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McNutt v. Manning

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division
Mar 27, 2000
Civil No. 3:98-CV-1741-H (N.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2000)

Opinion

Civil No. 3:98-CV-1741-H.

March 27, 2000.


MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER


Before the Court is Federal Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed January 7, 2000; Plaintiff's Response, filed February 3, 2000; and Defendants' Reply, filed February 14, 2000.

After considering the pleadings, briefs and relevant authorities, the Court is of the opinion, for the reasons stated below, that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be GRANTED.

I. Background

Plaintiff, doing business as McNutt Quality Used Cars, reconstructs trucks and cars in his backyard and garage, utilizing parts from a number of damaged vehicles to build usable ones. At the time of the events in question Defendants were employed as police officers: Officer Manning ("Manning") with the City of Grand Prairie, Texas, and Officer Coker ("Coker") with the City of Dallas, Texas. Both officers were assigned to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Major Offenders Interstate Task Force, which "worked primarily auto related crimes, such as chop shops, paint and body shops, salvage yards, organized auto theft rings and interstate property crimes." Federal Defendants' Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment [hereinafter "Defendants' Motion"], at pg. 2.

On July 24, 1996, Defendants saw Plaintiff's truck on the street in front of his house, and noticed that the body was from a 1993 Chevrolet Blazer, while the Vehicle Identification Number ("VIN") on the dash, which appeared scratched and possibly removed from another vehicle, was from a 1994 GMC Jimmy. Appendix in Support of Federal Defendants' Brief [hereinafter "Defendants' Appendix"], at pp. 15-17, 28-29.

Some conversation with Defendant, and possibly his wife, ensued. Plaintiff maintains Defendants were abusive; Defendants fail to address the conversation in detail other than to note that Plaintiff signed a waiver of his rights and unlocked the truck so they could investigate further. Defendants "Appendix, at pp. 30-32, Appendix to Plaintiff's Response to Federal Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [hereinafter "Plaintiff's Appendix"], at pp. 156-68. After examining the truck and determining that several parts of the truck came from a vehicle that had been reported stolen, Defendants seized it. Defendants "Appendix, at pp. 36-37.

Once the seized truck had been towed away, Manning and Coker requested, and received, permission to search other vehicles and parts located in Plaintiff's backyard. There is dispute over the extent of the permission granted, and whether Plaintiff's permission for the officers to search in back of the house was truly voluntary or the result of intimidation. Plaintiff's Appendix, at pp. 160-63; Defendants' Appendix, at pp. 12, 38. During that search, Manning and Coker allege they found discrepancies in the VIN numbers on other auto parts, i.e., some VIN markers had been removed from one vehicle or part and installed on another, and in some cases a VIN marker had been removed or filed off entirely. At least one of these parts, an engine, was from another vehicle that had been reported stolen. Defendants' Appendix, at pp. 13, 40-41. Plaintiff alleges that he offered to show Defendants receipts as proof that he lawfully purchased the various parts and vehicles, to no avail. Plaintiff's Appendix, at pg. 161. Manning and Coker eventually seized, in addition to the vehicle in front of Plaintiff's house, two partially restored trucks, several body parts, an engine, a transmission, seven ECM modules, a speed sensor, and one airbag unit, all of which were entered on an inventory record signed by both Manning and Plaintiff McNutt. Defendants' Appendix, at pg. 43. It is undisputed that Defendants' did not obtain a warrant before searching McNutt's property or seizing the vehicles and parts.

Based on the property seizure, on August 16, 1996, Officer Manning submitted an affidavit to a magistrate judge, and obtained a warrant to arrest Plaintiff for the crime of "Placement of Serial Number with Intent to Change Identity." Defendants' Appendix, at pp. 49-51. This charge pertained to one of the two vehicles seized from the rear of McNutt's residence. McNutt was subsequently arrested, indicted by a grand jury, then acquitted of the charge in a bench trial held on June 27, 1997. Defendants' Appendix, at pg. 55. The vehicle was then returned to him, allegedly with some VIN markers missing. Plaintiff's Appendix, at pg. 167.

