From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Martin v. Jones

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
May 30, 2003
Civil No. 02-CV-71614-DT (E.D. Mich. May. 30, 2003)

Opinion

Civil No. 02-CV-71614-DT

May 30, 2003


OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS


I. Introduction

Kim Gerald Martin, ("Petitioner"), presently confined at the Carson City Correctional Facility in Carson City, Michigan, seeks the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In his application, filed pro se, petitioner challenges the legality of his conviction after a jury trial in the Saginaw County Circuit Court of one count of second degree murder. M.C.L. § 750.317. Petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment for this offense.

The petition raises claims of 1) unconstitutional method of selecting and impaneling petitioner's Jury, 2) denial of the effective assistance of counsel, 3) prosecutorial misconduct, and 4) improper jury instructions. Respondent has answered the petition and contends that Petitioner's first, second, and fourth claims are procedurally defaulted and that his third claim lacks merit under controlling United States Supreme Court precedent.

The Court concludes for the following reasons that the petition must be denied.

II. Factual Background

Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder after the evidence showed that he fought with the victim and repeatedly kicked the victim in the head, including after the victim became unconscious. Petitioner kicked the victim many, many times with great force, like he was kicking a football. Trial Transcript ("Tr.") Volume ("Vol.") II at 207. After the victim was unconscious, petitioner left the scene, and returned shortly thereafter with another man (petitioner's co-defendant). Petitioner asked the other man "did he want some of the guy." Tr. Vol. II at 215. The other man then jumped on the victim's head, landing on it with both feet, between five and seven times. While the other man was doing this, Petitioner added a few additional kicks. Five or ten minutes after the beating, Petitioner allegedly told someone to call the police or an ambulance. The victim went into a deep coma and died of head injuries some time later.

III. Procedural History

Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder, M.C.L. § 750.317, after a jury trial in the Saginaw County Circuit Court on May 17, 1999. Petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment for his murder conviction.

Petitioner appealed his conviction as of right to the Michigan Court of Appeals, raising the following issues:

I. Jury selection was not fair and impartial where twenty-eight prospective jurors were assigned numbers one through twenty-eight, numbers one through fourteen were seated in the jury box, and prospective jurors fifteen through twenty-eight were present, allowing attorneys to know which prospective jurors would replace any dismissed jurors, and allowing possible unfair abuse of peremptory challenges.
II. Defense counsel was ineffective (A) for advising the jury in his opening statement that petitioner asked a witness to call for medical assistance for the victim but failing to ask the witness at triaL whether petitioner had done so and (B) for failing to request that the jury be instructed on the lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter and on a mere presence defense.
III. Prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct occurred when the prosecutor mislead the jury in his closing argument by stating that petitioner had not asked a witness to seek medical assistance for the victim.
IV. Petitioner was denied a fair trial where the jury was not instructed on the lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter and a mere presence defense. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner's conviction in an unpublished

opinion. People v. Martin, 2001 WL 665192, Mich. Ct. App. No. 219893 ( per curiam) (May 22, 2001). In its opinion denying relief, the Michigan Court of Appeals found that all of Petitioner's claims were procedurally defaulted by failing to contemporaneously object to these alleged errors and/or request the jury instructions in question at trial. Consequently, it limited its review of these issues to a search for plain error and found none. Id. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal this decision in an unexplained order. People v. Martin, 636 N.W.2d 527 (Table); Mich. Sup.Ct. No. 119457 (November 30, 2001).

On or about April 24, 2002, Petitioner filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this Court, raising the same claims he presented the Michigan appellate courts.

Respondent has answered the petition. Respondent asserts that review of Petitioner's first, second, and fourth claims for habeas relief are barred by his procedural defaults of failing to properly raise or preserve these claims in the trial court and the Michigan Court of Appeals' enforcement of these defaults. Respondent also asserts that Petitioner's third claim, his prosecutorial misconduct claim, lacks merit.

For the reasons set forth below, the petition shall be denied.

