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Mayard v. Hopwood

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
Jan 30, 1997
105 F.3d 1226 (8th Cir. 1997)

Summary

holding use of hobble tie objectively reasonable when arrestee resisted being placed in a police car

Summary of this case from Gunter v. Twp. of Lumberton

Opinion

No. 95-3989

Submitted October 23, 1996

Filed January 30, 1997

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellant was Carl Peter Erlinder of St. Paul, Minnesota.

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellee was Gerald Thomas Hendrickson of St. Paul, Minnesota.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota.

Before MAGILL, BRIGHT, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.


Elsie Mayard brought this 42 U.S.C. §(s) 1983 action against officers of the St. Paul, Minnesota, police department. Mayard sought damages for the alleged use of excessive force. The district court granted summary judgment to the police officers, and Mayard appeals. Mayard argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the officers based on her failure to prove actual injury or the use of unreasonable force. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Mayard also argues that the district court erred (1) by failing to find a Fourth Amendment violation when the police entered the nonpublic areas of Mayard's store and removed evidence and (2) by applying the reasonableness standard in a Fourth Amendment case when no warrant was obtained. Because these claims were not properly raised before the district court, we decline to consider them for the first time on appeal. See Renfor v. Swift Eckrich, Inc., 53 F.3d 1460, 1464 (8th Cir. 1995) (this Court ordinarily will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal unless exceptional circumstances exist).

I.

Elsie Mayard attempted to open a liquor store in St. Paul, Minnesota, in June 1992. Pursuant to state law, the city of St. Paul denied Mayard a liquor license because she was a nonresident alien, see Minn. Stat. Section(s) 340A.402 (1992), and Mayard was warned by the police not to attempt to sell liquor without a license. Mayard's attorney subsequently attempted to negotiate with the city to allow Mayard to open a liquor store.

On June 10, 1992, Mayard sold liquor to an undercover police officer. The police returned later that day to issue Mayard a citation for selling liquor without a license. Although the police did not intend to arrest Mayard at that time, Mayard became very upset, shouting and screaming at the police. Mayard's attorney arrived at the scene and attempted to calm her, but was unable to do so. She became extremely agitated when the officers began removing her inventory as evidence. She moved about the store and activated a very loud alarm system.

At this point, the officer in charge, Sergeant Joseph Neubergor, directed Officers Dennis Meyer, John Wright, and Karsten Jeffery Winger to arrest Mayard. The officers took Mayard by the arms and escorted her out of the store to a squad car. She began to struggle with them, attempting to pull away, and the officers handcuffed her. Because Mayard refused to get into the squad car, the officers picked her up and put her face down on the rear seat. Once in the car, she began kicking, hitting an officer. The officers responded by placing a hobble restraint on her. A hobble restraint is a nylon rope placed around the legs that tightens when the detainee struggles.

Mayard was then transported by Officer Meyer to police headquarters. It is during this trip that Mayard alleges that Meyer slapped her in the face, punched her in the chest, and used a racial epithet. Mayard states in her affidavit: "[W]hile I was in the car alone with Officer Meyer [sic] he inflicted both physical and injury on me by slapping me in the face twice, by punching me in my upper chest and [by] telling me `Shut up, nigger, I've got to drive.'" Appellant's App. at A7, Para(s) 26. Upon arriving at police headquarters, Officer Meyer noted that Mayard was foaming at the mouth and grinding her teeth. Paramedics were summoned to transfer her to Ramsey Medical Center.

At the hospital, Mayard was examined and treated for a seizure and severe anemia. She was not treated for any physical trauma. Following three days of observation, doctors placed her on a 72-hour psychiatric hold.

On January 15, 1993, a jury convicted Mayard of the illegal sale of alcohol. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed. In June 1994, Mayard brought this Section(s) 1983 action against the arresting officers. Discovery was completed, and Officers Meyer, Wright, and Winger were granted summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Mayard appeals.

II.

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards as the district court. See Disesa v. St. Louis Community College, 79 F.3d 92, 94 (8th Cir. 1996). "We will affirm the decision if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Zakrzewski v. Fox, 87 F.3d 1011, 1012 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Landreth v. First Nat'l Bank of Cleburne County, 45 F.3d 267, 268 (8th Cir. 1995)). Summary judgment is appropriate against a party who has the burden of proof at trial and has failed to make a sufficient showing to establish the existence of an element essential to her case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

For Mayard to state a claim under Section(s) 1983, she must "allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States . . . ." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Specifically, Mayard's excessive force claim must allege that the defendants violated her Fourth Amendment rights. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). An officer's conduct is evaluated under an objective reasonableness standard. Id. at 395; Greiner v. City of Champlin, 27 F.3d 1346, 1354 (8th Cir. 1994) ("Claims that law enforcement officers used excessive force in making an arrest are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, and the test is whether the amount of force used was objectively reasonable under the particular circumstances.").

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mayard, we conclude that the force used to take Mayard into custody and place her in the squad car was objectively reasonable. This is particularly true in light of Mayard's resistance. See Foster v. Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 914 F.2d 1076, 1082 (8th Cir. 1990). Without the requisite showing of a constitutional violation, summary judgment is proper because Mayard has failed to establish the existence of an essential element of her case.

However, accepting Mayard's account of her treatment by Officer Meyer while being transported to police headquarters, the force allegedly used against Mayard by Officer Meyer while she was handcuffed and hobbled in the rear of the squad car was not objectively reasonable. Thus, Mayard's and Officer Meyer's conflicting accounts of events result in an issue of material fact making summary judgment inappropriate. See Zakrzewski, 87 F.3d at 1012.

