Kneipp v. Tedder

15 Citing briefs

  1. Igwe v. Skaggs et al

    BRIEF in Opposition re Motion for Summary Judgment

    Filed May 31, 2017

    When viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the evidence submitted is sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether Officer SKAGGS affirmatively placed Decedent (Priscilla Robinson) in a position of danger as a result of his conduct on December 8, 2014. See Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1211 (3d. Cir. 1996). B. Plaintiff Has Set Forth Sufficient Evidence to Submit the Issue of Punitive Damages as to Officer Skaggs, as Alleged in Count I, to the Jury “The standard for governing the award of punitive damages in Pennsylvania is well settled.

  2. Igwe v. Skaggs et al

    BRIEF in Opposition re Motion to Dismiss, and Motion for Summary Judgment

    Filed December 27, 2016

    City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989); Gillyard v. Stylios, 1998 WL 966010 (E.D.Pa. 1998). In Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1213 (3d. Cir. 1996), the Third Circuit held that district courts should review a “plaintiffs' municipal liability claims independently of the section 1983 claims Case 2:16-cv-01403-MAK Document 39 Filed 12/27/16 Page 15 of 21 16 against the individual police officers, as the City's liability for a substantive due process violation does not depend upon the liability of any police officer.” (Citations omitted).

  3. Graff et al v. County of Bucks et al

    MOTION for Summary Judgment of Defendants

    Filed April 28, 2006

    The Third Circuit has clarified that a policymaker is an “official [with] final, unreviewable discretion to make a decision or take action.” Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1213 (quoting Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1481 (3d Cir. 1990)). Significantly, Plaintiffs fail to identify whom they allege is a “policymaker” for purposes of municipal liability, instead referring simply to “Defendants.”

  4. Adam Trotter v. ExxonMobil Corp. et al

    OPPOSITION to NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings 80

    Filed January 21, 2018

    879 F.2d at 590 (citing White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 384 & n.6 (7th Cir. 1979)).” Kneipp by Cusack, 95 F.3d 1199, 1206, supra. Neither was the Plaintiff merely a member of the general public either.

  5. Irani v. Indiana University of Pennsylvania

    BRIEF in Support re Motion to Dismiss

    Filed November 17, 2016

    Thus, a plaintiff Case 2:16-cv-00996-MAK Document 23 Filed 11/17/16 Page 3 of 8 4 asserting a civil rights violation under §1983 must establish: (1) the deprivation of a right secured by the United States Constitution or federal law; and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1204 (quoting Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995))(Emphasis added). B. Plaintiff’s §1983 Action Against Indiana University of Pennsylvania Fails Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, while acting under color of state law, deprives another individual of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution or federal law.

  6. Briggs v. Borough of Norristown et al

    RESPONSE in Opposition re MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM /First Amended Complaint

    Filed June 3, 2013

    Defendants’ official actions under the Old Ordinance directly increased Ms. Briggs’ vulnerability to domestic violence and placed her in a zone of danger that would not have existed otherwise. See, e.g., Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d at 235-37 (reversing grant of motion to dismiss and holding that plaintiff had sufficiently alleged state actors “use[d] their authority to create an opportunity that otherwise would not have existed for the third-party’s crime to occur” Case 2:13-cv-02191-ER Document 36 Filed 06/03/13 Page 58 of 95 -48- when plaintiff pled “a direct causal relationship between [defendants’] affirmative act and plaintiff’s harm” (citing Kneipp by Cusack v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1208 (3d Cir.1996))); Rivas, 365 F.3d at 197 (holding that a “reasonable factfinder could conclude” all of defendants’ efforts “when taken together, created an opportunity for harm that would not have otherwise existed”); Okin, 577 F.3d at 429-30 (holding that even without “explicit approval or encouragement” of domestic violence, “affirmative conduct of a government official may give rise to an actionable due process violation if it communicates, explicitly or implicitly, official sanction of private violence”); Pearce v. Labella, 473 Fed. Appx. 16, 18-19 (2d Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (holding that “at the pleading stage,” plaintiff had stated a claim of state-created danger because the facts, if true, could show that state actors had implicitly communicated to a domestic violence abuser “that he or she will not be arrested, punished or otherwise interfered with while engaging in conduct that is likely to endanger the life, liberty or property of others”). Defendants affirmatively enacted an

  7. Fischer v. County of Hudson et al

    BRIEF in Opposition

    Filed May 16, 2017

    Power & Light Co. v. Lacey Twp., 772 F.2d 1103, 1109 (3d Cir.1985)……………………………………………….….8 Kneipp v. Tedder., 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996)…………………………...……………...............22 Mascioli v. Arby's Rest. Group, Inc., 610 F.Supp.2d 419, 429-30 (W.D.Pa.2009)………………….

  8. Eshun v. Welsh et al

    BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re MOTION for Summary Judgment

    Filed May 15, 2017

    B. Section 1983 Provides the Remedy for Plaintiff’s Equal Protection Claim Section 1983 also provides the remedy for Plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim. See Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Section 1983 ... provides ... remedies for deprivations of rights established . . . in the Constitution or federal laws.”).

  9. Rascoe et al v. Cody et al

    BRIEF IN SUPPORT re MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

    Filed April 6, 2017

    Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights, but merely a method to vindicate violations of federal law committed by state actors. Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir.1996). To establish a claim under this section, the plaintiff must show a deprivation of a “right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States ... by a person acting under color of state law.” Id.

  10. Hall et al v. Millersville University et al

    MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

    Filed March 7, 2017

    Second, a state can be liable under a state-created danger theory. Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1201 (3d Cir. 1996). a.