IV. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 ("AEDPA") altered the standard of review federal courts must apply when reviewing applications for a writ of habeas corpus. The AEDPA applies to all habeas petitions filed after the effective date of the act, April 24, 1996. Because Petitioner's application was filed after April 24, 1996, the provisions of the AEDPA, including the amended standard of review, apply to this case.

As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d) imposes the following standard of review that a federal court must utilize when reviewing applications for a writ of habeas corpus:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(i) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings.
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d).

Therefore, federal courts are bound by a state court's adjudication of a petitioner's claims unless the state court's decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Franklin v. Francis, 144 F.3d 429 (6th Cir. 1998); Harris v. Stovall, 212 F.3d 940 (6th Cir. 2000). Additionally, this Court must presume the correctness of state court factual determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1) ; see also Cremeans v. Chapleau, 62 F.3d 167, 169 (6th Cir. 1995) ("We give complete deference to state court findings unless they are clearly erroneous").

28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1) provides, in pertinent part:

In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.

The United States Supreme Court has explained the proper application of the "contrary to" clause as follows:

A state-court decision will certainly be contrary to [the Supreme Court's] clearly established precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases. . . .
A state-court decision will also be contrary to this Court's clearly established precedent if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Court's] precedent.
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000).

With respect to the "unreasonable application" clause of § 2254(d)(1), the United States Supreme Court held that a federal court should analyze a claim for habeas corpus relief under the "unreasonable application" clause when "a state-court decision unreasonably applies the law of this Court to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 409. The Court defined "unreasonable application" as follows:

[A] federal habeas court making the "unreasonable application" inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable . . .
[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law. . . . Under § 2254(d)(1)'s "unreasonable application" clause, then, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.
Id. at 409-11 (emphasis in original).

With this standard in mind, the Court proceeds to address the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

V. Discussion

A. Procedural Default

Respondent contends that Petitioner's first, second, and fourth habeas claims are procedurally defaulted because they were not preserved by contemporaneous objections and requests for jury instructions at trial. In fact, all of Petitioner's claims are procedurally defaulted for this reason and these defaults were enforced by the Michigan appellate courts.

When the state courts clearly and expressly rely on a valid state procedural bar, federal habeas review is also barred unless a petitioner can demonstrate "cause" for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged constitutional violation, or can demonstrate that failure to consider the claim will result in a "fundamental miscarriage of justice". Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750-751, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). If a petitioner does not show cause for his procedural default, it is unnecessary for the court to reach the prejudice issue. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 91 L.Ed.2d 434 (1986); Bell v. Smith, 114 F. Supp.2d 633, 638 (E.D.Mich. 2000) (Gadola, J). In an extraordinary case, where a constitutional error has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal court may consider the constitutional claims presented even in the absence of a showing of cause for procedural default. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 479-480, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). However, to be credible, such a claim of innocence requires a petitioner to support the allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence of actual innocence that was not presented at trial. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995). Moreover, actual innocence, which would permit collateral review of a procedurally defaulted claim, means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998); See also Hilliard v. United States, 157 F.3d 444, 450 (6th Cir. 1998).

In the present case, the Michigan Court of Appeals, and the Michigan Supreme Court (through its unexplained order denying leave to appeal) found that Petitioner's claims were procedurally defaulted for failure to object to alleged errors and request jury instructions at trial.

When a habeas petitioner fails to obtain consideration of a claim by a state court due to a state procedural rule that prevents the state courts from reaching the merits of the petitioner's claim, that claim is procedurally defaulted and may not be considered by the federal court on habeas review. A petitioner may avoid this procedural default only by showing that there was cause for the default and prejudice resulting from the default, or that a miscarriage of justice will result from enforcing the procedural default in the petitioner's case. Seymour v. Walker, 224 F.3d 542, 549-50 (6th Cir. 2000); accord Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. at 750 (1991); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989). The Michigan courts found that all of Petitioner's claims were procedurally defaulted and enforced these defaults by limiting review of his claims to a search for plain error. Consequently, this Court must determine whether the procedural rules enforced were adequate and independent state law grounds for barring petitioner's claims.

Although Respondent has not raised procedural default as a defense to Petitioner's prosecutorial misconduct claim, the Court may raise the issue sua sponte. Elzy v. United States, 205 F.3d 882, 886-87 (6th Cir. 2000).

