STATEMENT OF CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 10, 2017, the plaintiff, John Angelo LaPaglia, who is self-represented, commenced this action by service of writ, summons and complaint against the defendants, the State of Connecticut Department of Mental Health and Connecticut Valley Hospital (CVH), sounding in libel, perjury, and negligence, and alleging the following facts from which the chronology of events and causes of action arise are is difficult to discern. It appears from the complaint that the plaintiff’s allegations began with criminal charges brought against him in July 2013, and a subsequent hospitalization at CVH in September 2013 to October 2013. According to the allegations in count one of the complaint, in July 2013, the plaintiff was arrested and charged with threatening in the second degree and harassment in the second degree. For approximately six weeks from September 2013 until October 2013, the plaintiff was hospitalized at Connecticut Valley Hospital, where he was required to undergo psychological evaluation and medical treatment. The plaintiff alleges that while he was hospitalized at CVH, he was the subject of, and attended a hearing before the Middletown Probate Court on an Application for a Special Limited Conservator. At the time relevant to the allegations of the complaint, Dr. Steven Lazrove was an employee of the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services and CVH and testified in support of the application on behalf of the Defendants. Dr. Lazrove testified that the plaintiff had an online internet Facebook account with criminally threatening content but then allegedly later stated that he could not provide any evidence of criminally threatening content within the Facebook account. The plaintiff further alleges that Dr. Lazrove falsely testified that the plaintiff was the owner of the Facebook account and that the plaintiff denied ownership of the said Facebook account. At the hearing, Dr. Lazrove testified that he could not find the Facebook account online and that the plaintiff somehow gained access to the internet and altered the Facebook account. The plaintiff alleges that this testimony amounts to perjury and that Dr. Lazrove intentionally and recklessly lied under oath. The complaint further alleges that patients at CVH cannot gain access to computers. The complaint alleges that Dr. Lazrove further testified that said Facebook account is evidence of plaintiff’s delusions, psychosis and hallucinations and that according to the plaintiff, an electronic business card found in a YouTube video from the year 2009 was a symptom of the plaintiff’s delusional thoughts and psychosis and that the plaintiff was practicing clinical psychology without a license. The plaintiff claims he was billed approximately $5,000.00 for his treatment at CVH, and in order to discharge the debt, he had to file for bankruptcy. As part of his prayer for relief, the plaintiff seeks to be removed from any database which may label him as "adjudicated as a mental defect" or "committed to any mental institution," the "Connecticut Mental Health Adjudication Repository (MHAR)" or any other related databases which may prevent him from obtaining a Connecticut State Pistol Permit or entry into the T.S.A. Pre-check program or the T.S.A. Global Entry program (TSA). The complaint alleges that The State of Connecticut, Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection ("DESPP") must report the name, date of birth and physical description of anyone prohibited from possessing a firearm pursuant to federal law to NICS. In addition, DESPP, DMHAS and the Judicial Department are parties to a Memorandum of Understanding with the FBI for the purpose of implementing NICS. The plaintiff alleges that his application for the Global entry program was denied on January 28, 2017.
This court is mindful that the plaintiff is a self-represented litigant and takes the same into account as it considers the present motion. "Although [this court] will not entirely disregard our rules of practice, [it does] give great latitude to [self-represented] litigants in order that justice may both be done and be seen to be done ... For justice to be done, however, any latitude given to [self-represented] litigants cannot interfere with the rights of other parties, nor can [this court] disregard completely our rules of practice." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Shobeiri v. Richards, 104 Conn.App. 293, 296, 933 A.2d 728 (2007).
In count two of the complaint the plaintiff alleges negligence and claims that CVH was negligent, had a duty of care and breached that duty of care thereby causing damages. The complaint alleges that the plaintiff has filed a Notice of Claim with the Claims Commissioner and that he is seeking money damages as well as an injunction for the removal from "all relevant databases," including the "Connecticut Mental Health Adjudication Repository," which may prevent him from obtaining a Connecticut pistol permit or clearance for the TSA Pre-Check program or the TSA Global Entry program.
