LiMandri v. Judkins

56 Citing briefs

  1. Ralston .v Mortgage Investors Group, Inc., et.al.

    Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' 25 Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint

    Filed July 25, 2008

    Wilkins v. Nat’l. Broad. Co., Inc., 71 Cal. App. 4th 1066, 1082 (1999) (citing Judkins, 52 Cal. App. 4th at 336-337). Case 5:08-cv-00536-JF Document 29 Filed 07/25/2008 Page 25 of 34 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PLTF’S OPP. TO DEFS’ MOTION TO DISMISS PTF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT -19- Defendants made partial representations and suppressed other material facts concerning the ARM loans at issue.

  2. Valcor Engineering Corporation v. Parker Hannifin Corporation

    NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss

    Filed July 5, 2017

    Furthermore, the mere fact that there was a transaction between Parker and Valcor, or a buyer/seller relationship, does not, by itself, automatically give rise to a duty to disclose. Notably, while LiMandri v. Judkins, upon which Valcor previously relied, generally suggested the possibility that such a circumstance could arise as part of the court’s enumeration of various relationships, 52 Cal. App. 4th at 337, the court gave absolutely no context when that would apply and certainly did not apply such a duty to that case. Indeed, to the contrary, the LiMandri court held that there was no fiduciary duty between counsel for one party and counsel for another that would give rise to a duty to disclose.

  3. Plascencia et al v. Lending 1st Mortgage et al

    Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of re MOTION to Certify Class

    Filed November 6, 2008

    These representations obscured the fact that negative amortization was virtually certain to occur under the terms of the loan, a fact which created a duty to disclose. See Judkins, 52 Cal.App.4th at 336. “Even where no duty to disclose would otherwise exist, ‘where one does speak, he must speak the whole truth to the end that he does not conceal any facts which materially qualify those stated.

  4. Jordan v. Paul Financial, LLC

    MOTION to Certify Class Memorandum in Support

    Filed October 31, 2008

    These representations obscured the fact that negative amortization was virtually certain to occur under the terms of the loan, a fact which created a duty to disclose. See Judkins, 52 Cal.App.4th at 336. “Even where no duty to disclose would otherwise exist, ‘where one does speak, he must speak the whole truth to the end that he does not conceal any facts which materially qualify those stated.

  5. Plascencia et al v. Lending 1st Mortgage et al

    Memorandum in Opposition to EMC's Motion to Dismiss

    Filed September 4, 2008

    (Wilkins v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1082, citing Judkins, 52 Cal.App.4th at 336-337.) Plaintiffs have alleged that EMC is liable under aiding and abetting, agency, and assignee theories.

  6. J.B. Hughes And Associates v. Giunio Santi Engineering et al

    MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim First Amended Complaint with Prejudice

    Filed July 20, 2016

    Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 11 Cal. 4th 376, 393 (1995); see also Case 3:16-cv-00114-DMS-JMA Document 22-1 Filed 07/20/16 Page 21 of 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 - 17 - MEMO. IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS LiMandri, 52 Cal. App. 4th at 341. An act is independently wrongful “if it is unlawful, that is, if it is proscribed by some constitutional, statutory, regulatory, common law, or other determinable legal standard” an must be “independently actionable.”

  7. Marchante et al v. Sony Corporation of America, Inc et al

    RESPONSE in Opposition re MOTION to Dismiss Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Consolidated Amended Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12

    Filed December 31, 2010

    See Judkins, 52 Cal. App. 4th at 337. To state a claim for concealment, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that: (1) the defendant must have concealed or suppressed a material fact; Case 3:10-cv-00795-JLS -RBB Document 30 Filed 12/31/10 Page 21 of 33 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 - 16 - 10-cv-0795 (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff; (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff; (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact; and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage.

  8. Contreras et al v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A Inc. et al

    Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss

    Filed April 27, 2010

    Toyota was obligated to disclose the brake defect because it was a material safety fact within Toyota’s exclusive knowledge. (FAC ¶¶36, 39); Judkins, 52 Cal. App. 4th at 337; Falk, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 1096-97.) i. The Fact that a Car’s Brakes Might Fail, Depending on the Weather is Material. Strangely, Toyota has challenged whether including defective brakes in the cars it sold was material to the purchase of the vehicles.

  9. Carlos Collado et al. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.

    MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 63 MOTION to Dismiss.. Document

    Filed February 12, 2010

    (Mot. at 11 (citing Limandri v. Judkins, 52 Cal. App. 4th 326, 337 (1997)) (emphasis added)); see also, e.g., Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 347 (1976). Under the facts set forth in Plaintiffs’ complaint, Toyota was obliged to disclose to Plaintiffs and other Prius buyers that the vehicles’ HID headlights temporarily shut off during use (i.e., the HID Headlight System defect) under the 2nd and/or 3rd “Judkins” scenarios.

  10. Paul Stockinger et al v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc

    NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint

    Filed March 3, 2017

    Further, to the extent Plaintiff Dey (or any other Plaintiff) attempts to establish a duty to disclose based on any “active concealment” by Toyota of the alleged defect, this exception also fails. Although California recognizes an “active concealment” exception, see LiMandri v. Judkins, 52 Cal. App. 4th 326, 336 (1997), Plaintiff Dey has not alleged any facts that Toyota “actively concealed” or “‘sought to suppress information in the public domain or obscure the consumers’ 4 No duty to disclose non-safety related defects that manifest during the warranty period exists under California law. Wilson, 668 F.3d at 1141 (“manufacturer’s duty to consumers is limited to its warranty obligations absent either an affirmative misrepresentation or a safety issue”).