The other vehicle seized from McNutt's backyard was also returned at approximately this same time, also with some YIN markers missing, and McNutt was never charged with any crime related to this vehicle. Plaintiff's Appendix, at pg. 168. On July 10, 1997, Officer Manning also returned the speed sensor, the airbag unit and the ECM's to McNutt.

Defendants allege Plaintiff was indicted on other charges, including one to which he pleaded guilty and another which was dismissed as part of a plea agreement. Defendants' Appendix, at pp. 59-65. Plaintiff argues that these other charges were unrelated to any of the vehicles or parts at issue here. Plaintiff's Appendix, at 171-72. Because consideration of those charges would not affect the outcome here, their relevance need not be determined.

Defendants' Appendix, at pp. 46, 57.

Finally, on April 3, 1998, a state judge addressed the vehicle that Manning and Coker seized from in front of McNutt's house. Those parts that were found to be stolen were awarded to an insurance company, while the parts not coming from a stolen vehicle were awarded to McNutt. Defendants' Appendix, at pg. 45.

McNutt ended up selling the parts left to him to the insurance company.

Plaintiff McNutt originally brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment violations, as well as similar state law claims. In their answer Defendants Manning and Coker asserted the affirmative defense of qualified and official immunity. Defendants then moved to dismiss Plaintiff's claims, and this Court dismissed all but McNutt's § 1983 claims for false arrest, malicious prosecution and unlawful seizure of property; and his state law claims for false arrest, malicious prosecution and conversion. See January 20, 1999, Order. After taking discovery, Defendants now move for summary judgment on all remaining claims.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate where the facts and law as represented in the pleadings, affidavits and other summary judgment evidence show that no reasonable trier of fact could possibly find for the nonmoving party as to any material fact. FED.R.CIV, P. 56; Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986); Innovative Database Systs. v. Morales, 990 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1993). "The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery in the record that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, but is not required to negate elements of the nonmoving party's case." Lynch Properties, Inc. v. Potomac Ins. Co. of Ill., 140 F.3d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-25). If the movant fails to meet its initial burden, the motion must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant's response. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).

If the movant does meet its burden, the nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Edwards v. Your Credit, Inc., 148 F.3d 427, 431 (5th Cir. 1998). A party opposing summary judgment may not rest on mere conclusory allegations or denials in its pleadings unsupported by specific facts presented in affidavits opposing the motion for summary judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); Lujan, 497 U.S. at 888; Hightower v. Texas Hosp. Assn., 65 F.3d 443, 447 (5th Cir. 1995).

In determining whether genuine issues of fact exist, "[f]actual controversies are construed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, but only if both parties have introduced evidence showing that a controversy exists." Lynch, 140 F.3d at 625; see also Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Services, 504 U.S. 451 (1992). However, in the absence of any proof the Court will not assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts. Lynch, 140 F.3d at 625. A party must do more than simply show some "metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. "If the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Friou v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 948 F.2d 972, 974 (5th Cir. 1991).

III. Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity shields police officers from being sued for performance of their discretionary functions unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable officer would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). In deciding whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, the first inquiry is whether Plaintiff has alleged the violation of a clearly established right. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); see also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998); Macias v. Raul A. (Unknown), 23 F.3d 94, 98 (5th Cir. 1994). Next, a complaint against police officers must "state with factual detail and particularity the basis for the claim which necessarily includes why the defendant-official cannot successfully maintain the defense of immunity." Babb v. Dorman, 33 F.3d 472 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993).

Qualified immunity for the defendant officers turns on whether "a reasonable officer could have believed [the search and seizure] to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the . . . officer[s] possessed. Even law enforcement officials who `reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present' are entitled to immunity." See Babb, 33 F.3d at 477 (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224 (1991)). Immunity must be recognized if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the facts known by the officers could reasonably lead them to conclude that probable cause was present to search and seize Plaintiff and his property. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986).