On January 16, 2018, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. On February 6, 2018, the defendants filed the present motion to dismiss both counts of the original complaint on the grounds that sovereign immunity bars the present action. On February 13, 2018, the plaintiff filed a request for argument on the defendants’ motion to dismiss. On February 20, 2018, the defendant filed a second motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s amended complaint on similar grounds as the first motion to dismiss. On February 21, 2018, the plaintiff filed an additional request for argument on the defendants’ second motion to dismiss. On March 16, 2018, the plaintiff filed a second amended complaint. On March 23, 2018, the defendants filed an objection to the second amended complaint. In its April 18, 2018 order, the court sustained the defendants’ objection, and ruled that because the question of the court’s subject matter jurisdiction had been raised in the defendants’ first motion to dismiss, that question must be resolved before the court can consider any subsequent issues, including the first amended complaint. The court heard oral argument on the present motion during short calendar on June 4, 2018.
The defendant also argued that one or both of the counts of the complaint should be dismissed because perjury is not a private cause of action, the plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations, and the litigation privilege applies absolute immunity to the plaintiff’s claims. Because the present motion is resolved on the ground of sovereign immunity, the court does not reach these arguments. Concerning the litigation privilege and absolute immunity, the court notes that the litigation privilege is specifically designed to apply absolute immunity for tort claims arising from statements made during the course of a judicial hearing. "[D]efamatory words spoken upon an occasion absolutely privileged, though spoken falsely, knowingly, and with express malice, impose no liability for damages ..." Simms v. Seaman, 308 Conn. 523, 536, 69 A.3d 880 (2013). See also, e.g., Gordon v. Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-17-5038333-S (February 6, 2018, Wilson, J.) (65 Conn.L.Rptr. 893).
Legal Standard of Review
"A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, 310 Conn. 616, 626, 79 A.3d 60 (2013). "[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Housatonic Railroad Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 301 Conn. 268, 274, 21 A.3d 759 (2011). "When a trial court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss on the basis of the complaint alone, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light ... In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 651, 974 A.2d 669 (2009). "[T]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265 Conn. 423, 430 n.12, 829 A.2d 801 (2003). "It is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Financial Consulting, LLC v. Commissioner of Insurance, 315 Conn. 196, 226, 105 A.3d 210 (2015). "An evidentiary hearing is necessary when a court cannot make a critical factual jurisdictional finding based on memoranda and documents submitted by the parties." Ruisi v. O’Sullivan, 132 Conn.App. 1, 5 (2013). The court has reviewed the contents of the case file and concludes that an evidentiary hearing is not required.
The defendants argue in the present motion that the doctrine of sovereign immunity deprives this court of jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims. The plaintiff responded that because the harms he is suffering are ongoing, sovereign immunity does not apply.
Because the plaintiff has not sufficiently pleaded facts that would allow him to overcome sovereign immunity, the court agrees with the defendants. The court also notes that the plaintiff did not sue Dr. Lazrove individually, but rather sued the state for acts allegedly committed by Lazrove while in the performance of his duties as an employee of CVH.
"The doctrine of sovereign immunity protects state officials and employees from lawsuits resulting from the performance of their duty." Hultman v. Blumenthal, 67 Conn.App. 613, 620, 787 A.2d 666, cert. denied, 259 Conn. 929, 793 A.2d 253 (2002). "[The Connecticut] Supreme Court has recognized that because a state can only act through its officers and agents, a suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state is, in effect, against the state." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kenney v. Weaving, 123 Conn.App. 211, 215, 1 A.3d 1083 (2010). "The law is firmly established that the state cannot be sued except with its own consent ... Whether a particular action is one against the state is not determined solely by referring to the parties of record." (Citations omitted.) Somers v. Hill, 143 Conn. 476, 479, 123 A.2d 468 (1956).
"If the plaintiff’s complaint reasonably may be construed to bring claims against the defendants in their individual capacities, then sovereign immunity would not bar those claims." Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 307, 828 A.2d 549 (2003). "To determine whether an action is against the state or against a defendant in his individual capacity, we look to the four criteria established by our Supreme Court ... If all four criteria are satisfied, the action is deemed to be against the state ... The criteria are: (1) a state official has been sued; (2) the suit concerns some matter in which that official represents the state; (3) the state is the real party against whom relief is sought; and (4) the judgment, though nominally against the official, will operate to control the activities of the state or subject it to liability." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kenney v. Weaving, supra, 123 Conn.App. at 216. As previously stated, the plaintiff here did not bring suit against Dr. Lazrove, but rather brought suit against the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services and CVH, both state agencies, for alleged actions committed by Dr. Lazrove while in the performance of his duties as an employee of CVH.
Pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-450, the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services is an agency of the State of Connecticut and pursuant § 17a-450, Connecticut Valley Hospital ("CVH") is a facility operated by the State of Connecticut, Department of Mental Health and Addictions Services.
General Statutes § 17a-450 provides:
"[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Housatonic Railroad Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 301 Conn. 268, 274, 21 A.3d 759 (2011). "The principle that the state cannot be sued without its consent, or sovereign immunity, is well established under our case law ... [T]he practical and logical basis of the doctrine [of sovereign immunity] is today recognized to rest ... on the hazard that the subjection of the state and federal governments to private litigation might constitute a serious interference with the performance of their functions and with their control over their respective instrumentalities, funds, and property ... Exceptions to this doctrine are few and narrowly construed under our jurisprudence." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Markley v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 301 Conn. 56, 65, 23 A.3d (2011).
"In the absence of a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, the plaintiff may not bring an action against the state for monetary damages without authorization from the claims commissioner to do so." (Citations omitted: internal quotation marks omitted.) DiPietro v. Dept. of Public Safety, 126 Conn.App. 414, 418, 11 A.3d 1149, cert. granted on other grounds, 300 Conn. 932, 17 A.3d 69 (2011), appeal withdrawn, June 26, 2012. "When sovereign immunity has not been waived, the claims commissioner is authorized by statute to hear monetary claims against the state and determine whether the claimant has a cognizable claim ... This legislation expressly bars suits upon claims cognizable by the claims commissioner except as he may authorize, an indication of the legislative determination to preserve sovereign immunity as a defense to monetary claims against the state not sanctioned by the commissioner or other statutory provisions." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cox v. Aiken, 278 Conn. 204, 212 n.11, 897 A.2d 71 (2006). Even in cases where the claims commissioner denies or dismisses a claim, our statutes provide that the General Assembly may, in certain circumstances, provide the plaintiff such a right. See General Statutes § § 4-158, 4-159.
There are two ways in which a plaintiff who sues the state can avoid the bar of sovereign immunity: (1) if the state has consented to the suit; or (2) if the allegations of the complaint and the relief requested fall within a common-law exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Consent to Suit
The state may waive its right to sovereign immunity by consenting to suit. Since the giving or withholding of consent to suit is the prerogative of the General Assembly, id., the General Statutes control this inquiry.
In most cases, the General Assembly has delegated the task of waiving sovereign immunity to the State Claims Commissioner under General Statutes § 4-142. Section 4-142 requires the Claims Commissioner to hear all "claims" against the state except those covered by any of the five narrow exceptions listed in the statute, then to decide, in his sole discretion, whether or not to authorize suit. Capers v. Lee, 239 Conn. 265, 268 n.3, 684 A.2d 696 (1996).
With the above legal principles in mind, this court’s inquiry as to whether or not the state has consented to this suit must proceed as follows. The court must first determine if the suit is covered by one of the five exceptions listed in Section 4-142. If it is, then the state must be found to have consented to the suit as a matter of law. If, however, the suit is not covered by one of the listed statutory exceptions, the court must go on to determine if the Claims Commissioner has consented to the suit in the manner prescribed by law. If he has not, then the suit must be dismissed unless it falls within a common-law exception to the sovereign immunity doctrine.
The first exception listed in Section 4-142 authorizes suits against the State for "[c]laims for the periodic payment of disability, pension, retirement or other employment benefits." This case is plainly not covered by the first exception because it does not involve claims for the periodic payment of employment benefits.
The second exception listed in the statute is for "claims upon which suit otherwise is authorized by law including suits to recover similar relief arising from the same set of facts." The State is deemed to have consented to suit under this exception if the General Assembly has passed another statute granting the right to bring a civil action directly against the state in particular circumstances. E.g., General Statutes § 13a-144 (the defective highway statute). "Such a statute must clearly indicate an intent to allow a suit against the state by the use of express terms or by force of a necessary implication." Conn. Employees Ass’n v. Dept. of Administrative Services, 20 Conn.App. 676, 678, 569 A.2d 1152 (1990), quoting Baker v. Ives, 162 Conn. 295, 298, 294 A.2d 290 (1972) ). No such statute has been invoked by the plaintiff in this case, and none is fairly implicated by the allegations of his complaint.
