From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Lawrence v. St. Bernard Police Department

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana
Nov 5, 2002
CIVIL ACTION NO. 99-3494, SECTION "K" (5) (E.D. La. Nov. 5, 2002)

Opinion

CIVIL ACTION NO. 99-3494, SECTION "K" (5)

November 5, 2002


ORDER AND REASONS


The defendant in this case, the City of New Orleans, brings before this Court two motions: 1) a Motion for Relief from Judgment Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time to Serve Detective Harrison Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), and 2) a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(5). For the following reasons, this Court finds that the first Motion is moot and DENIES the City of New Orleans' Motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(5).

Facts and Procedural History:

This case arises from circumstances surrounding the attempted execution of an arrest and search warrant for Lawrence Blunt by a law enforcement team, consisting of officers from the New Orleans Police Department, the Louisiana State Police, St. Bernard Sheriff's Office and the federal Drug Enforcement Administration. During the execution of the warrant, the officers allegedly entered the wrong apartment — unbeknownst to the officers, the building had been split into three apartments. Plaintiffs in the instant matter occupied the apartment that the officers wrongly entered. Once inside, the officers allegedly arrested, interrogated, searched, and harassed the four plaintiffs even after they: (1) knew they had entered the wrong apartment (2) questioned plaintiffs as to the identity and whereabouts of Blunt, the subject of the arrest and search warrant, and (3) were assured that Blunt, was not in that apartment.

Lawrence Blunt was subsequently found in a downstairs apartment and arrested shortly thereafter for a drug charge.

On November 17, 1999, one day shy of the first anniversary of the incident, plaintiffs, Anita Lawrence, Barbara Jean Rose, Raymond Michael Lawrence, and Cheryl McKennies filed a complaint against St. Bernard Police Department, Officer Jack Doe, New Orleans Police Department, Officer John Doe, United States Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, and David Drasutis, alleging that on November 18, 1998, the defendants unlawfully raided the upstairs apartment at 2658 Athis Street, in New Orleans, Louisiana, where the plaintiffs resided. (Rec. Doc. 1). The plaintiffs alleged several causes of action against the defendants including violations of the Federal Tort Claims Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.

On May 23, 2000, more than six months after filing the original complaint and over two years after the incident, the magistrate judge granted the plaintiff leave to file a Plaintiff's First Supplemental and Amending Complaint naming detective Michael Harrison of the New Orleans Police Department, Captain John Doran of the St. Bernard Police department, Trooper Anthony Graffeo of the Louisiana State Police and DEA Task Force Officer Eric Covell. The plaintiffs had originally named "John Doe" as a plaintiff and changed the complaint to replace Detective Michael Hams as the formerly unknown "John Doe."

On May 31, 2000 the plaintiffs allege that they served a representative at the New Orleans Police Department located at 715 South Broad Street, New Orleans, Louisiana, who accepted service on behalf of Detective Harrison. (Rec. Doc. 91, p. 2). The City of New Orleans contends that service on Detective Harrison was not in fact perfected until January 8, 2002. (Rec. Doc. 86, p. 2).

On September 3, 2002 the City of New Orleans filed the two motions now before this Court: the Motion for Relief from Judgment and the Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 12(b)(6). (Rec. Docs. 85, 86). The City's Motion for Relief from Judgment argues that this Court should set aside its January 15, 2002 grant of Plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time to serve Detective Harrison because any suit against him is prescribed. The City urges that the plaintiffs may not apply Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 15(c)(3) to a "John Doe" defendant and thereby use the relation-back provision to prevent prescription. The City makes same argument in its Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to 12(b)(5). Because the Court finds that this issue is more properly addressed by the City's Motion to Dismiss, the Court will resolve the Motion to Dismiss, and finds that the Motion for Relief from Judgment is moot because it raises the same issues as the Motion to Dismiss.

The Rule states in relevant part:

(C)Relation Back of Amendments. An amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when
(2) the claim of defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, or
(3) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted if the foregoing provision (2) is satisfied and, within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for service of the summons and complaint, party to be brought in by amendment (A) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudices in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (B) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, action would have been brought against the party (italics added).

