McCarthy v. United States

8 Citing briefs

  1. PEOPLE v. FARWELL

    Amicus Curiae Brief of Criminal Justice Legal Foundation

    Filed October 26, 2016

    They simply mandated thetrial courts to create a record ofthe proceedings and did not dictate the exact level of information the trial courts must engage the defendant in whenhe or she pleads guilty. (See Boykin, 395 U.S. at pp. 243-244; McCarthy, 394 U.S. at pp. 468-467, fn. 20.) In Boykin, Justice Harlan’s dissent voiced concern that the Court “in effect fastens upon the States, as a matter of federal constitutional law, the rigid prophylactic requirements ofRule 11 ....” (Boykin, 395 U.S.at p. 245 (dis. opn. of Harlan, J.).)

  2. The People, Appellant,v.Keith Fagan, Respondent.

    Brief

    Filed September 13, 2016

    Courts have long recognized that the remedy for the failure to advise defendants of significant and direct consequences of their convictions has been plea vacatur. See, e.g., Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244 35 (vacating the plea “because the record does not disclose that the defendant voluntarily and understandingly entered his pleas of guilty”); McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466 (“if a defendant’s guilty plea is not equally voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore void”); People v. Lopez, 71 N.Y.2d 662, 666 (1988) (finding that when a defendant’s factual allocution negates an essential element of the offense, the plea may be vacated on direct appeal); In re Chaipis v. State Liq. Auth., 44 N.Y.2d 57, 63-64 (1978) (“If the plea be coerced, or if defendant’s knowledge of its consequences be not explored sufficiently, the plea may be subject to vacation on proper and timely motion.”)

  3. PEOPLE v. WEAVER (LATWON R.)

    Respondent's Brief

    Filed March 20, 2008

    AS with the waiver required of other constitutional rights, a defendant's waiver of the right to jury trial must be knowing and intelligent, that is, made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences o f the decision to abandon it, as well as voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. (Id. at p. 305 citing Colorado v. Spring (1987) 479 U.S. 564, 573 [I07 S.Ct. 851, 857, 93 L.Ed.2d 9541 [requiring a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination]; see also McCarthy v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 459,465-466 [89 S.Ct. 1166,1170,22 L.Ed.2d 41 81 [an "intentional revocation of a known right or privilege" must accompany a guilty plea, which in effect is a waiver of the right to trial by jury, the right to confront opposing witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination]; Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458,464,468 [58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024-1025, 82 L.Ed.14611 [requiring knowing and intentional waiver o f the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel] .) The law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the defendant fully understands the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in general under the circumstances, even though the defendant may not know the specific detailed consequences of invoking it. (United States v. Ruiz (2002) 536 U.S. 622,629 [I22 S.Ct. 2450, 153 L.Ed.2d 5861.)

  4. The People, Appellant,v.Roman Baret, Respondent.

    Brief

    Filed May 1, 2014

    This is also the reason that the only plea retroactivity case, Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831, 831, 832-33 (1969), does not change our analysis. In Halliday, the Supreme Court ruled that the automatic reversal rule of McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), for violation of Rule 11, is not retroactive. In McCarthy, the U.S. Supreme Court required federal judges to strictly follow the procedures of Rule 11 and that the plea would be vacated on appeal if the Court failed to abide by its statutory responsibilities under the rule.

  5. PEOPLE v. DANIELS (DAVID SCOTT)

    Appellant’s Reply Brief

    Filed April 28, 2014

    As appellant has pointed out (AOB 51): (1) a waiver of the rights to a jury trial under both the federal and state constitutions requires an express and personal waiver by the defendant (People v. Collins (2001) 26 Cal.4th 297, 304-305 & fn. 2 [express waiver in open court required under both state and federal law]; Calif. Const., art. 1, § 16; Patton v. United States (1930) 281 U.S. 276, 308-312 [express personal waiver required under federal Constitution]; see also Fed. Rules of Crim. Proc. Rule 23 [express, written waiver required underfederal rules]); and, (2) a waiver ofthe right to a jury trial must be voluntary, knowing,andintelligent, “‘made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequencesofthe 28 decision to abandonit’” (People v. Collins, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 305, citing Colorado v. Spring (1987) 479 U.S. 564, 573; McCarthy v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 459, 465-466; Johnsonv. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464; Patton v. United States, supra, 281 U.S. 276, 308-312).

  6. The People, Respondent,v.Daniel Boyer, Appellant.

    Brief

    Filed October 17, 2013

    Unlike the context of the sentencing after trial in Gill, the entry of a guilty plea is a context where both the Constitution and the New York statute require something more. “‘[I]f a defendant’s guilty plea is not equally voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore void’” (Boykin v Alabama, 395 US 238, 243 n. 5 [1969], quoting McCarthy v United States, 394 US 459, 466 [1969]): “A trial court has the constitutional duty to ensure that a defendant, before pleading guilty, has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and its consequences. Although the court is not required to engage in any particular litany when allocuting the defendant, due process requires that the record be clear that the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant” (People v Catu, 4 NY3d 242, 244-245 [2005] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see also People v Mox, ___ NY3d ___, 2012 NY Lexis 3598, 2012 NY Slip Op 8441 [Dec. 11, 2012]; People v McAlpin, 17 NY2d 936 [2011]).

  7. PEOPLE v. PALMER

    Appellant’s Reply Brief on the Merits

    Filed February 14, 2013

    (Cf. McCarthy v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 459, 461-462, 467, 89 S.Ct. 1166 [counsel’s statementthat he advised defendant of consequencesof plea did not satisfy rule 11 [federal equivalent to § 1192.5]].) Nor cana stipulation satisfy the factual basis inquiry. A defendant who enters such a plea simultaneously waives several constitutional rights, including his privilege against compulsoryself-incrimination, his right to trial by jury, and his right to confront his accusers.

  8. PEOPLE v. DANIELS (DAVID SCOTT)

    Respondent’s Brief

    Filed August 30, 2012

    As with the waiver of other constitutional rights, a defendant’s waiverofthe right to jury trial must be knowing andintelligent, that is, made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandonit, as well as voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. (People v. Weaver (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1056, 1071-1072; see Collins, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 305, citing Colorado v. Spring (1987) 479 U.S. 564, 573 [requiring a knowing,intelligent, and voluntary waiverofthe Fifth Amendmentprivilege against self-incrimination; see also McCarthy v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 459, 465-466 [an “intentional revocation of a knownright or privilege” must accompanya guilty plea, whichin effectis a waiverofthe rightto trial by jury, the right to confront witnesses, and the 69 privilege againstself-incrimination]; Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464, 468 [requiring knowing andintentional waiver of the Sixth Amendmentrightto the assistance of counsel].) “[I]n determining whether there has been an effective waiver of a jury trial in favor of a court trial, the cases do not require a specific formula or extensive questioning beyond assuring that the waiveris personal, voluntary andintelligent.”