The third exception listed in Section 4-142 grants consent to suit on "claims for which an administrative hearing procedure otherwise is established by law." That exception is patently irrelevant to this case because this is a civil action rather than a proceeding before an administrative tribunal.
The fourth and fifth exception set forth in the statute are for "requests by political subdivisions of the state for the payment of grants in lieu of taxes" and "claims for the refund of taxes." This suit is plainly not authorized under either such exception because it is brought by an individual rather than a political subdivision and it does not involve any listed request or claim.
Since this case does not fit within any of the five exceptions spelled out in § 4-142, the only way the state could have consented to this suit would have been if the Claims Commissioner had authorized it. The plaintiff acknowledges in his complaint that he has filed a claim with the Claims Commissioner, and that the claim remains pending.
Because the claims presented in this lawsuit do not fall within any of the five exceptions, listed in Section 4-142, and the Claims Commissioner has not yet authorized the plaintiff to sue the state based upon those claims, the state has not consented to this suit, and thus has not waived its sovereign immunity. Therefore, this case can continue only if the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not apply. The court now turns to the common-law exceptions to the doctrine of ‘ sovereign immunity.
Common-Law Exceptions to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity
Our courts have come to recognize two important exceptions to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Those exceptions, which arise in situations where the interests of individuals to sue the State are deemed to outweigh the State’s sovereign right to be free from suit, are for: (1) actions for declaratory and/or injunctive relief based upon clear violations of fundamental constitutional rights: see, e.g., Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 624, 376 A.2d 359 (1977); and (2) actions based upon allegations of egregious misconduct by state agents "in excess of their statutory authority." See, e.g. Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. 134, 169, 749 A.2d 1147 (2000); Antinerella v. Rioux, 229 Conn. 479, 642 A.2d 699 (1994).
A plaintiff bringing a claim under these exceptions must meet heightened pleading standards ..."For a claim made pursuant to the [first] exception, complaining of unconstitutional acts, we require that [t]he allegations of such a complaint and the factual underpinnings if placed in issue, must clearly demonstrate an incursion upon constitutionally protected interests ... For a claim under the [second] exception, the plaintiffs must do more than allege that the defendants’ conduct was in excess of their statutory authority; they also must allege or otherwise establish facts that reasonably support those allegations ... In the absence of a proper factual basis in the complaint to support the applicability of these exceptions, the granting of a motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds is proper." Columbia Air Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, supra, 293 Conn. 349-50.
With regard to the first exception, the plaintiff has not clearly established an incursion upon constitutionally protected interests. Reading the complaint broadly and realistically, the plaintiff alleges a violation of his rights under the first amendment to the United States Constitution by Dr. Lazrove, who utilized internet media posted by the plaintiff during his testimony. More specifically, the plaintiff alleges that Dr. Lazrove committed the tort of copyright infringement when he took and made multiple copies of the plaintiff’s "Copyrighted Intellectual Motion Picture Property." This, the plaintiff argues, is a copyright violation and a violation of his rights under the first amendment to the United States Constitution. Complaint, ¶ 35. The court cannot discern from the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint the factual basis for his claim that Dr. Lazrove’s making of multiple copies of the plaintiff’s Face Book posting and use of same during his testimony in the probate hearing, violated the plaintiff’s first amendment rights. Moreover, neither has the plaintiff presented any legal authority in support of this contention.
In paragraph 42 of the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that he may be prevented from obtaining a permit to carry a firearm in Connecticut, but has not set forth sufficient factual allegations to support a constitutional violation, and that he has in fact suffered an injury as a result of said violation.
