Filed November 28, 2011
In a letter to the bill’s sponsor that was published in the Congressional Record, the U.S. Attorney-General and the Secretary of State emphasized that passage ofthe Actwill: "finally satisfy U.S. obligations under the judgmentofthe International Court of Justice (ICJ) in [Avena]. As we expressed in April 2010 letters to the Senate Judiciary Committee, this Administration believes that legislation is an optimal way to give domestic legal effect to the Avena judgment and to comply with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008). (See 157 Cong. Rec. $4216 (daily ed. June 29, 2011).
Filed December 31, 2008
102 Since both sets of statements were obtained before expiration of the three day period allowed by the treaty for consular notification "without delay," there was no violation of the treaty in obtaining the statements prior to consular notification. (See Medellin, supra, 128 S.Ct. at p. 1355, fn. 1 [noting Medellin confessed "before there could bea violation ofhis Vienna Convention right to consular notification"].) Petitioner has failed to plead facts establishing he was prejudiced in any other way.
Filed December 21, 2012
In Medellin, the United States Supreme Court ruled that “the ICJ*s judgment in Avena... does not of its own force constitute binding federal law that pre-empts state restrictions on the filing of successive habeas petitions.” Medellin, 552 U.S. at 522. Because, as explained above,state procedural bars are not applicable to Mr. Benavides’s claim that law enforcement violated his VCCR rights or to his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the VCCR violation and for enlisting the assistance of the Mexican consulate in a timely manner, the ruling in Medellin does not preclude this Court from reviewing and reconsidering Mr. Benavides’s case and from grantingrelief in his case.
Filed February 3, 2011
For a treaty to provide private rights (or remedial rights), it must be self- executing. Medellin, 552 U.S. 491. So while the self-executing treaties as cited by Plaintiff may have provided private rights that are enforceable through federal laws, non-self-executing treaties, such as the Protocol, do not provide private rights, and thus there is nothing to enforce.
Filed July 9, 2008
First, no FARR Act claim can be considered at this stage because the petitions do not invoke that statute. See Munaf, 128 S. Ct. at 2226. Second, even if the petitions had14 raised claims under the FARR Act, that statute does not provide jurisdiction to adjudicate such claims.
Filed July 9, 2008
First, no FARR Act claim can be considered at this stage because the petitions do not invoke that statute. See Munaf, 128 S. Ct. at 2226. Second, even if the petitions had14 raised claims under the FARR Act, that statute does not provide jurisdiction to adjudicate such claims.
Filed July 9, 2008
First, no FARR Act claim can be considered at this stage because the petitions do not invoke that statute. See Munaf, 128 S. Ct. at 2226. Second, even if the petitions had14 raised claims under the FARR Act, that statute does not provide jurisdiction to adjudicate such claims.
Filed March 8, 2017
Moreover, the President’s understanding of the scope of section 1182(f) flies in the face of historical practice. Of course, “[p]ast practice does not, by itself, create power.” Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 532 (2008). Therefore, it would not be significant if past presidents had inappropriately expanded their authority through a misreading of Section 1182(f).
Filed December 5, 2016
While Defendants quote portions of the cases stating that treaties generally do not create private rights of action, they omit the language that often follows, which confirms that, when private rights are explicitly contemplated by the treaties, those private rights are enforceable. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 n. 3 (“Accordingly, a number of the Courts of Appeals have presumed that treaties do not create privately enforceable rights in the absence of express language to the contrary.”); Gross v. German Found.
Filed December 24, 2014
In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), the President conceded that he was acting outside of authority provided to him by statute. In Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008), the Supreme Court addressed, in the context of a non-self-executing treaty, whether a Presidential memorandum preempted state law in the absence of Congressional ratification. Angelus Milling Co. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 325 U.S. 293, 296 (1945), recites the truism that the Executive must follow the law, notwithstanding that the Court held in that case that the IRS could lawfully exercise its discretion in refusing to waive the formal requirements of the authorized Treasury regulations.