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Martinez v. Warden

Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Tolland at Rockville
May 12, 2006
2006 Conn. Super. Ct. 8751 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006)

Opinion

No. CV03-0004075 S

May 12, 2006


MEMORANDUM OF DECISION


The petitioner, Eduardo Martinez, filed a pro se petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus on July 25, 2003. After the appointment of counsel, the petition was amended for the final time on July 21, 2005. That amended petition alleges that the petitioner's confinement is illegal due to violations of his rights to due process and equal protection.

This matter came to trial on January 5 and 18, 2006. The Court heard testimony from petitioner, Department of Correction (D.O.C.) Record Specialist II Michelle Deveau, D.O.C. Correctional Counselor Supervisor Donna Cupka, Assistant States Attorney Edward Narus, and petitioner's former counsel, Attorney William Collins. Additionally, several transcripts, mittimi, and D.O.C. timesheets also were entered into evidence. The Court has reviewed all of the testimony and evidence and makes the following findings of fact. For the reasons set forth more fully below, the petitioner has failed in meeting his burden of proof and the petition shall be denied.

The petitioner objected to the respondent calling Attorney Narus to testify. The court indicated after the parties' arguments that it would permit Attorney Narus to testify, subject to a review of the cases cited by both parties to determine whether the testimony should be stricken. The court has concluded that the testimony should not be stricken. See discussion below, infra, at 5-6.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The petitioner was as a result of his guilty pleas sentenced on February 16, 1996, in the Judicial District of Hartford/New Britain at Hartford, in almost a dozen criminal cases (hereinafter "February 16, 1996 cases"). The Court (Espinosa, J.) initially sentenced the petitioner to a total effective sentence of twenty-five (25) years, execution suspended after sixteen (16) years, and five (5) years probation. As a result of the petitioner's behavior in court during the sentencing proceeding, Judge Espinosa also found the petitioner guilty of two counts of contempt and imposed an additional year to serve, consecutive to the 25/16/5 total effective sentence. 2. Four of the February 16, 1996 cases (CR94-466680, CR95-470031, CR95-470034, and CR95-470035) involve offense dates that precede October 1, 1994. Consequently, these four cases are good time eligible.

3. All other February 16, 1996 cases (CR95-467575, CR94-83187, CR95-96646, CR94-465612, CR95-468143, and CR96-484624) involve offense dates on or after October 1, 1994. These six cases are not good time eligible.

4. The petitioner testified that he was sixteen (16) years old when he was initially arrested for some of the underlying offenses, but that he was seventeen (17) years old when he pleaded guilty. He further testified that while he had no experience as an adult with the criminal justice system, he nevertheless was aware of good time, but not that it had been abolished. The petitioner also testified that he thought all the sixteen-year sentences would expire on the same day.

5. The petitioner was represented in the underlying cases at issue by Attorney William Collins. Attorney Collins testified that he generally talks to his clients in criminal cases about credits to be applied to sentences. He also testified on cross examination that he was not present when the plea bargain was negotiated. Instead, his son, Attorney Matthew Collins, filled in for him during the plea negotiation. Attorney William Collins had no recollection of the petitioner receiving any court-ordered credits at the time of sentencing.

6. Assistant States Attorney Edward Narus prosecuted the underlying criminal cases. According to his testimony, he does not negotiate regarding credits to be applied to sentences. Attorney Narus further testified that if he were to negotiate such credits as an inducement in a plea agreement, he would put such offer on the record. The petitioner, according to Attorney Narus, was not concerned with good time credits and whether he was eligible to earn such credits. Attorney Narus further testified that he offered the petitioner, whose number of pending criminal matters increased prior to the plea and sentencing, twenty-five (25) years to serve on all the underlying files. During a judicial pretrial the court (Miano, J.) offered the petitioner a sentence of twenty-five (25) years, execution suspended after fifteen (15) years. The petitioner refused that offer. Ultimately, Judge Espinosa imposed a sentence that reduced the suspended portion by one (1) year and required sixteen (16) years of incarceration.

