LaDuke v. Nelson

17 Citing briefs

  1. Aguilar et al v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Division of the United States of America Department of Homeland Security

    MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 240 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Claim for Injunctive Relief.. Document

    Filed July 30, 2010

    Case 1:07-cv-08224-JGK-FM Document 257 Filed 07/30/10 Page 24 of 51 -16- Finally, in some cases ICE agents handcuffed residents without even bothering to question them and refused to explain their justification for being present.44 ICE agents prohibited occupants from making phone calls – a practice in keeping with ICE’s official procedures45 – and did not permit them to use bathrooms in private.46 This pattern, practice, and de facto policy of coercive conduct amounted to a seizure of residents within their homes and vitiated any purported consent. See Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 631-32 (2003) ( “a group of police officers rousting an adolescent out of bed in the middle of the night with the words ‘we need to go and talk’ presents no option but ‘to go’”); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (stating that threatening presence of officers, display of weapon, and physical touching vitiates consent); LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1321 (9th Cir. 1985) (no consent where immigration agents conducted searches “during early morning or late evening hours, surrounded the residences in emergency vehicles with flashing lights, approached the homes with flashlights, and stationed officers at all doors and windows”); see also United States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67, 78 (2d Cir. 1973) (“gun in hand” a factor in invalidating consent); United States v. Gandia, 424 F.3d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 2005) (protective sweeps permissible only when “justified by a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the house is harboring a person posing a danger to those on the arrest scene”); United States v. Isiofia, 370 F.3d 226, 233 (2d Cir. 2004) (language barrier and “abusive” manner of agents indicate lack of consent); United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) (curtilage of home “should be placed under the home’s ‘umbrella’ of Fourth Amendment protection”). 44 J. Mijangos Tr.

  2. Committee for Immigrant Rights of Sonoma County et al v. County of Sonoma et al

    Reply to Opposition re MOTION to Dismiss , Notice and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support And Motion for More Definite Statement

    Filed April 1, 2009

    The LaDuke Court distinguished the facts in that case from Lyons in four separate ways to determine that the plaintiff class had standing: (1) there was a likelihood of recurrent injury; (2) defendants engaged in a standard pattern of officially sanctioned officer behavior; (3) the absence of prudential considerations; and (4) plaintiffs constituted a certified class. (LaDuke, 762 F.2d at 1325.) In the instant case, Plaintiffs can meet none of these LaDuke factors: (1) Plaintiffs have failed to allege that there is a likelihood of recurrent injury sufficient to demonstrate standing – which is addressed in Section II.A.2, below; (2) Plaintiffs have failed to allege that any unlawful activity (e.g., racial profiling, unreasonable stops and seizures) is part of a standard pattern of officially sanctioned Case4:08-cv-04220-PJH Document70 Filed04/01/09 Page9 of 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 COUNTY DEFENDANTS’ REPLY RE MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT USDC Case No.

  3. Bryant et al v. Service Corporation International et al

    MOTION to Dismiss The Amended Complaint Pursuant to FRCP 12

    Filed August 8, 2008

    As noted above, a court's inquiry regarding a Plaintiffs standing involves both constitutional limitations and prudential limitations. (Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 473; La Duke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d at 1232.) To meet the "prudential" standing requirements, a Plaintiff must show: (1) that she is asserting her own legal rights and interests, and not the legal rights or interests 0 third persons; (2) that the claim involves more than a generalized grievance that is pervasively shared by a large class of citizens; and (3) in statutory cases, that her claim falls within the zone 0 interests regulated by the statute in question.

  4. Smith et al v. City of Chicago et al

    RESPONSE

    Filed September 25, 2015

    did not contain such allegations. Based on the allegations in the Amended Complaint, it is not “mere speculation and conjecture” that Plaintiffs will again be subjected to                                                                                                                                                                                                 Sidney Bell when he was walking home with his girlfriend), ¶¶ 426-433 (alleging a suspicionless stop and frisk of Plaintiff Calvin Jackson when he was walking with a friend to another friend’s house). 7 Accord Floyd v. City of New York, 283 F.R.D. 153, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that plaintiffs had standing to seek injunctive relief in stop and frisk case); Hernandez v. Cremer, 913 F.2d 230, 234-35 (5th Cir. 1990) (explaining that the INS stop in question inflicted an injury which “did not result from an individual’s disobedience of official instructions and [the plaintiff] was not engaged in any form of misconduct”); LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1326 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding standing because “the members of plaintiff class do not have to induce a police encounter before the possibility of injury can occur. . . . The class members are subject to constitutional injury based on . . . completely innocent behavior.”)