When analyzing a procedurally defaulted claim, a federal habeas court must consider: (1) whether there is a procedural rule that is applicable to the petitioner's claim and whether the petitioner failed to follow this rule; (2) whether the state courts actually enforced the state procedural rule; (3) whether the state procedural rule is an adequate and independent state ground to foreclose federal relief; and if so (4) whether the petitioner has established cause for his failure to follow the rule and prejudice by the alleged constitutional error. White v. Schotten, 201 F.3d 743 749 (6th Cir. 2000).

The state procedural rule in question here is the issue preservation rule, or the contemporaneous objection rule. Specifically, a criminal defendant must present a claim to the trial court for consideration in order to preserve the claim for appellate review. See, e.g., People v. Grant, 445 Mich. 535, 546 (1994) (acknowledging the general rule that issues not properly raised before a trial court cannot be raised on appeal absent compelling or extraordinary circumstances); People v. Ullah, 216 Mich. App. 669, 679 (1996) (stating that "[a]ppellate review of improper prosecutorial remarks is generally precluded absent an objection because it deprives the trial court of an opportunity to cure the error"). Petitioner violated the preservation rule by failing to make a contemporaneous objection to (1) the trial court's method of jury selection, (2) allegedly inadequate jury instructions, and 3) prosecutorial misconduct. Petitioner also violated the preservation rule by 1) failing to request jury instructions on involuntary manslaughter and the mere presence defense and 2) failing to move for a new trial or seek an evidentiary hearing in the trial court regarding counsel's alleged ineffectiveness.

The Michigan court of Appeals was the last state court to render a reasoned judgment on petitioner's claims. It enforced the preservation rule by stating in its opinion that petitioner had failed to preserve his claims for appellate review by objecting at trial, by seeking jury instructions on involuntary manslaughter and the mere presence defense, and by seeking a new trial or evidentiary hearing in the trial court regarding his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The state appellate court's alternative analyses that Petitioner's claims lacked merit do not preclude this Court from concluding that Petitioner's claims are procedurally defaulted. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. at 264 n. 10; Paprocki v. Foltz, 869 F.2d 281, 285 (6th Cir. 1989).

The preservation rule was firmly established and regularly followed before petitioner's 1999 trial. See Grant, 445 Mich. at 546. Therefore, the state court's reliance on petitioner's failure to make timely objections was an adequate and independent state ground for foreclosing review. Luberda v. Trippett, 211 F.3d 1004, 1006-07 (6th Cir. 2000); see Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 110 (1982) (concluding that a petitioner who fails to comply with a state rule mandating contemporaneous objections to jury instructions may not challenge the constitutionality of those instructions in a federal habeas corpus proceeding).

Michigan state law generally requires criminal defendants to object at trial in order to preserve a challenge to the jury instructions for appellate review. See People v. Van Dorsten, 441 Mich. 540, 544-45 (1993) (quoting People v. Kelly, 423 Mich. 261, 271-72 (1985)). Petitioner did not object to the jury instructions as given. Nor did petitioner request jury instructions on either the mere presence defense, or the lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter.

As previously explained, the Michigan court of Appeals enforced the preservation/contemporaneous-objection rule by stating that Petitioner's claims about the jury instructions were not preserved for appellate review because petitioner failed to object to the jury instructions at trial and did not seek the jury instructions he claimed on appeal should have been given. The Michigan Supreme Court did not set aside this decision and rule on the merits of petitioner's claims. Thus, the last state court to render a reasoned judgment on Petitioner's claim "clearly and expressly" stated that its judgment rested on a state procedural bar. Harris, 489 U.S. at 263; see Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991) (concluding that a court must "look through" unexplained orders to the last reasoned decision to determine the basis for the judgment).

