Lukev.Cplace Forest Park SNF, L.L.C.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUITJun 22, 2015
No. 14-31347 (5th Cir. 2015)
No. 14-31347608 Fed. Appx. 246

No. 14-31347

06-22-2015

ERYON LUKE, Plaintiff - Appellant v. CPLACE FOREST PARK SNF, L.L.C., doing business as Nottingham Regional Rehab Center, Defendant - Appellee


Summary Calendar Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana
USDC No. 3:13-CV-402
Before REAVLEY, DENNIS, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

The plaintiff in this case claims that her employer, the defendant, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), when it declined to make reasonable accommodations to her job duties that would have allowed her to continue working during her pregnancy and instead terminated her employment. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed. While this appeal was pending, and after both parties filed their initial briefs, the Supreme Court handed down Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015). The Court in Young, abrogating precedent from this circuit, see id. at 1348 (abrogating Urbano v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204 (5th Cir. 1998)), laid out a new analysis for Title VII claims, such as the one presented here, that an employer's failure to accommodate pregnancy constitutes sex discrimination. See id. at 1353-55. Given this intervening change in the law, we conclude that the parties here must be afforded an opportunity to present their claims and defenses in light of Young, and the district court should decide the matter under current law in the first instance. See Easterling v. Sch. Bd. of Concordia Parish, 196 F. App'x 251, 253 (5th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (after intervening change in Title VII law, vacating district court's judgment and remanding for decision based on new law). Therefore, the district court's summary judgment as to the Title VII claim is VACATED, but the court's judgment is AFFIRMED in all other respects, and the case is REMANDED. On remand, the district court should decide whether, and to what extent, additional discovery is appropriate.

We have considered the plaintiff's arguments regarding her claim under LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:342(2)(b) and conclude that they are without merit. --------