Filed May 31, 2017
When viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the evidence submitted is sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether Officer SKAGGS affirmatively placed Decedent (Priscilla Robinson) in a position of danger as a result of his conduct on December 8, 2014. See Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1211 (3d. Cir. 1996). B. Plaintiff Has Set Forth Sufficient Evidence to Submit the Issue of Punitive Damages as to Officer Skaggs, as Alleged in Count I, to the Jury “The standard for governing the award of punitive damages in Pennsylvania is well settled.
Filed December 27, 2016
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989); Gillyard v. Stylios, 1998 WL 966010 (E.D.Pa. 1998). In Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1213 (3d. Cir. 1996), the Third Circuit held that district courts should review a “plaintiffs' municipal liability claims independently of the section 1983 claims Case 2:16-cv-01403-MAK Document 39 Filed 12/27/16 Page 15 of 21 16 against the individual police officers, as the City's liability for a substantive due process violation does not depend upon the liability of any police officer.” (Citations omitted).
Filed April 28, 2006
The Third Circuit has clarified that a policymaker is an “official [with] final, unreviewable discretion to make a decision or take action.” Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1213 (quoting Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1481 (3d Cir. 1990)). Significantly, Plaintiffs fail to identify whom they allege is a “policymaker” for purposes of municipal liability, instead referring simply to “Defendants.”
Filed January 21, 2018
879 F.2d at 590 (citing White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 384 & n.6 (7th Cir. 1979)).” Kneipp by Cusack, 95 F.3d 1199, 1206, supra. Neither was the Plaintiff merely a member of the general public either.
Filed November 17, 2016
Thus, a plaintiff Case 2:16-cv-00996-MAK Document 23 Filed 11/17/16 Page 3 of 8 4 asserting a civil rights violation under §1983 must establish: (1) the deprivation of a right secured by the United States Constitution or federal law; and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1204 (quoting Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995))(Emphasis added). B. Plaintiff’s §1983 Action Against Indiana University of Pennsylvania Fails Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, while acting under color of state law, deprives another individual of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution or federal law.
Filed June 3, 2013
Defendants’ official actions under the Old Ordinance directly increased Ms. Briggs’ vulnerability to domestic violence and placed her in a zone of danger that would not have existed otherwise. See, e.g., Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d at 235-37 (reversing grant of motion to dismiss and holding that plaintiff had sufficiently alleged state actors “use[d] their authority to create an opportunity that otherwise would not have existed for the third-party’s crime to occur” Case 2:13-cv-02191-ER Document 36 Filed 06/03/13 Page 58 of 95 -48- when plaintiff pled “a direct causal relationship between [defendants’] affirmative act and plaintiff’s harm” (citing Kneipp by Cusack v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1208 (3d Cir.1996))); Rivas, 365 F.3d at 197 (holding that a “reasonable factfinder could conclude” all of defendants’ efforts “when taken together, created an opportunity for harm that would not have otherwise existed”); Okin, 577 F.3d at 429-30 (holding that even without “explicit approval or encouragement” of domestic violence, “affirmative conduct of a government official may give rise to an actionable due process violation if it communicates, explicitly or implicitly, official sanction of private violence”); Pearce v. Labella, 473 Fed. Appx. 16, 18-19 (2d Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (holding that “at the pleading stage,” plaintiff had stated a claim of state-created danger because the facts, if true, could show that state actors had implicitly communicated to a domestic violence abuser “that he or she will not be arrested, punished or otherwise interfered with while engaging in conduct that is likely to endanger the life, liberty or property of others”). Defendants affirmatively enacted an
Filed May 16, 2017
Power & Light Co. v. Lacey Twp., 772 F.2d 1103, 1109 (3d Cir.1985)……………………………………………….….8 Kneipp v. Tedder., 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996)…………………………...……………...............22 Mascioli v. Arby's Rest. Group, Inc., 610 F.Supp.2d 419, 429-30 (W.D.Pa.2009)………………….
Filed May 15, 2017
B. Section 1983 Provides the Remedy for Plaintiff’s Equal Protection Claim Section 1983 also provides the remedy for Plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim. See Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Section 1983 ... provides ... remedies for deprivations of rights established . . . in the Constitution or federal laws.”).
Filed April 6, 2017
Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights, but merely a method to vindicate violations of federal law committed by state actors. Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir.1996). To establish a claim under this section, the plaintiff must show a deprivation of a “right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States ... by a person acting under color of state law.” Id.
Filed March 7, 2017
Second, a state can be liable under a state-created danger theory. Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1201 (3d Cir. 1996). a.