IV. Official Immunity

Texas grants government officials official immunity from suit for matters arising from the performance of their discretionary duties if they are: 1) acting within the scope of their authority, and 2) acting in good faith. Hart v. O'Brien, 127 F.3d 424, 450 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex. 1994)). This standard is similar to that required for qualified immunity, with the important difference that "official immunity does not incorporate the requirement that the plaintiff show the violation of a clearly established right. Rather, official immunity hinges on whether the official's activities were undertaken in good faith, that is, whether they were objectively reasonable." Id.

V. Analysis

A. False Arrest

Freedom from illegal arrest is a clearly established constitutional right. See, e.g., Sorenson v. Ferrie, 134 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 1998). The key issue in establishing false arrest is proving the arresting officers lacked probable cause. Id. (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979)). Where, as here, a warrant was issued for his arrest and an objective magistrate determined that probable cause existed, McNutt must show that the officers submitted an affidavit to the magistrate knowing that it was false, or they "were recklessly indifferent to its truth. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978). As the Hart court put it, plaintiff must show "the warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable." Hart, 127 F.3d at 444 (also noting that "A magistrate's findings on the issue of probable cause are entitled to great deference.").

McNutt acknowledges that he was arrested based upon a warrant issued by an objective magistrate, but attacks the affidavit that caused the warrant to be issued. McNutt cites to a partial copy of the affidavit that Defendants include in their Appendix and alleges that no probable cause existed because the affidavit "does not state a factual basis establishing probable cause for an arrest." Plaintiff's Response, at pg. 18. He also notes that the affidavit "is not signed by Manning, nor does it appear that it was signed under oath as required by the Constitution." Id. At the request of the Court, Defendants filed a complete copy of the affidavit as an addendum to their Appendix. See March 22, 2000, Order. After review of the complete affidavit, the Court concludes that the affidavit was properly signed and the arrest warrant was issued based upon reasonable indicia of probable cause.

McNutt does not claim that the warrant was facially invalid, or that the warrant was improperly executed. "Police officers acting pursuant to a facially valid judicial warrant enjoy qualified immunity for executing the warrant." Hart, 127 F.3d at 445. Even if there was some animus between McNutt and either or both of the officers, that does not defeat their qualified immunity. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (holding that the objective conduct, and not the subjective intent, is the proper focus of Fourth Amendment analysis); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (noting that any malignant motive of the arresting officers is irrelevant under Harlow to the question of qualified immunity); and United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding a pretextual arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment where the arrest was objectively supported by probable cause). The Court concludes Manning and Coker acted in the reasonable belief they had probable cause to secure the warrant and arrest McNutt, and therefore are protected by qualified immunity from McNutt's claim for false arrest.

McNutt also appears to make the back-door argument that the officers lacked probable cause to search the premises therefore any arrest warrant issued as a result of that search is invalid. Plaintiff's Response, at pg. 6. Even if no probable cause existed to search the premises, such an argument fails since the Exclusionary Rule has never been applied by the Supreme Court to civil cases, state or federal. See, e.g., Wren v. Towe, 130 F.3d 1154, 1158 (5th Cir. 1997).

B. Malicious Prosecution

To establish his § 1983 claim of malicious prosecution, McNutt must establish the following elements: 1) the state commenced a criminal prosecution against him; 2) the defendants caused or aided the prosecution; 3) the prosecution terminated in McNutt's favor; 4) McNutt was innocent; 5) the defendants acted without probable cause; 6) the defendants acted with malice; and 7) the criminal proceeding damaged McNutt. Goodson v. City of Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 740 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Kerr v. Lyford, 171 F.3d 330, 340 (5th Cir. 1999)).

The first three elements are undisputed by the parties, and McNutt claims that his receipts showing legal purchase of the various vehicle parts, combined with his use of procedures approved by Texas Department of Transportation, establish that he was innocent of any crime.