Respectfully, we cannot agree with the district court's finding that Mayard has failed to establish the existence of an essential element of her case by not demonstrating any injury that rises to the level of a constitutional injury. See Mem. Op. at 9. Although "[n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers, violates the Fourth Amendment," Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (quotations and citation omitted), a police officer's slapping in the face and punching in the chest a handcuffed and hobbled prisoner while using a racial epithet are actions that result in a cognizable constitutional injury. These actions are of such a nature that we find that a constitutional injury is presumed to flow from the wrong itself. See Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F.2d 1220, 1228 (8th Cir. 1981) (presumed damages are allowed when substantive constitutional rights have been violated); cf. Dawkins v. Graham, 50 F.3d 532, 535 (8th Cir. 1995) ("We have not decided whether a plaintiff bringing a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim must suffer some minimum level of injury. . . . Assuming without deciding that the [plaintiff] must have suffered some minimum level of injury to proceed with their Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, we conclude the necessary level of injury is actual injury.").

III.

Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part. The district court's grant of summary judgment to John Wright, Karsten Winger, and Dennis Meyer on Mayard's claim of excessive force while being taken into custody and placed in the squad car is affirmed. Only the district court's grant of summary judgment to Dennis Meyer on Mayard's claim of excessive force while transporting her to police headquarters is reversed. The case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings.


Summaries of

Mayard v. Hopwood

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
Jan 30, 1997
105 F.3d 1226 (8th Cir. 1997)

holding use of hobble tie objectively reasonable when arrestee resisted being placed in a police car

Summary of this case from Gunter v. Twp. of Lumberton

holding that the force used to take the plaintiff into custody and place her in the squad car, which included hobbling her, was objectively reasonable

Summary of this case from Sallenger v. Oakes

holding that officers' actions were objectively reasonable as a matter of law when they handcuffed resisting individual's wrists, placed hobble restraints on individual's legs and placed individual face down in squad car

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holding that physically putting a resisting suspect into a squad car was objectively reasonable

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holding that the use of a hobble restraint was objectively reasonable in light of plaintiff's resistance at time of arrest

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holding that "a police officer's slapping in the face and punching in the chest a handcuffed and hobbled prisoner while using a racial epithet are actions that result in a cognizable constitutional injury"

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holding that placing a person wearing handcuffs and leg restraints in a prone position was reasonable as a matter of law where the person had violently resisted arrest

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finding use of a "hobble" restraint fastening individuals hands and feet objectively reasonable where she resisted being placed in a police car

Summary of this case from Cruz v. City of Laramie

finding that placing defendant in a hobble restraint after violently resisting arrest was reasonable, but slapping, punching, and using a racial slur against defendant after she was handcuffed was not reasonable

Summary of this case from Dyer v. Blankenship

finding the officer's actions were such that the constitutional injury was "presumed to flow from the wrong itself"

Summary of this case from Carter v. Hassell

finding that placing defendant in a hobble restraint after violently resisting arrest was reasonable, but slapping, punching, and using a racial slur against defendant after she was handcuffed was not reasonable

Summary of this case from Williams v. Chambers

finding a constitutional violation where the plaintiff was slapped in the face and punched in the chest while handcuffed in the rear of the defendant's squad car

Summary of this case from Tindall v. Arkansas State Police Department

concluding that the use of force was not objectively reasonable where the plaintiff was handcuffed and hobbled in the back seat of a squad car and the defendant slapped her in the face and punched her in the chest

Summary of this case from Orsak v. Metropolitan Airports Comm. Airport Police D

denying qualified immunity to an officer who slapped and punched a suspect, in handcuffs and leg restraints, even though the suspect had, prior to being completely restrained, kicked and hit an officer, physically resisted arrest, and shouted and screamed at officers

Summary of this case from Bailey v. Kennedy

denying qualified immunity for excessive force for actions taken after arrest even though plaintiff had physically resisted

Summary of this case from Earle v. City of Huntington

denying qualified immunity to an officer who slapped and punched a suspect, in handcuffs and leg restraints, even though the suspect had, before being restrained, kicked and hit an officer, physically resisted arrest, and shouted and screamed at officers

Summary of this case from Bixler v. Harris

denying qualified immunity where police officer continued beating suspect after the suspect was placed in handcuffs and leg restraints

Summary of this case from Goodman v. Barber

denying qualified immunity when an officer slapped and punched a suspect after retraining him, even though he had resisted arrest, kicked, hit and shouted at the officer prior to being restrained

Summary of this case from Valladares v. Cordero

affirming the reasonableness of force used in placing a resisting, hobbled suspect in a prone position to transport her to the jail

Summary of this case from Hanson v. Best

affirming application of Fourth Amendment standard to claim of excessive force that occurred after Plaintiff had been arrested and was being transported to police headquarters

Summary of this case from McBride v. Deputy Kim Clark

reversing grant of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds on excessive force claim where the plaintiff alleged she was slapped in the face and punched in the chest while being transported in a squad car in handcuffs

Summary of this case from Pena v. City of Worthington

noting that the officer slapped and punched the restrained arrestee without any apparent reason

Summary of this case from Jones v. Buchanan

explaining reasonableness standard as whether police officer's conduct was objectively reasonable under circumstances; concluding slapping and punching restrained arrestee was actionable

Summary of this case from Harris v. St. Louis Police Department

placing prone detainee, who was kicking and otherwise struggling with officers, in hobble restraint was objectively reasonable "particularly...in light of [the detainee's] resistance"

Summary of this case from Lombardo v. Saint Louis City

applying Fourth Amendment standards when force was applied in the back of a police car following the arrest

Summary of this case from Carter v. Walsh
Case details for

Mayard v. Hopwood

Case Details

Full title:Elsie Marie Mayard, Appellant, v. Tamara Joy Hopwood; Kernie Beam Miller…

Court:United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit

Date published: Jan 30, 1997

Citations

105 F.3d 1226 (8th Cir. 1997)

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