  5. Holland et al v. Yahoo! Inc.

    MOTION for Summary Judgment

    Filed September 19, 2015

    Auto. Ins. Co., 350 F.3d 1018, 1022-23 (9th Cir. 2003) (vacating district court’s certification of the class for lack of standing); LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1325 (9th Cir. 1985); Neal v. Naturalcare, Inc., 2014 WL 346639, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2014). Plaintiffs initially based their SCA claim on a portion of Yahoo’s FAQs page, which states “4.

  6. Alice Mayall v. USA Water Polo, Inc.

    OPPOSITION to NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss First Amended Class Action Complaint 46

    Filed August 24, 2015

    “When a named plaintiff asserts injuries that have been inflicted upon a class of plaintiffs, [the court] may consider…the harm asserted by the class as a whole, to determine whether [there is] a credible threat that the named plaintiff’s injury will recur.” Armstrong v. David, 275 F.3d, 849, 861 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing LaDuke, 762 F.2d at 1326). In Armstrong, the court explained: Where a court, through its specific factual findings, documents the threat of future harm to the plaintiff class and establishes that the named plaintiffs (or some subset thereof sufficient to confer standing on the class as a whole) are personally subject to that harm, the “possibility of recurring injury ceases to be speculative,” and standing is appropriate.

  7. Gaos v. Google Inc.

    MOTION for Settlement

    Filed July 19, 2013

    Commonality exists where, as here, a “lawsuit challenges a system-wide practice or policy that affects all of the putative class members.” Armstrong, 275 F.3d at 868 (citing LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1332 (9th Cir. 1985); 5 James Wm. Moore, et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 23.23[5][f] (3d ed.

  8. Goodman et al v. St. Paul, City of et al

    MEMORANDUM in Opposition re MOTION to Dismiss Amended Complaint Based in Part on Qualified Immunity

    Filed January 6, 2011

    Other courts have appropriately distinguished Lyons in cases where the plaintiffs have been subjected to police action for engaging in legal activity. See, e.g., Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir. 1999) (standing exists for plaintiffs merely driving near border); Deshawn E. v. Safir, 156 F.3d 340, 345 (2d Cir. 1998) (plaintiffs had standing to seek equitable relief because the misconduct they challenged was undertaken pursuant to “officially endorsed policies”); Thomas v. County of Los Angeles, 978 F.2d 504, 508 (9th Cir. 1992) (standing to enjoin police brutality directed at innocent minority citizens); Hernandez v. Cremer, 913 F.2d 230, 234-35 (5th Cir. 1990) (courts should not be reluctant to find that plaintiff will be subject to future police conduct placing him at risk of injury where “the injury alleged to have been inflicted did not result from an individual’s disobedience of official instructions [or any other] form of misconduct”); LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1321 (9th Cir. 1985) (standing to enjoin unlawful INS searches directed at innocent migrant f rm workers); National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights v. City of New York, 75 F. Supp. 2d 154, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (standing exists for innocent plaintiffs who were victims of unconstitutional stop and frisks).4 4 Arias v. USCIS, Civ. No. 07-1959 ADM/JSM, 2008 WL 1827604 (D. Minn. April 23, 2008), is also inapposite. In that case, the district court held that plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not allege any facts demonstrating that they would be a target of a law enforcement effort.

  9. Ralston .v Mortgage Investors Group, Inc., et.al.

    MOTION to Strike Certain of Plaintiff's Class Allegations Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12

    Filed December 3, 2010

    Standing is a critical threshold question in every putative class action that must be determined prior to class certification. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95, 101 (1998) (standing is an “antecedent question” which is “inflexible and without exception”); LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1325 (9th Cir. 1985) (standing “is a jurisdictional element that must be satisfied prior to class certification.”); see also Culver v. City of Milwaukee, 277 F.3d 908, 910 (7th Cir. 2002) (fate of the class lies to a “considerable extent” with a single plaintiff unknown to class members and who often has only a nominal stake in the litigation).

  10. Carter et al v. Washburn et al

    MOTION to Certify Class

    Filed August 21, 2015

    The unique factual and legal situations of the individual class members does not defeat commonality where, as here, the class challenges a discriminatory scheme or policy applicable to all members of the class. Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1122–23 (9th Cir. 2009) (class action challenge to common detention policy did not lack commonality even though prisoners were in different stages and phases of detention and had been imprisoned for different reasons under different statutes); LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1332 (9th Cir. 1985) (uniform pattern of INS conduct established commonality among residents of migrant farm dwellings, even though the residents were affected differently by the conduct). Indeed, it is not even necessary for all of the absent members of the class to be currently suffering actual injury as a result of these discriminatory policies and practices, “demonstrating that all class members are subject to the same harm will suffice.”