It is elements five and six that prove fatal to McNutt's claim. As previously stated, based upon the officers' examination of the various vehicles and parts at the McNutt residence, their observation that several VIN markers had been removed and relocated or filed off entirely, and their determination that at least some of those parts were from vehicles reported stolen, they had probable cause to believe McNutt was guilty of the crime charged. McNutt makes the conclusory statement that Manning and Coker acted with malice because "Plaintiff's vehicles were returned to him with malicious damage done to them," i.e., some of their VIN markers were removed. Plaintiff's Response, at pp. 24-25. McNutt adduces no evidence that Manning or Coker were responsible for removing the VIN markers, or that such removal was done out of malice. In any event, because the summary judgment evidence establishes that Manning and Coker reasonably believed they had probable cause to pursue McNutt's prosecution, they are protected by qualified immunity from his federal claim for malicious prosecution.

C. Unlawful Seizure of Property

McNutt claims that Manning and Coker searched his vehicle and his premises, and seized his property, without a warrant and without probable cause. Under Texas law, any peace officer "may inspect the inventory on the premises of the [salvage] dealer at any reasonable time in order to verify, check, or audit the [inventory] records." TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6687-2(j) (West 2000). Similarly, "a peace officer may seize, hold, and dispose of according to the Code of Criminal Procedure a motor vehicle or part thereof which has been stolen or which has been altered so as to remove, change, mutilate, or obliterate a permanent vehicle identification number. . . . "TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6687-2(k) (West 2000). This last article has been codified as TEX. TRANS. CODE ANN. § 501.158, which states:

(a) A peace officer may seize a vehicle or part of a vehicle without a warrant if the officer has probable cause to believe that the vehicle or part:

(1) is stolen; or

(2) has had the serial number removed, altered, or obliterated.

McNutt argues strongly that he did not give Manning and Coker voluntary consent to search either the vehicle in front of his house or the vehicles and parts behind his house. Under Texas law, however, the officers did not need McNutt's consent to search his inventory, as it is undisputed that McNutt, doing business as McNutt Quality Used Cars, was a salvage dealer as defined by the Texas statute. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6687-1a (West 2000). Once the officers determined that numerous parts in McNutt's possession were reportedly stolen or had their identifying numbers removed or altered, they did not need a warrant to seize those parts.

The state statute couches the search authority in terms of verifying the records of the salvage dealer, and McNutt submits summary judgment evidence that Manning and Coker searched the rear of his premises while angrily refusing to examine the records he proffered to show legitimate possession. Plaintiff's Appendix, at pp. 160-63. While the summary judgment evidence does make it appear that the officers were verbally abusive in their treatment of McNutt (and the Court notes that this is not the first time Officer Manning has been sued for his actions on the FBI Task Force, see Wren, 130 F.3d at 1157 n. 5), nonetheless the Court finds that once the officers determined that the vehicle in front of his house contained stolen parts, they had probable cause to continue their inventory search to determine if McNutt had other stolen parts, as well. They did not need to justify, that search on a review of his inventory records.

McNutt attacks the officers' authority under the state statute on two fronts. First he asserts that despite the statute's language, the officers should still have obtained a search warrant. "While Texas Transportation Code § 501.158 does appear to authorize a seizure without a warrant, this statute does not and can not authorize Manning and/or Coker to ignore Fourth Amendment requirements that warrants to search and seize are preferable to situations where the police act without a warrant." Plaintiff's Response, at pg. 19.

In reviewing the constitutionality of a previous iteration of the Texas statute, the Fifth Circuit noted "administrative searches of salvage yards are generally held to be exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment because of the important state interest in administrative schemes designed to regulate the vehicle-dismantling or automobile-junkyard industry." United States v. Thomas, 973 F.2d 1152, 1155 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 698 (1987)). See also United States v. Cobb, 975 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding art. 6687-2 authorized a warrantless search). The Thomas court went on to reject the plaintiff's claim that a search targeted at particular vehicles instead of a general administrative search was still unconstitutional Thomas, 973 F.2d at 1155-56. The Fifth Circuit addressed the provision in its revised form, viz, art. 6687-2(k), codified as § 501.158, where it again did not find the provision unconstitutional. Wren, 130 F.3d at 1158. In light of these precedents, this Court rejects McNutt's claim that § 501.158 violates the Fourth Amendment or that Manning and Coker needed a warrant to search McNutt's property.

