Maine v. Moulton

4 Analyses of this case by attorneys

  1. Confession - Right to Counsel

    Garland, Samuel & Loeb, P.C.Don SamuelSeptember 1, 2015

    The trial court suppressed the statements on the grounds that the interrogation of an indicted defendant violated his sixth amendment rights. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985). The First Circuit affirmed.

  2. Capital Defense Weekly, March 8, 2004

    Capital Defense NewsletterMarch 7, 2004

    Pp. 8-15.(a) The Sixth Amendment secures to a defendant facing incarceration the right to counsel at all "critical stages" of the criminal process, see,e.g., Mainev.Moulton,474 U. S. 159, 170, including a plea hearing,Whitev.Maryland,373 U. S. 59, 60(per curiam).Because Tovar received a two-day prison term for his first OWI conviction, he had a right to counsel both at the plea stage and at trial had he elected to contest the charge.Argersingerv.Hamlin,407 U. S. 25, 34, 37.

  3. Capital Defense Weekly, October 29, 2001

    Capital Defense NewsletterOctober 29, 2001

    But the right to counsel is "offense specific." See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985). *fn4 That is, the Sixth Amendment does not require the assistance of counsel as to interrogations in the course of an investigation concerning then-uncharged criminal conduct, even though other charges are pending as to which the right has attached.

  4. Capital Defense Weekly, April 2, 2001

    Capital Defense NewsletterApril 1, 2001

    (a) InMcNeilv.Wisconsin,501 U. S. 171, 176, this Court held that a defendant's statements regarding offenses for which he has not been charged are admissible notwithstanding the attachment of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel on other charged offenses. Although some lower courts have read intoMcNeil's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are "factually related" to a charged offense, and have interpretedBrewerv.Williams,430 U. S. 387, andMainev.Moulton,474 U. S. 159, to support this view, this Court declines to do so.Brewerdid not address the question at issue here. And to the extentMoultonspoke to the matter at all, it expressly referred to the offense-specific nature of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.