October 31, 1975
Appeal from the Monroe Special Term.
Present — Marsh, P.J., Moule, Cardamone, Simons and Del Vecchio, JJ.
Order unanimously affirmed, without costs. Memorandum: Special Term properly considered all of the "contested" matters which were relevant to its determination (CPLR 3211, subd [c]) and correctly granted plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendants' counterclaim on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action (CPLR 3211, subd [a]) for either prima facie tort or the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff's actions in allegedly threatening to encourage the Internal Revenue Service to act against defendant personally unless he gave plaintiff bank additional security were motivated by an intention to secure an economic benefit and were not solely intended to injure defendant in his trade, occupation, professional reputation or property (Squire Records v Vanguard Recording Soc., 25 A.D.2d 190, affd 19 N.Y.2d 797). Further, plaintiff's single action falls far short of the pattern of conduct in those cases which held claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress legally sufficient (contrast Nader v General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560; Long v Beneficial Finance Co. of N.Y., 39 A.D.2d 11; Prince v Gurvitz, 37 A.D.2d 727). The law does not fasten liability on mere threats, annoyances or petty oppressions or other trivial incidents which must necessarily be expected and are incidental to modern life no matter how upsetting. It is only where the conduct complained of is of such a character as to exceed all reasonable bounds of decency that the law will recognize it as an actionable tort (Restatement, Torts, 2d, § 46).