The state court's reliance on Petitioner's failure to object to the jury instructions and alleged prosecutorial misconduct, failure to request particular jury instructions, and the complained of jury selection method were adequate and independent state grounds for foreclosing or limiting review of these claims because the contemporaneous-objection rule was firmly established and regularly followed before Petitioner's trial. See Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1991) (concluding that courts may consider a state procedural rule to be an adequate and independent ground for foreclosing review if the rule was "firmly established and regularly followed by the time as of which it [was] to be applied"); see also Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. at 110; People v. Handley, 415 Mich. 356, 360 (1982) (stating as early as 1982 that "instructional error should not be considered on appeal unless the issue has been preserved by an objection to the instruction in the trial court"). Accordingly, Petitioner must show cause for his procedural errors and resulting prejudice or a miscarriage of justice.

Petitioner has not alleged "cause" for his procedural defaults. Nor does it appear that he could do so. To establish "cause" for a state procedural default, a habeas petitioner must show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded efforts to comply with the procedural rule. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). Objective impediments to compliance with a procedural rule are an unavailable claim, some interference by officials making compliance impracticable, and ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.

The only arguable cause for Petitioner's defaults would be a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. However, Petitioner did not raise defense counsel's failure to object to the jury selection method, jury instructions, or prosecutorial misconduct, or failure to seek a new trial and/or evidentiary hearing in the trial court as independent claims in state court. Consequently, allegations that defense counsel should have objected to the jury selection method and instructions and so on has not been exhausted as an independent claim in state court and cannot serve as cause for petitioner's procedural default. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488-89; Lyons v. Stovall, 188 F.3d 327, 332-33 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting that the exhaustion requirement is not satisfied unless the prisoner argued his claim in state court on the same ground that he asserted it in federal court), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 2197 (2000). The Court need not determine if Petitioner was prejudiced by the alleged violation of federal law because he has not shown cause for his noncompliance with state procedural rules. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). Petitioner's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is also procedurally defaulted, and he has not shown cause and prejudice or a miscarriage of justice for that procedural default. Therefore, ineffective assistance of trial counsel cannot serve as "cause" for Petitioner's other procedural defaults. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, ___, 120 S.Ct. 1587, 1591 (2000).

The only remaining question is whether this Court's failure to consider Petitioner's defaulted claims on the merits will result in a miscarriage of justice. The exception for miscarriages of justice requires showing that a constitutional violation probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 326-27 (1995); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496. The record does not convince the Court that Petitioner is "actually innocent;" on the contrary, the record is replete with overwhelming evidence of petitioner's guilt. Petitioner has not supported his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence that was not presented at trial. Therefore, a miscarriage of justice will not occur if the court declines to review Petitioner's defaulted claims on the merits, Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, and his state procedural defaults bar habeas review of his seventh claims.

B. Merits of Petitioner's Claims

One judge in this district has found that the contemporaneous objection or preservation rule is not an independent and adequate state law basis for denying a petitioner's constitutional claims, because the Michigan courts decline to follow the rule and allow full appellate review of unpreserved claims "when they perceive the constitutional question to be `substantial' or `important.'" Bentley v. Bock, 2002 WL 319414473, ___ F.3d ___ (E.D. Mich. Dec. 31, 2002) (page references unavailable). As the district court noted, "this determination begs the question can such a finding be an independent state law basis for denying review, when it is inextricably bound up with a determination of the merits of the constitutional claim itself?" Id.

With this in mind, this Court will briefly review the merits of Petitioner's defaulted claims.

Petitioner's claim that the trial court's method of jury selection was not "fair and impartial" does not merit habeas relief because it fails to set forth a cognizable claim of federal constitutional error. Petitioner claimed in state court and claims here that the jury selection method used at his trial violated Michigan law. Claims concerning errors of state law alone are not cognizable in habeas corpus. A federal writ of habeas corpus reaches only convictions and sentences obtained in violation of some provision of the United States Constitution. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982). "`[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.'" Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780, 110 S.Ct. 3092, 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990)). See also, Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41, 104 S.Ct. 871, 79 L.Ed.2d 29 (1984) and Floyd v. Alexander, 148 F.3d 615, 619 (6th Cir.) (concluding that violation of state law is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1025, 119 S.Ct. 557.

Petitioner contends that the method of allowing the trial attorneys to possibly know which prospective jurors would replace struck jurors violated state law and may have encouraged or allowed abuse of peremptory challenges. However, Petitioner does not contend that, for example, he suffered from racial discrimination in jury selection, or any other federal constitutional wrong, encouraged, facilitated, or allowed by this jury selection method. Hence, petitioner's claim is a state law claim only and is not a basis for habeas relief.

Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims lack merit. There exists clearly established Supreme Court precedent governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the United States Supreme Court established a two-pronged test for determining whether a habeas corpus petitioner has received ineffective assistance of counsel. First, a petitioner must prove that counsel's performance was deficient, which "requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Second, a petitioner must show that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the petitioner. A petitioner may establish prejudice by "showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial." Id.

The Supreme Court emphasized that, when considering an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the reviewing court should afford counsel a great deal of deference: Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (citations omitted).

The Supreme Court further explained that, to establish deficient performance, a petitioner must identify acts that were "outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." Id. To satisfy the prejudice prong, a petitioner must show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. "Of course, a reasonable probability' does not mean a certainty, or even a preponderant likelihood." Matthews v. Abramajtys, 2002 FED App. 0045P (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Strickland). The Sixth Circuit, applying the Strickland standard, has held that a reviewing court must focus on whether counsel's alleged errors "have undermined the reliability of and confidence in the result." McQueen v. Scroggy, 99 F.3d 1302, 1311 (6th Cir. 1996).

In the present case Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to alleged prosecutorial misconduct, failing to question a witness about whether Petitioner asked someone to call for medical assistance for the victim, and failing to seek involuntary manslaughter and mere presence jury instructions.

The alleged prosecutorial misconduct is of minor or no significance. Petitioner contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by stating that a witness did not testify that petitioner asked anyone to call for medical assistance for the victim. The prosecutor was merely restating the facts of the trial testimony. No one testified at trial that petitioner asked someone to call for medical assistance. It was not prosecutorial misconduct to restate the evidence as it was testified to at trial.

Someone did testify to this effect at Petitioner's preliminary exam. However, the evidence showed that Petitioner mercilessly kicked the victim in the head many, many times rendering him unconscious and continued to kick him there, went and got another man and invited him to inflict additional brutality upon the victim. The other man obliged, stomping on the victim's head five to seven times with both feet while petitioner added a few extra kicks of his own. In this scenario, there is no reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged error of failing to elicit testimony that Petitioner, after inflicting all this damage to the victim, first alone and then with his co-defendant, asked someone to call for medical assistance, the outcome of Petitioner's trial would have been different. Calling for medical help after inflicting fatal injuries on someone is not a defense to murder. Such behavior might be indicative of a lack of intent to kill, at least after the fact of inflicting the injuries. But, under the circumstances of this case, there is no reasonable probability that testimony that Petitioner asked someone to call for medical assistance for the victim would have changed the outcome of his trial.

Similarly, this allegation fails as a prosecutorial misconduct claim. Petitioner fails to show that this alleged misconduct, even if assumed to be such, deprived him of a fair trial.

Petitioner's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek involuntary manslaughter and mere presence instructions is likewise without any merit. Overwhelming evidence showed that Petitioner intentionally murdered the victim and/or intentionally aided and abetted his co-defendant in doing so. Nothing about the circumstances about the crime suggests that the killing was involuntary manslaughter or that Petitioner was merely present. On the contrary, as found by the Michigan Court of Appeals, the evidence did not support such theories, hence petitioner was not entitled to these instructions. Counsel was ineffective for not seeking them.

Consequently, this Court concludes that, in addition to being procedurally defaulted, Petitioner's claims lack merit.

VI. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that all of Petitioner's claims for habeas relief filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 are either barred by the doctrine of procedural default or lack merit. Consequently, Petitioner's application for federal habeas relief shall be dismissed and the writ denied.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED and the case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.


Summaries of

Martin v. Jones

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
May 30, 2003
Civil No. 02-CV-71614-DT (E.D. Mich. May. 30, 2003)
Case details for

Martin v. Jones

Case Details

Full title:KIM GERALD MARTIN, #207331, Petitioner, v. KURT JONES, Respondent

Court:United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division

Date published: May 30, 2003

Citations

Civil No. 02-CV-71614-DT (E.D. Mich. May. 30, 2003)