Filed October 30, 2008
At the very least, however, the exercise of discretion was subject to the "erroneous or distorted conception of the facts or the law ...." (Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., supra, 446 U.S. at p. 242.) It is very likely that in the absence of the appearance of bias - as shown by the judge's repeated erroneous rulings against the defense and remarks disparaging defense counsel - the errors complained of in this brief would not have occurred.
Filed June 17, 2016
51 The public perception of our judicial system’s fairness and neutrality is central to the due process inquiry because it “preserves both the appearance and reality of fairness, ‘generating the feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice has been done.’” Jerrico, 446 U.S. at 242 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 50 Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch Delivers Remarks at White House Convening on Incarceration and Poverty, Dec. 3, 2015, available at, https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-loretta-e-lynch-delivers-remarks- white-house-convening-incarceration-and. 51 Letter from Vanita Gupta, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Civil Rights Division, and Lisa Foster, Director, Office for Access to Justice, to all state chief justices and state court administrators, Mar. 14, 2016, available at https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/832461/download.
Filed May 10, 2016
5 The Jerrico Court concluded that the “ridged requirements” of Tumey and Ward were inapplicable to assessing whether the ESA’s financial interest violated due process because the agency’s administrative functions were prosecutorial, not judicial, in nature. 446 U.S. at 248. Nevertheless, Jerrico’s discussion of the agency’s financial interest is relevant to its ultimate holding that the plaintiff failed to establish a disqualifying institutional bias.
Filed October 15, 2012
A court is a neutral and disinterested forum for resolving disputes, not an advocate charged with assisting class members or their counsel in attempting to maximize their damage claims. See Marshall, 446 U.S. at 242. The Court’s initial skepticism about whether it should approve the proposed notice because it “do[es]n’t give legal advice” was well placed.
Filed November 23, 2011
cy v. Gramley (1997) 520 U.S. 899, 905) — 1.e., one whois “impartial and disinterested” (Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc. (1980) 446 U.S. 238, 242 [100 S.Ct. 1610, 64 L.Ed.2d 182]).*° “This requirementof neutrality ... safeguards [one of] the two central concerns of procedural due process, the prevention of unjustified or mistaken 39 Accord, Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570, 577 [106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460] [“The State of course must providea trial before an impartial judge’’]; People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1140 [“Under the due process clause of the federal Constitution, [a] defendantis entitled to an impartialtrial judge”]; Cooper v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County (1961) 55 Cal.2d 291, 301 [“The judge’s function as presiding officer is preeminently to act impartially”].) 272 deprivations....” It is the cornerstone of the “guarantee that life, liberty, or property will not be taken on the basis of an erroneousor distorted conception of the facts or the law....” (Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., supra, 446 U.S. at p. 242.) “Without th[at] ... basic protection ..., a criminal trial cannotreliably serveits function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence.... Adjudication by [a] biased judge ... necessarily render[s] a trial fundamentally unfair.”
Filed April 30, 2009
67 B. Extraordinary Judicial Emphasis on Countering a Bias That Could Hurt the Prosecution Introduced the Opposite Bias into the Proceedings The Due Process Clauses prohibit a judicial tilt towards the prosecution in criminal proceedings. (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 15; Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., supra, 446 U.S. 238, 242; People v. Moore (1954) 43 Cal.2d 517, 526; People v. Mahoney (1927) 201 Cal. 618, 627; see also Quercia v. United States (1933) 289 U.S. 466, 470; Cool v. United States (1972) 109 U.S. 100, 103, fn. 4; Bihn v. United States (1946) 328 U.S. 633, 637; People v. Brown (1993) 6 Cal.4th 322, 332.) Here, the trial court interrupted its rote reading of brief pattern pre- instructions with an extensive and obviously personally-prepared commentary on the validity of a circumstantial case, i.e., the kind about to be presented by the prosecution.
Filed May 29, 2014
See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980) (addressing civil penalties assessed by government for violating child labor provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) (overturning contempt of court conviction where Michigan law allowed a judge to serve as a “one-man grand jury”). Yu requested that the gender of the panel be mixed, and it was—two panelists, Sophia Harvey and Jane Parker, were female, and one, Jamie Kelly, was male. (Inoa Dep. 150:9-18.)3 Yu complains that the panel was not impartial because Complainant’s father is a faculty member, but there is no evidence that the panel members were aware of that fact at the time of his hearing.
Filed May 16, 2014
An impartial and disinterested tribunal is a basic requirement of due process serving to preserve both the appearance and reality of fairness and to help prevent takings on the basis of an erroneous or distorted conception of the facts or the law. Marshall v. Jerrico. Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980); In re Murchison, 349 US. 133, 136 (1955).
Filed August 27, 2013
These due process rights guaranteethata litigant shall proceed before an impartial and disinterested tribunal in order to preserve "both the appearanceandreality of fairness." (Marshall v. Jerico, Inc. (1980) 446 U.S. 238, 242.) In her openingbrief, appellant cited to comments contained in pages upon pages of the appellate record which demonstratethetrial court's bias by its comments and lack of response to appellant's pleas to have the court intercede to protect her basic humanandlegal rights.
Filed July 9, 2012
The Supreme Court has identified “two central concerns”: “the prevention of unjustified or mistaken deprivations and the promotion of participation and dialogue by affected individuals in the decisionmaking process.” Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980). As to the former, which may be called the instrumental rationale, the Due Process Clause “serve[s] as a check on the possibility that a wrongful deprivation would occur.”