Analysis

The Defendant, the City of New Orleans, argues that the Plaintiffs failed to properly name Detective Harrison as a "Doe" defendant and therefore improperly served him. The City urges the Court to dismiss this action under Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 12(b)(5). Due to the significant time gap between the incident and the time that Detective Harrison was properly served, the City argues that the Plaintiffs' action against Harrison is fatally flawed because the action has prescribed. They contend that the Plaintiffs may not avail themselves of the relation back provision in Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 15(c)(3) which would allow Plaintiffs' amended complaint, adding Detective Harrison, to relate back to the date that the original complaint was filed, thereby avoiding any prescriptive bar.

The Plaintiffs' contend that their argument does not rely on 15(c)(3) or the relation back doctrine because the suit against Detective Harrison is not barred by the statute of limitations. The Plaintiffs argue that the statute of limitation was interrupted due to Harrison's status as a joint tortfeasor with the other timely sued defendants.

The City's argument that Plaintiffs' amendment cannot relate back to the original complaint as a matter of law stems from the holding of the Fifth Circuit in Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 1998). In that opinion the Fifth Circuit made it quite clear that an amendment to substitute a named party for a John Doe cannot relate back to the original complaint under Fe. R. Civ. Proc. 15(c). Rule 15(c) has a "mistake" requirement for an amendment to "relate back." Under the rule, an amendment can only relate back to the date of the original complaint if the party was mistakenly identified, not if the party was unknown. This opinion clarified a previously unsettled question of law in the Circuit by holding that in the "John Doe" situation, there is no mistake" in identifying the correct defendant: rather, the problem is in not being able to identify the correct defendant at all during the prescriptive period due to lack of knowledge of his identity. See Holoway v. Triola, 1998 WL 195986, 1 (E.D.La. 1998) (Clement, J.).

The ruling in Jacobsen is consistent with the majority of other circuit courts that have considered the issue. See id.

As applied here, the City asserts that plaintiffs made no "mistake" in failing to identify Harrison in their complaint. Rather, their problem was the inability to obtain his identity within the limitations period. That being the case, the City argues that plaintiffs cannot avail themselves of the relation back doctrine to add or substitute Harrison as a defendant in this matter.

Although the City is correct that a the relation back doctrine is inapplicable to a John Doe defendant, the Court does not need to reach the issue because under the applicable Louisiana law, the prescriptive period that would otherwise bar the amendment at issue was interrupted by the filing of the original complaint.

The applicable statute of limitation in a § 1983 action is the forum state's personal injury limitations period. Jacobsen v Osborne, 133 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1998). Therefore, the Court applies the Louisiana Civil Code article 3492, which carries a limitations period of one year. Elzy v. Roberson, 868 F.2d 793, 794 (5th Cir. 1989).

The court applies federal law to determine when the § 1983 action accrues. Jacobsen, 133 F.3d at 319. Under federal law, a § 1983 action accrues plaintiff "becomes aware that he has suffered an injury or has sufficient information to know that he has been injured." Helton v. Clements, 832 F.2d 332, 335 (5th Cir. 1987). In the instant case, if there the statute of limitations has not been interrupted or tolled, the plaintiffs' cause of action accrued on November 18, 1998; and therefore would have been barred on November 18, 1999.

As previously discussed, the Plaintiffs counter that their action is not prescribed because they filed suit against various other defendants who are joint tortfeasors with Detective Harrison. The Plaintiffs argue that when suit is filed against one "joint or solidary torfteasor, prescription is interrupted as to all joint or solidary tortfeasors." (Rec. Doc. 92, p. 4). The Plaintiffs maintain that under C.C. Art. 2324(c), which provides that, "[i]nterruption of prescription against one joint tortfeasor is effective against all joint tortfeasors," the limitations period was interrupted. For example, because DEA Agent Drasutis was timely sued, and is a joint tortfeasor along with Harrison and the other defendants, prescription against Harrison was interrupted by the original complaint naming Drasutis and the other defendants.

Plaintiffs quote this Court's decision in Lawrence v. St. Bernard Police Dept., 2000 WL 1751607 (E.D. La. 2000).

