Argued June 22, 1999
October 4, 1999
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the petitioners leave to assert a claim for the decedent's conscious pain and suffering and a derivative claim ( see, e.g., Matter of Rudisel v. City of New York, 217 A.D.2d 702; Carbone v. Town of Brookhaven, 176 A.D.2d 778). The petitioners failed to adequately explain their 15-month delay in moving for leave to serve a late notice of claim ( see, e.g., Burns v. New York City Tr. Auth., 213 A.D.2d 300; Matter of O'Mara v. Town of Cortlandt, 210 A.D.2d 337; Chattergoon v. New York City Hous. Auth., 161 A.D.2d 141, affd 78 N.Y.2d 958). Moreover, as the Supreme Court correctly stated, the fact that the respondent may have learned from the ensuing police investigation and local media reports that the decedent's body had been found on a Friday night in its elementary school yard, did not suffice to put the respondent on notice that it would be charged with responsibility for the decedent's murder ( see, e.g., Matter of Lenoir v. New York City Hous. Auth., 240 A.D.2d 497; Matter of DiBella v. City of New York, 234 A.D.2d 366). As the Supreme Court further noted, the respondent would be prejudiced as it would be effectively "cheated * * * of its first year of investigation" ( see, e.g., Walston v. City of New York, 229 A.D.2d 485, 486: Pollicino v. New York City Tr. Auth., 225 A.D.2d 750, 751: Steiger v. Board of Educ. for Connetquot Cent. School Dist. of Islip, 192 A.D.2d 517).
THOMPSON, J.P., FRIEDMANN, SCHMIDT, and SMITH, JJ., concur.