McNutt further asserts that the statute authorizing seizure can only be read in concert with other statutes pertaining to VIN's, and that seizure of suspect property "is authorized only when all of the provisions of these referenced statutes are taken into consideration." Plaintiff's Response, at pg. 7. He claims seizure is not authorized solely because a VIN marker is missing or has been removed and placed on another vehicle, because such activity is a common occurrence in the business of reconditioning vehicles. McNutt, however, cites no authority for his assertions that art. 6687-2(j), codified as § 501.158, can only be enforced in concert with other provisions, nor has the Court found any such restriction. On the contrary, in a similar action the Court of Appeals of Texas stated "Appellant contends that we must read article 6687-2(j) together with article 6687-2(1) and article 47.01a of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We disagree with appellant's contention. Our interpretation of article 6687-2 standing alone is dispositive of the forfeiture action." Murphree v. State of Texas, 854 S.W.2d 193, 194 (Tex.App.-Houston 1993) ( no writ).

McNutt spends a great deal of time explaining the vehicle reconditioning process, and why a vehicle might have a different VIN from the one originally assigned, several different VIN numbers on different parts, or no VIN at all. The Court does not dispute his logic or his explanation, and it must be assumed that officers enforcing the various statutes pertaining to the placement and alteration of vehicle VIN's are aware of those possibilities, as well. What he conveniently ignores in his explanation, however, is that some of the VIN numbers on his vehicles reflect that the parts originated from vehicles reported stolen. Once Manning and Coker made that determination, they had probable cause to seize any part that might have an altered number.

The Court finds that Officers Manning and Coker were reasonable in their belief that their actions were consistent with McNutt's rights. "Qualified immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Wren, 130 F.3d at 1159 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). Accordingly, Manning and Coker are protected from McNutt's claim for unlawful seizure of property.

D. State Law Claims

McNutt also brings state law claims against Manning and Coker for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and conversion, which are almost identical to his federal law claims. As previously stated, the officers' protection by official immunity turns on whether they were acting in good faith.

For the same reasons stated previously, the Court finds that McNutt has adduced no summary judgment evidence that Manning and Coker were not acting in good faith when they sought an arrest warrant for, and subsequently arrested, McNutt. They had reason to believe he was guilty of the crime charged; they did not falsify or omit significant facts from the affidavit seeking the warrant, McNutt was arrested with a facially valid warrant; and the warrant was properly executed. Manning and Coker are protected by official immunity from McNutt's state law claim of false arrest.

Similarly, as the evidence adduced by Manning and Coker establishes that they had probable cause to pursue McNutt's prosecution, they are protected by official immunity from McNutt's state law claim for malicious prosecution.

Lastly, the Court addresses McNutt's state law claim for conversion. Again, Manning and Coker had probable cause and statutory authority to seize and hold the property in question. The officers submitted summary judgment evidence that they inventoried the items seized, and McNutt signed the inventory sheet. As the various proceedings came to resolution all items properly belonging to McNutt were returned to him, while those items adjudicated to belong to others were returned to the rightful owners. McNutt does not allege that Manning or Coker kept any of the seized property, and the summary judgment evidence does not establish that they acted in bad faith in seizing or retaining any item seized. Accordingly, Manning and Coker are protected by official immunity against McNutt's claim of conversion.

VI. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth, the Court finds no genuine issues of material fact exist pertaining to Defendants' qualified and official immunity from Plaintiff McNutt's federal and state law claims, and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Manning and Coker are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Judgment will be entered accordingly.

SO ORDERED.


Summaries of

McNutt v. Manning

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division
Mar 27, 2000
Civil No. 3:98-CV-1741-H (N.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2000)
Case details for

McNutt v. Manning

Case Details

Full title:CHRIS McNUTT, Plaintiff v. OLEN MANNING and MIKE COKER, Defendants

Court:United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division

Date published: Mar 27, 2000

Citations

Civil No. 3:98-CV-1741-H (N.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2000)