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Langan v. Bellinger

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Third Department
Apr 28, 1994
203 A.D.2d 857 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)

Opinion

April 28, 1994

Appeal from the Supreme Court, Schoharie County (Hughes, J.).


This lawsuit demonstrates that what may be music to the ears of some can, in certain circumstances, be a nuisance to the ears of others. Plaintiffs, who reside in the Village of Schoharie, Schoharie County, have commenced this action against their neighbor, the Presbyterian Church of the Town of Schoharie, seeking injunctive relief "from playing hourly chimes on a daily basis beginning at 8:00 o'clock in the forenoon and ending at 8:00 o'clock in the afternoon * * * and from playing carillon music on a daily basis at 12:00 o'clock in the afternoon and at 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon", which plaintiff Julie Langan avers "is a complete disruption of [her] family life, prevents a child from sleeping, and invades the privacy of [her] residence and creates unnecessary stress". The complaint characterizes the foregoing to be both a private nuisance and a violation of an ordinance of the Village of Schoharie. Plaintiffs moved by order to show cause for a preliminary injunction, in response to which defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Supreme Court denied plaintiffs' motion, granted defendant's cross motion and dismissed the complaint. We affirm.

Langan and the other plaintiff, Ernest Eggers, both reside approximately 250 feet from the church.

One may be liable for a private nuisance where the wrongful invasion of the use of another's land is intentional and unreasonable. The elements of such a private nuisance are "(1) an interference substantial in nature, (2) intentional in origin, (3) unreasonable in character, (4) with a person's property right to use and enjoy land, (5) caused by another's conduct in acting or failing to act" (Copart Indus. v Consolidated Edison Co., 41 N.Y.2d 564, 570; see, Restatement of Torts § 822). We note that the complaint appears to be defective in that it fails to allege two of the basic elements of private nuisance, i.e., that the interference is substantial in nature or that it is unreasonable in character. For this reason alone, dismissal of the complaint would be appropriate.

Nonetheless, we similarly find dismissal on the ground found by Supreme Court to be proper. Defendant's moving papers included the sworn affidavit of and report by Wayne Sikora, an expert in noise management, which showed that the sound levels emanating from the bells and chimes were no greater than the sound from a passing automobile, of which some 6,500 passed plaintiffs' properties each day. This document, together with affidavits from the pastor of the church, defense counsel and affidavits from 15 other Village residents who found the bells and chimes to be pleasant, as well as an affidavit from the Village Mayor and Village Attorney showing there was no violation of an ordinance (see, Camarda v Vanderbilt, 147 A.D.2d 607, 608-609), constituted a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment (see, Lewis v Stiles, 158 A.D.2d 589, 590).

In opposition, plaintiffs offered only their own affidavits and that of their attorney, all of which were lacking in objective evidence to either rebut the opinion of defendant's expert or demonstrate that the music and chimes constituted a nuisance. Because plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of coming forward with proof in evidentiary form to demonstrate the existence of factual issues requiring a trial, summary judgment dismissing the complaint was entirely appropriate (see, Hagan v General Motors Corp., 194 A.D.2d 766, 767-768, lv denied 82 N.Y.2d 658; Kinner v Corning, Inc., 190 A.D.2d 977, 978; G.O.V. Jewelry v United Parcel Serv., 181 A.D.2d 517, 518). We further note that opposition which rests only on discrepancies between opposing papers and relates solely to matters of credibility of conflicting opinions of experts will not suffice (see, Meizinger v Akin, 192 A.D.2d 1011, 1014, lv denied 82 N.Y.2d 661; Pizzaro v City of New York, 188 A.D.2d 591, 594, lv denied 82 N.Y.2d 656).

Finally, we find that Supreme Court correctly denied plaintiffs' applications for preliminary injunctive relief in the absence of any demonstration of the probability of success in the lawsuit (see, Aetna Ins. Co. v Capasso, 75 N.Y.2d 860, 862).

Cardona, P.J., Mercure, White and Peters, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.


Summaries of

Langan v. Bellinger

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Third Department
Apr 28, 1994
203 A.D.2d 857 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)
Case details for

Langan v. Bellinger

Case Details

Full title:JULIE LANGAN et al., Appellants, v. SHIRLEY BELLINGER, as Treasurer of the…

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Third Department

Date published: Apr 28, 1994

Citations

203 A.D.2d 857 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)
611 N.Y.S.2d 59

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