7. The petitioner testified that he has not been able to earn good time due to his classification by D.O.C. According to D.O.C. records, it is clear that the petitioner has not exactly been a model prisoner. He has amassed one hundred and nine (109) disciplinary tickets in the decade spanning from late 1994 to early 2005. The disciplinary offenses include, but are not limited to, flagrant disobedience, fighting, causing disruption, threats, destruction of property, possession of contraband, assault on D.O.C. employee, disobeying direct order, security tampering, and interfering with safety and security. This multitude of disciplinary offenses resulted in the forfeiture of not only the modest amount of good time the petitioner was able to earn during the initial part of his confinement, but also left the petitioner with a good time credit deficit.

8. The Court will discuss additional facts as needed.

DISCUSSION

As previously indicated, the petitioner objected to the respondent calling Attorney Narus. A brief synopsis of the habeas proceeding is necessary at this point. At the end of the January 5, 2006 portion of the habeas trial, the respondent indicated that there was one more witness the respondent would call to the witness stand. The matter was continued to January 18, 2006, so that Attorney William Collins could testify.

On January 18, 2006, the respondent indicated that Attorney Narus would be called to testify in addition to Attorney Collins. The petitioner objected, relying on Practice Book § 10-19, as well as Commissioner of Social Services v. Smith, 265 Conn. 723, 830 A.2d 228 (2003), and Commissioner of Social Services v. Syed, 74 Conn.App. 190, 810 A.2d 846 (2002). The respondent cited to Postemski v. Watrous, 151 Conn. 183, 195 A.2d 425 (1963).

First, the court notes that Attorney Narus was disclosed prior to trial as one of the respondent's witnesses. On December 30, 2005, the respondent filed a witness list including Attorney Narus as an expected witness. The witness list was properly certified to petitioner's habeas counsel. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim surprise in that Attorney Narus was an undisclosed witness.

The authorities relied upon by the petitioner pertain to implied admissions resulting from either deficient pleadings or failure to appear at a proceeding that permit a court to conclude that a party has, by default, admitted material allegations. A review of the operative pleadings, the amended petition and the return thereto, show that the respondent fully complied with Practice Book § 23-30 and responded to the amended petition's allegations. As indicated above, the respondent properly disclosed Attorney Narus as a witness. The court finds that the authorities relied on by the petitioner neither preclude the respondent from calling a disclosed witness, nor do they support a contention that the respondent somehow has admitted material allegations through default. Consequently, the court will not strike Attorney Narus's testimony.

The petitioner alleges in his one-count amended petition that his due process and equal protection rights were violated. In support of this claim, the petitioner avers that he ". . . reasonably understood that the sentences he received in exchange for entering pleas of guilty, were to run concurrently, and to be discharged at the same time. [He] understood that he would be credited with pre-sentence time and good time on ALL his dockets." (Emphasis in original.) Amended Petition, at 1-2. The petitioner further alleges that ". . . his state and federal Constitutional rights to Due Process [were violated] because the respondent has illegally lengthened the petitioner's confinement and this constitutes a failure on behalf of the state to honor the plea bargain into which the petitioner entered with the state. Conn. Const., art. 1, § 8; U.S. Const., amends. V and XIV; Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 [,92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427] (1971); State v. Garvin, 242 Conn. 296, 313 [,699 A.2d 921] (1997)." Amended Petition, at 2.

"Due process requires that a guilty plea must be knowingly and voluntarily entered." Braham v. Commissioner of Correction, 72 Conn.App. 1, 12, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 906 (2002). "For a plea of guilty to be constitutionally valid, it must be equally voluntary and knowing. It cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts. An understanding of the law in relation to the facts must include all relevant information concerning the sentence. The length of time a defendant may have to spend in prison is clearly crucial to a decision of whether or not to plead guilty." Guadalupe v. Commissioner of Correction, 68 Conn.App. 376, 384, cert. denied, 260 Conn. 913 (2002).

