Marshall, J., concurring), and it can sometimes be hard to say what the reason is.

  6. Capital Defense Weekly, January 26, 2004

    Capital Defense NewsletterJanuary 25, 2004

    Second, if that showing has been made, the prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in question. Third, in light of the parties' submissions, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 328-29, 154 L. Ed. 2d 931, 123 S. Ct. 1029 (2003) (citations to Batson omitted).Under Batson, although "a defendant has no right to a petit jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race ... the defendant does have the right to be tried by a jury whose members are selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria."

  7. Capital Defense Weekly, October 1, 2007

    Capital Defense NewsletterSeptember 30, 2007

    As the United States Supreme Court noted in Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 162 L. Ed. 2d 196 (2005):"[T]he rule in [*8] Batson provides an opportunity to the prosecutor to give the reason for striking the juror, and it requires the judge to assess the plausibility of that reason in light of all evidence with a bearing on it. 476 U.S., at 96-97, 106 S. Ct. 1712; Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. [322] at 339, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 154 L. Ed. 2d 931 [(2003)]. It is true that peremptories are often the subjects of instinct, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S., at 106, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (Marshall, J., concurring), and it can sometimes be hard to say what the reason is.

  8. SCOTUS: Defense counsel was ineffective for injecting race into sentencing

    Wisconsin State Public DefenderMarch 1, 2017

    ’” (Slip op. at 13 (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003))). The Fifth Circuit cited that standard but didn’t apply it, and instead essentially decided the merits of the case against Buck—an approach “flatly prohibit[ed]” by the Court’s precedent.

  9. Jury Selection - Batson v. Kentucky

    Garland, Samuel & Loeb, P.C.Don SamuelSeptember 1, 2015

    The appropriate standard requires the movant to: “Produc[e] evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.” It is not proper to hold that the movant must make a showing by a preponderance of the evidence.Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003)The Court identified factors that should inform the trial court’s assessment of whether the proffered explanations rebutted the prima facie case. In this death penalty case, the manner in which the prosecutor questioned prospective jurors showed a discriminatory motive.

  10. Timothy Tyrone Foster v. Humphrey, Warden, USSC No. 14-8349, cert. granted 5/26/15

    Wisconsin State Public DefenderMay 26, 2015

    Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. See alsoSnyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008); Miller-El v. Cockrell (Miller-El I), 537 U.S. 322, 339 (2003); Miller-El v. Dretke(Miller-El II), 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005). The state habeas court deferred to the previous state-court finding that the prosecutor articulated race neutral reasons and gave short shrift to the jury selection notes which, Foster argues, give the lie to the state’s proffered race-neutral reasons.Clearly, then, this will not be just a one-off decision addressing the “extraordinary circumstances” of Foster’s case; instead, it will likely either reaffirm or alter how courts analyze Batson claims.