Filed August 5, 2016
Kobach, 772 F.3d at 1197. Case 1:16-cv-00236-RJL Document 103 Filed 08/05/16 Page 40 of 49 36 and explain[ed] something that the statute or regulation already required,” see Mendoza, 754 F.3d at 1021 (alteration omitted) (quotation omitted)—i.e., that in order to require documentary proof of citizenship, states must demonstrate that such information is “necessary” within the meaning of the NVRA. E.g., (AR301) (observing that EAC staff had authority “to ‘implement and interpret’ the agency’s policies consistent with federal law and EAC regulations”); (AR0304) (observing that “granting the States’ requests . . . would contravene the EAC’s deliberate rulemaking decision that additional proof was not necessary to establish voter eligibility”); (AR0304-05) (reminding the requesting states that “the EAC, both by the staff and a duly-constituted quorum of commissioners, has already denied the very same substantive request that is at issue here”); (AR0308) (observing that the EAC’s “discretionary authority . . . is limited by the terms of the statute, which provide, among other things, that the Federal Form may only require from applicants ‘such information . . . as is necessar
Filed March 10, 2017
The result of the Mendoza litigation was a finding that the 2011 DOL guidance letter (“TEGL”) had been issued without the notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures required by the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). Mendoza, 754 F.3d at 1024. As noted by this Court in denying Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction (ECF 38, at 2), the D.C. Circuit’s decision was that the TEGL was “procedurally invalid” only.
Filed September 14, 2016
v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 516 F.3d 1021, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Because the statute of limitations is jurisdictional in nature, it cannot be waived by the parties, see Mendoza, 754 F.3d at 1018, and serves as an appropriate basis for a motion to dismiss. Here, Plaintiffs Becker, Shulem, Mayerson, and Manning each allege that they were aggrieved by a final agency action occurring more than five years before they filed their complaint on May 2, 2014.
Filed March 21, 2019
Accordingly, even if the soft referral guidance represented a change in policy such that notice- and-comment rulemaking would be required – which it does not – NCFA’s failure to identify a concrete and particularized harm to the organization, see supra Section I.A, dooms its procedural claims, as well. See Mendoza v. Perez, 754 F.3d 1002, 1012-13 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“Plaintiffs asserting a procedural rights challenge . . . need to show the agency action affects their concrete interests in a personal way.”); Owner-Operator Indep.
Filed August 18, 2015
B, Dec’l of Dermot Lynch, at ¶¶ 9-15 (noting that a review of the DOL H-2A for fiscal year 2014 reveals only two of the almost nine hundred H-2A Sheepherder Applications certified by the DOL offered a rate of pay higher than the wage floor). 13 Cf. Mendoza, 754 F.3d at 1011 (recognizing for purposes of establishing standing that ex- sheepherders who would return to herding but for the low wages suffered this). Case 1:15-cv-01562-RC Document 1 Filed 08/18/15 Page 16 of 22 16 relief.
Filed December 18, 2014
“In Mendoza, for example, the Court held that plaintiffs had standing, but were not required to show that they applied for and were denied a specific position that was filled by a competitor. 754 F.3d 1002. ….”
Filed May 8, 2017
As the D.C. Circuit has “long held[,] § 2401(a) ‘creates a jurisdictional condition attached to the government's waiver of sovereign immunity,’” which cannot be waived by the parties. Mendoza v. Perez, 754 F.3d 1002, 1018 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting P & V Enters. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 516 F.3d 1021, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 2008)).