In paragraph 42 of the complaint, the plaintiff further alleges that he has been found ineligible for certain simplified procedures for entering and exiting the country offered by the TSA. The plaintiff seems to be alleging that his constitutional right to travel has been violated. The complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to show that the finding of ineligibility pursuant to these TSA procedures violates the plaintiff’s right to travel for which the state is responsible.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized a right to travel as a fundamental right which "protects the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second State, and, for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that State." Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500, 119 S.Ct. 1518, 143 L.Ed.2d 689 (1999). "The right to travel has long been recognized and protected as a fundamental right which is firmly established in the law. See Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2566, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 1177, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966). It is a right which the courts have repeatedly protected in the face of durational residency requirements that affect that right. See Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, supra ; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969). Writing for the court in Shapiro v. Thompson, Justice Brennan cited with approval the decision of Chief Justice Taney in the Passenger cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 492, 12 L.Ed. 702 (1849), as follows: ‘For all the great purposes for which the Federal government was formed, we are one people, with one common country. We are all citizens of the United States; and, as members of the same community, must have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States.’ Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, 394 U.S. 630, 89 S.Ct. 1329." Bruno v. Civil Service Com’n of City of Bridgeport, 192 Conn. 335, 346, 472 A.2d 328 (1984).
Moreover, neither does the plaintiff explicitly allege a procedural due process claim under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Even if he had alleged a due process claim, he would need to show what process was due, and how the process was inadequate, which he has not done. See Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) ("the Due Process Clause provides that certain substantive rights- life, liberty, and property- cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures"); see also Chase Group Alliance, LLC v. City of New York Dept. of Finance, 620 F.3d 146, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2010) ("a procedural due process violation cannot have occurred when the governmental actor provides apparently adequate procedural remedies and the plaintiff has not availed himself of those remedies"). In addition, the plaintiff’s claim of negligence as alleged in the second count could not serve as the basis for a procedural due process claim under the fourteenth amendment. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986) (injuries inflicted by governmental negligence are not addressed by United States Constitution). Having examined the allegations in the complaint and construed them in the manner most favorable to the pleader, the court cannot conclude that the plaintiff’s claims fall within the exception of the doctrine of sovereign immunity due to the violation of a clear constitutional right.
With regards to the second exception to sovereign immunity, a claim alleging conduct by state agents in excess of their statutory authority, the facts provided in the complaint are insufficient. After careful review of the plaintiff’s complaint and construing the complaint broadly and in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the facts as alleged fail to allege actions in excess of statutory authority. Without facts sufficiently pleaded to allege conduct of state agents in excess of their statutory authority, a claim under the second exception cannot be brought.
"Although in reviewing a motion to dismiss we must construe the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, to survive the defense of sovereign immunity the complaint must nevertheless allege sufficient facts to support a finding of unconstitutional or extrastatutory state action ... In the absence of a proper factual basis in the complaint to support the applicability of these exceptions, the granting of a motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds is proper." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Markley v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 301 Conn. 56, 66, 23 A.3d 668 (2011).
In light of the foregoing, the court can find no exception to the application of sovereign immunity to the plaintiff’s claims. Accordingly as this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims of the plaintiff’s complaint, the complaint is dismissed.
(a) There shall be a Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services headed by a Commissioner of Mental Health and Addiction Services, appointed by the Governor with the advice of the Board of Mental Health and Addiction Services established pursuant to section 17a-456:
(b) For the purposes of chapter 48 [C.G.S.A. § 4-38c et seq.], the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services shall be organized to promote comprehensive, client-based services in the areas of mental health treatment and substance abuse treatment and to ensure the programmatic integrity and clinical identity of services in each area. The department shall perform the functions of: Centralized administration, planning and program development; prevention and treatment programs and facilities, both inpatient and outpatient, for persons with psychiatric disabilities or persons with substance use disorders, or both; community mental health centers and community or regional programs and facilities providing services for persons with psychiatric disabilities or persons with substance use disorders, or both; training and education; and research and evaluation of programs and facilities providing services for persons with psychiatric disabilities or persons with substance use disorders, or both. The department shall include, but not be limited to, the following divisions and facilities or their successor facilities: The office of the Commissioner of Mental Health and Addiction Services; Capitol Region Mental Health Center; Connecticut Valley Hospital, including the Addictions Division and the General Psychiatric Division of Connecticut Valley Hospital; the Whiting Forensic Hospital; the Connecticut Mental Health Center; Ribicoff Research Center; the Southwest Connecticut Mental Health System, including the Franklin S. DuBois Center and the Greater Bridgeport Community Mental Health Center; the Southeastern Mental Health Authority; River Valley Services; the Western Connecticut Mental Health Network; and any other state-operated facility for the treatment of persons with psychiatric disabilities or persons with substance use disorders, or both, but shall not include those portions of such facilities transferred to the Department of Children and Families for the purpose of consolidation of children’s services.