Plaintiff is correct in its assertion that the prescriptive period is interrupted as to all joint or solidary tortfeasors, if suit is timely filed against one joint or solidary tortfeasor. La. Civ. Code. Art. 2324(C); Hultgren v. Construction South, 2000 WL 713272 at (E.D. La. 2000). Therefore, the Court must determine whether Detective Harrison is a joint and solidary tortfeasor with any of the other defendants that were timely sued. If Harrison shares this relationship with any one of the other defendants, then the prescriptive period has been interrupted and Plaintiffs may maintain their cause of action against him.

Joint and solidary tortfeasor liability exists when a plaintiff can show that each actor "had a substantial role in bringing about the results" of their actions. Anderson v. Nosser et al., 438 F.2d 183, 199 (5th 1971); Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d 110, 119 (5th Cir. 1963) (indicating that the defendants do not need to have conceived of a prior plan if each participant had a substantial role in bringing about the results); Smith v. Xerox Corp., 718 F. Supp. 494, 496 (E.D. La. 1989) (explaining that liability is solidary as between obligors when each obligor is liable for the whole performance). As long as the "actions throughout the whole sequence of events are . . . intertwined and interlocking . . . [the] Defendants must fall together." Nesmith, 318 F.2d at 119.

This Court has previously held that establishing a joint tortfeasor relationship for purposes of interruption does not require a high modicum of proof. (See Minute Entry, October 24, 2000, Rec. Doc. 42). For instance, in Hultgren v. Construction South, 2000 WL 713272 (E.D.La.)(McNamara, Chief J.), the fact that the allegations made against the original defendants were the same as those made against the newly added defendants (they were both alleged to be negligent) was sufficient to establish a joint tortfeasor relationship.

The remaining defendants in this case are: the St. Bernard Sheriff's Department, David Drasutis, the United States, and Captain John Doran of the St. Bernard Sheriff's Department. At this time the Court, finds sua sponte that the St. Bernard Sheriff's Department is not a proper party and dismisses it from this action because "[i]t is well settled that a Sheriff's Department is not a legal entity capable of being sued."Causey v. Parish of Tangipahoa, 167 F. Supp.2d 898, 904 (E.D. La. 2001) quoting Valentine v. Bonnevile Ins. Co., 691 So.2d 665, 668 (La. 1997). Under Louisiana law, the Parish Sheriff's Department has no recognized legal status and cannot sue or be sued. Id. Such legal status is reserved for the Sheriff. Id. Therefore, Detective Harrison is not a joint tortfeasor with this entity.

Many of the former defendants have been dismissed since the initiation of this action. The New Orleans Police Department was dismissed on the grounds that it is not a proper party to be sued. (Rec. Doc. 15). The Drug Enforcement Agency and the Department of Justice were dismissed pursuant to a Motion for Summary Judgment granted on August 18, 2000, on the grounds that they are not proper parties to be sued. (Rec. Doc. 34). The Louisiana State Police Department and Anthony Graffeo, a Louisiana State Trooper, were dismissed with prejudice on January 15, 2002, pursuant to a motion filed by the Plaintiffs (Rec. Doc. 65).

In the case at bar, the timely sued defendants remaining in the case and Detective Harrison are alleged to have been involved in the same incident and are alleged to have committed the same violations of law. Clearly these allegations sufficiently give rise to a joint tortfeasor relationship for purposes of interruption.

IT IS ORDERED that the City's Motion to Dismiss be and is hereby DENIED.


Summaries of

Lawrence v. St. Bernard Police Department

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana
Nov 5, 2002
CIVIL ACTION NO. 99-3494, SECTION "K" (5) (E.D. La. Nov. 5, 2002)
Case details for

Lawrence v. St. Bernard Police Department

Case Details

Full title:ANITA LAWRENCE v. ST. BERNARD POLICE DEPARTMENT, ET AL

Court:United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana

Date published: Nov 5, 2002

Citations

CIVIL ACTION NO. 99-3494, SECTION "K" (5) (E.D. La. Nov. 5, 2002)