"Plea agreements are an essential and necessary part of the administration of justice; Santobello v. New York, [ supra, 404 U.S. 260-61] . . .; and, without this vital process, the overburdened wheels of justice would nearly grind to a stop. Disposition of charges after plea discussions is not only an essential part of the process but a highly desirable part for many reasons. It leads to prompt and largely final disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pretrial confinement for those who are denied release pending trial; it protects the public from those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the time between charge and disposition, it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned. This essential tool of the criminal justice system will lose its efficacy if the state's performance of the agreement is contrary to the reasonable expectations of the defendant . . . Because a defendant waives several constitutional rights when she elects to plead guilty to a criminal offense, the choice of a guilty plea is of profound significance.

"If the state makes promises to the defendant in order to induce a guilty plea, those promises must be fulfilled . . . and the breaking of a promise made by the prosecutor as a result of plea negotiations is sufficient to invalidate a conviction." (Internal citations and quotation marks omitted.) State v. Nelson, 23 Conn.App. 215, 218-19, cert. denied, 216 Conn. 826 (1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 922 (1991).

In Nelson, which involved ". . . a dispute as to the terms of a plea agreement, [the Appellate Court's] analysis turn[ed] on the real intent of the parties, and most significantly, of the defendant . . . The defendant argue[d] that she reasonably believed that the plea agreement terminated all her criminal liability flowing from the accident. Despite the state's silence as to what would happen if the victim died, its conduct strongly implied that it shared the defendant's interpretation of the plea agreement. (Internal citation and quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 219.

The instant petitioner's central claim is that his ". . . guilty plea was induced by the promise of the State that the terms imposed in [the] dockets would run concurrently with, and be discharged at the same time as each other." Id. The court finds this claim to be wholly unsupported by the evidence presented to the court, including the petitioner's own testimony. There is no evidence before this court that shows the existence of a plea agreement encompassing either presentence confinement or good time credits. Nor is there any evidence that the State made a promise that induced the petitioner. Furthermore, the court has difficulty assigning any credibility to the petitioner's testimony that he thought he would discharge on the same day from all sixteen-year sentences. Even a cursory review of several of the D.O.C. timesheets reveals that differing amounts of presentence credit were applied to different dockets due to different dates on which the petitioner came into the respondent's custody. The petitioner's testimony might have some credibility if the date on which he came into the respondent's custody were identical in all dockets that carry a sixteen-year sentence. The court finds, therefore, that the petitioner's claim that he was induced into pleading guilty to be without merit.

Lastly, the court will briefly address the petitioner's claim regarding reclassification. He claims that he ". . . has been denied the opportunity to enroll in programs that would lower his confinement level." Amended Petition, at 3. This denied opportunity results, according to the petitioner, from his being transferred to an out-of-state facility in Wallens Ridge, Virginia, as well as being confined in this state's Northern Correctional Institution. The petitioner alleges that this ". . . denial of access to programs, while out of state and now, is a violation of his right to Equal Protection under the United States Constitution and the State Constitution." Id.

The scarcity of evidence regarding this claim prevents this court from addressing it in a reasoned manner. While the respondent put on evidence regarding programs administered by D.O.C., the petitioner has not presented any meaningful evidence in support of this claim. Consequently, the court finds that this claim is deemed abandoned.

The Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is denied.


Summaries of

Martinez v. Warden

Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Tolland at Rockville
May 12, 2006
2006 Conn. Super. Ct. 8751 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006)
Case details for

Martinez v. Warden

Case Details

Full title:EDUARDO MARTINEZ (INMATE #234198) v. WARDEN, STATE PRISON

Court:Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Tolland at Rockville

Date published: May 12, 2006

Citations

2006 Conn. Super. Ct. 8751 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006)