The right also applies to intrastate travel: "We find our thinking to be substantially in accord with the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 442 F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S . 863, 92 S.Ct. 113, 30 L.Ed.2d 107 (1971). The court in King considered a five-year durational residency requirement for admission to public housing. The appellant municipality argued that the United States Supreme Court decisions on the issue of durational residency protected only the fundamental right to interstate travel. Protecting the plaintiff’s right to intrastate travel, the court concluded that ‘it would be meaningless to describe the right to travel between states as the fundamental precept of personal liberty and not to acknowledge a correlative constitutional right to travel within a state.’ Id., 648. Furthermore, the way to the recognition of an intrastate right to travel within Connecticut has already been considered in Nicholls v. Schaffer, 344 F.Supp. 238 (D.Conn. 1972). In Nicholls, the United States District Court considered a constitutional attack on a statutory requirement in a six-month durational residency requirement which, if not complied with, prohibited the plaintiffs’ right to register to vote in town elections. The ‘travel’ involved in the case was intrastate travel; the plaintiffs were denied the right to register to vote in Hartford after they moved there from West Hartford. The court declared the requirement invalid as a denial of equal protection, quoting a comment made by Justice Marshall in Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, 405 U.S. 342, 92 S.Ct. 1003: ‘[S]uch laws [with durational residency requirements] force a person who wishes to travel and change residence to choose between travel and the basic right to vote ... Absent a compelling state interest, a State may not burden the right to travel in this way.’ Implicit in this Nicholls decision was the recognition by the court of a fundamental right to intrastate travel, a right we now explicitly recognize." Id., 346-47. "A state law implicates the right to travel when it actually deters such travel, when impeding travel is its primary objective, or when it uses ‘any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right.’ " Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 903, 106 S.Ct. 2317, 90 L.Ed.2d 899 (1986). The Supreme Court’s right to travel cases have principally involved classification according to durational residency requirements. See, e.g., Saenz, 526 U.S. 489, 119 S.Ct. 1518, 143 L.Ed.2d 689 (durational residency requirements violate right to travel); Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 106 S.Ct. 2317, 90 L.Ed.2d 899 (New York’s restriction of its civil service preference to veterans who entered armed forces while residing in: New York violated constitutionally protected right to travel); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (holding unconstitutional a state or District of Columbia statutory provision denying welfare assistance to residents of state or district who have not resided within their jurisdictions for at least one year immediately preceding their applications for such assistance). See also Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (allegation of conspiracy to prevent blacks from using highway facilities); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 62 S.Ct. 164, 86 L.Ed. 119 (1941) (invalidating a state law that impeded the free interstate passage of the indigent); Crandall v. State of Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 73 U.S. 35, 18 L.Ed. 745 (1867) (invalidating a Nevada tax on every person leaving the State by common carrier). "The right to travel, like many constitutional rights, is not absolute. Not every restriction on one’s movement or ability to travel will impermissibly burden the right to travel in a constitutional sense. When determining whether a fundamental right has been infringed, Courts look to whether there has been a direct and substantial interference with that right. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 816 (4th ed. 2011) (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 98 S.Ct. 673, 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1978)). The Supreme Court has explained that the ‘nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.’ Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629 (emphasis added). Courts have therefore consistently limited the constitutional right to travel to situations where something more than a mere minor restriction on one’s ability to travel is at issue." Peruta v. City of Hartford, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:09-cv-1946 (VLB) (D.Conn. August 24, 2012). Although not explicitly alleged, the plaintiff appears to allege that a finding of ineligibility for certain simplified procedures for entering and exiting the country offered by the TSA, due to Dr. Lazrove’s testimony, violates his right to travel. However, the plaintiff has not alleged facts demonstrating that this finding of ineligibility was a direct and substantial interference with his right to travel for which the state should be held responsible. The plaintiff has not alleged facts that the finding of ineligibility substantially inhibited his right to travel, and that such was a result of acts committed by the state.